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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and key questions
The view that macroeconomic stabilization and income redistribution are import-
ant functions of government activity goes back to Musgrave (1939), but has gained
renewed interest recently. The economic crisis in 2008-2009 has brought the issue
of scal policy as a stabilization tool back to the agenda of both policy-makers
and academic research. The tremendous growth in income inequality which can
be observed in many industrialized countries in the last decades and the surge in
income shares of the top 1%, in particular in Anglo-Saxon countries such as the
US1, has fuelled a tax-the-richdebate and discussions how to design a fair tax
system.2 While a large strand of the theoretical literature in public nance and
macroeconomics focuses on normative questions with regard to the optimal level
of stabilization and income redistribution3, it is an open question how much insur-
ance and redistribution existing tax and transfer systems actually generate. This
book consists of four essays which aim to shed light on this question. Importantly,
1Cf. Piketty and Saez (2003).
2"We are the 99%" is one of the central slogans of the protest movement Occupy Wall Street
which has its origin in the US and subsequently gained popularity in other countries. To a large
extent, the protests are based on the perception that the incomes of the top 1% have decoupled
from the rest of the population. Claims that taxes on top earners should be raised were recently
high on the agenda in the election campaigns in the US and France.
3See e.g. a recent paper by Piketty, Saez and Stantcheva (2011) for a model of optimal taxation
of top labor incomes.
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the essays do not give value judgements but contain comprehensive empirical and
purely positive analyses.
In chapters 2 and 3, we start by investigating the stabilizing function of tax
and transfer systems. We assess to what extent tax and transfer systems in the
EU and the US have provided income insurance through automatic stabilization
in the recent economic crisis. When the nancial crisis turned into a broader
macroeconomic crisis, many observers urged governments to use discretionary scal
policy in order to counteract a further slowdown of the global economy.4 Policy-
makers widely followed this advice. For example, with the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act the US administration passed one of the largest scal stimulus
programs in US history.5 Much less attention was devoted to the workings of
automatic stabilizers. One exception was Auerbach (2009) who suggested that
weak automatic stabilizers, estimated to be on a historically low level in the US
before the economic crisis unfolded, are a key explanatory factor for the renewed
use of discretionary scal policy by the US government. In line with this view,
there is the widespread opinion that automatic stabilizers are much more important
in Europe than in the US. Jürgen Stark, a former member of the Board of the
European Central Bank, emphasized at an early stage of the crisis that more
than half of the scal impulse in the euro area for the years 2009-2010 was due
to automatic stabilizers.6 Given that estimates of automatic stabilizers based on
macroeconomic data raise a number of methodological issues and in light of a lack
of comparable micro estimates, the key question which we address in chapter 2 is:
"How large is the EU-US stabilization gap?"
Our main contribution in chapter 2 is that we provide micro estimates for
the EU-US stabilization gap in a consistent framework and for two distinct shock
scenarios. In chapter 3, we extend this analysis and ask:
"How do European tax and transfer systems protect households at di¤erent
income levels against losses in current income?"
4For example, the IMF argued: "The optimal scal package should be timely, large, lasting,
diversied, contingent, collective, and sustainable." Cf. Spilimbergo, Symansky, Blanchard and
Cottarelli (2008), page 2.
5Overall costs of this scal stimulus are estimated to exceed $800 billion (see e.g. Congressional
Budget O¢ ce (2011) and Wilson (2012)).
6Interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on May 20th 2009.
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This is an important question since one lesson from past recessions is that
income and job losses are distributed rather unequally across the income distribu-
tion.7
In chapter 4, we examine the redistributive role of the US tax system in the
last three decades. The analysis is motivated by the fact that in this time period
signicant changes in tax legislation coincided with a dramatic increase in income
inequality. While income inequality has been increasing in most OECD countries
in the last decades, the trend was particularly pronounced in the US. In terms of
legislative changes, major reforms of the US federal income tax system occured
in the 1980s, early 1990s as well as during the last decade. The tax reforms in
the 1980s were characterized by reductions in marginal tax rates and a broadening
of the tax base. The trend of declining marginal tax rates was to some extent
reversed in the 1990s. At the same time major expansions of the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) were implemented.8 Marginal tax rates were again reduced by
provisions enacted in the early 2000s and as part of the scal stimulus program in
2009. An obvious question that arises from these observations but which has not
been su¢ ciently addressed in the literature is elaborated on in chapter 4:
"To what extent have changes in US tax policy counteracted or accelerated the
rise in income inequality?"
The main contribution of this chapter is to disentangle the impact of tax policy
changes from other factors which have inuenced the rise in pre-tax income inequal-
ity.
Chapter 5 is motivated by the observation that tax policy changes in the US
have had inequalityincreasing and decreasing e¤ects which broadly follow the
political cycle. We calculate time series on automatic stabilizers in the US and
nd a similar pattern. A serious concern with previous studies examining partisan
e¤ects on economic outcomes is that that the dependent variable, for example
income inequality, is often inuenced by factors which are beyond the control of
the government. A crucial advantage of the policy e¤ect calculated in chapter 4
and used as dependent variable in chapter 5 is that it captures the intended e¤ect
7Cf. Heathcote, Perri and Violante (2010) and Hoynes, Miller and Schaller (2012) for the US
and Domeij and Floden (2010) for Sweden.
8The EITC provides cash assistance to the working poor and has gained signicantly in import-
ance relative to traditional welfare programs in the US. See e.g. Eissa and Hoynes (2011).
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of a policy reform as can reasonably be argued. Our empirical analysis is based
on a panel of US states spanning the last three decades and sheds light on the
following question:
"Are there signicant di¤erences in the stabilizing and redistributive role of the
US income tax system under Democratic and Republican administrations?"
The rest of this introductory chapter is structured as follows. In section 1.2,
we introduce the technique of counterfactual simulations which is the core meth-
odological approach used in this book. Section 1.3 summarizes the main results of
the following chapters.
1.2 Empirical approach: Counterfactual simula-
tions
A central methodological approach which is applied in the subsequent analyses is
the technique of counterfactual simulations to identify the parameters of interest.
Simulation analysis allows conducting a controlled experiment by changing certain
parameters while holding everything else constant.9 In chapters 2 and 3, the para-
meters of interest are summary measures for the degree of automatic stabilization
of household disposable income after the economy is hit by an aggregate shock.
In chapter 4, the direct e¤ect of tax policy on income inequality is investigated.
In chapter 5, the policy e¤ect obtained from counterfactual simulations is used as
dependent variable in a set of panel regressions. In this section, we rst briey
introduce the microsimulation models used in this book and then describe the
empirical strategy of counterfactual simulations.
The microsimulation models EUROMOD, a tax-benet model for the European
Union, and TAXSIM, the NBERs model for US federal and state income tax
laws, are important tools for the analyses in chapter 2-4.10 The models simulate
9Cf. Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006).
10For more information on TAXSIM see Feenberg and Coutts (1993) or visit
http://www.nber.org/taxsim/. For further information on EUROMOD see Suther-
land (2001, 2007). There are also country reports available with detailed informa-
tion on the input data, the modeling and validation of each tax benet system, see
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod. The tax-benet systems included in the
model have been validated against aggregated administrative statistics as well as national tax-
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direct taxes and cash benets for representative micro-data samples of households
which serve as model input.11 They are static in the sense that they do not
consider behavioral reactions of households to policy changes, but focus on rst-
rounde¤ects. In principle, by estimating behavorial responses it is possible to
incorporate second-rounde¤ects in the analysis. Furthermore, the models assume
full benet take-up and tax compliance focusing on the intended e¤ects of tax-
benets systems. In general, microsimulation models are widely used for ex-ante
analyses of hypothetical reforms of the tax and transfer system. By changing the
policy parameters in the model, the policy-analyst can simulate and evaluate the
new policy with regard to its distributional and, in case behavorial reactions are
accounted for, e¢ ciency e¤ects.
In chapters 2 and 3, we run counterfactual simulations by changing model input
parameters, but keep everything else constant including the policy parameters.
More precisely, we manipulate the input data by simulating macro shocks to income
and employment. These controlled experiments enable us to calculate the shock-
absorption capacity of di¤erent tax and transfer systems which can be interpreted
as a summary measure for automatic stabilization of income. A key advantage
of this approach is that we can single out the role of automatic stabilizers from
discretionary scal policy and behavioral reactions of economic agents which is
hard to achieve in an ex-post analysis based on macroeconomic aggregates.
The analysis presented in chapter 4 is based on counterfactual simulations
with the aim to isolate the impact of tax policy on income inequality. The usual
approach in the literature analyzing the redistributive capacity of a given tax
system is to compare pre- and post-tax inequality. As tax burdens and their
impact on the income distribution are determined by both tax schedule and tax
base, it is unclear how much of an observed change in tax burdens is due to policy
reforms and how much due to changes in the pre-tax income distribution. We
overcome this shortcoming by applying a decomposition method that allows us
benet models (where available), and the robustness checked through numerous applications
(see, e.g., Bargain (2006)).
11The TAXSIM model incorporates all benets which are provided through the income tax
system, in particular the Earned Income Tax Credity (EITC) and various other tax credits.
EUROMOD can simulate most of the benets which are not based on previous contributions
as this information is usually not available from the cross-sectional survey data used as input
datasets.
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to disentangle mechanical e¤ects due to changes in pre-tax incomes from direct
e¤ects of policy reforms. Our counterfactual simulations consist of policy swaps in
which the tax system of year t is applied to the population of year t+ 1 and vice
versa. Performing these swaps on a year-to-year basis over an extended period of
thirty years, we are able to determine how income inequality would have developed
if tax policy parameters had not changed, or to put it di¤erently, to what extent
changes in inequality are driven by tax policy and other factors. Chapter 5 uses
some of these variables as left-hand side variables in a set of panel regressions.
1.3 Summary of results
Chapter 2: Automatic stabilizers and economic crisis: US vs. Europe
We compare a proportional income shock to an asymmetric unemployment shock
and show that the strength of automatic stabilizers crucially depends on the type
of shock.12 In case of the proportional income shock, automatic stabilizers aborb
38% of the shock in the EU compared to 32% in the US. The EU-US stabilization
gap widens substantially in case of the unemployment shock when 47% of the shock
is absorbed in the EU compared to 34% in the US. We then use various methods
in order to estimate the prevalence of credit constraints among households, in par-
ticular sample-splitting techniques based on wealth and homeownership and direct
survey questions on household nances. Based on this information, we assess how
the cushioning of disposable income translates into demand stabilization. Demand
stabilization is up to 30% in the EU and up to 20% in the US. Our results suggest
that social transfers play a key role for stabilization of income and demand and ex-
plain an important part of the di¤erence in automatic stabilizers between Europe
and the US. The country decomposition reveals that there is large heterogeneity
within the EU. Automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern Europe are much
lower than in Central and Northern European countries. In three extensions, we
consider the stabilizing impact of employer social insurance contributions, con-
sumption taxes and in-kind benets.
12Economic downturns are typically characterized by a mixture of these two stylized shock scen-
arios. Reductions in disposable household income can be caused by job losses (extensive mar-
gin) or wage and hours of work adjustments (intensive margin).
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Chapter 3: Automatic stabilizers, economic crisis and income distribu-
tion in Europe
Chapter 3 builds on the framework presented in chapter 2, but focuses on the
distributional e¤ects of the shock scenarios and to what extent tax and transfer
systems in Europe protect households at di¤erent income levels against losses in
current income. Our main results are as follows. Firstly, we nd that the ag-
gregate redistributive e¤ects of the tax and transfer systems increases in response
to the shocks. Secondly, we show that European taxbenet systems place un-
equal weights on the extent how di¤erent income groups are protected. In case of
the unemployment shock, some Eastern and Southern European countries provide
little income stabilization for low-income groups whereas the opposite is true for
the majority of Nordic and continental European countries. Thirdly, we nd that
taxbenet systems with high built-in automatic stabilizers are also those which
are more e¤ective in mitigating existing inequalities in market income.
Chapter 4: Tax policy and income inequality in the US, 1978-2009: A
decomposition approach
We apply a decomposition approach which separates the direct e¤ects of policy
reforms on inequality from other factors, including indirect policy e¤ects due to
behavioral responses. We nd that the increase in post-tax income inequality was
slower than that of pretax inequality indicating that the redistributive role of the
tax system has increased over time. However, our decomposition reveals that most
of this increase in redistribution was not due to the policy e¤ect but a mechanical
consequence of the rising inequality in pretax income. Looking at specic reforms,
we nd sizable policy e¤ects which are sometimes as important as changes in the
pre-tax income distribution. There are signicant di¤erences between results for
the lower and upper parts of the distribution. While tax reforms implemented
under Democratic administrations, in particular the EITC reforms in the 1990s
and provisions enacted through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in
2009, had an equalizing e¤ect at the lower half of the distribution, the disequalizing
e¤ects of the Reagan and Bush reforms in the 1980s and early 2000s are due to
tax cuts for high-income families. Overall policy e¤ects almost cancel out over the
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whole time period.
Chapter 5: Stabilization, redistribution and the political cycle in the US
In the rst part of chapter 5, we investigate how automatic stabilizers in the US
have changed in the last three decades and nd that tax reforms in the 1980s and
early 2000s which caused post-tax inequality to rise weakened automatic stabilizers
whereas the opposite e¤ect can be observed for tax reforms in the late 1970s and
early 1990s. Calculating automatic stabilizers for each state separately we nd a
large heterogeneity in income insurance across states which is mainly caused by
di¤erences in income taxation on the state level, but also by di¤erences in income
distributions across states.
In the second part of chapter 5, we shed light on the relationship between the
political cycle and changes in the US income tax system. We exploit the institu-
tional framework in the US that redistribution occurs both on the federal as well
as the state level and estimate a set of panel regressions for the US states spanning
the time period 1978-2008. In particular, we examine how the tax burden in each
state, automatic stabilizers and the tax policy e¤ect on inequality are a¤ected by
Democratic and Republican governments. Our results provide strong evidence for
the hypothesis that tax legislation enacted by Republican and Democratic govern-
ments signicantly di¤ers in terms of its redistributive e¤ect. Most strikingly, tax
policy changes enacted by Democratic administrations on the federal and state
level lead to reductions in post-tax inequality ranging between 4-9% depending on
the inequality measure.
Chapter 2
Automatic stabilizers and
economic crisis: US vs. Europe
2.1 Introduction
In the recent economic crisis, the workings of automatic stabilizers are widely
seen to play a key role in providing income insurance for households and hence in
stabilizing demand and output. Automatic stabilizers are usually dened as those
elements of scal policy which mitigate output uctuations without discretionary
government action. Despite the importance of automatic stabilizers for stabilizing
the economy, very little work has been done on automatic stabilization [...] in
the last 20 years (Blanchard (2006)). However, especially for the recent crisis,
it is important to assess the contribution of automatic stabilizers to overall scal
expansion and to compare their magnitude across countries. Previous research on
automatic stabilization has mainly relied on macro data (e.g. Girouard and André
(2005)). Exceptions based on micro data are Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) and
Kniesner and Ziliak (2002 a, b) for the US and Mabbett and Schelkle (2007) for
the EU-15. More comparative work based on micro data has been conducted on
the di¤erences in the tax wedge and e¤ective marginal tax rates between the US
and European countries (see, e.g., Piketty and Saez (2007)).
In this chapter, we combine these two strands of the literature to compare
the magnitude and composition of automatic stabilization between the US and
9
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Europe based on micro data estimates.1 We analyze the impact of automatic
stabilizers using microsimulation models for 19 European countries (EUROMOD)
and the US (TAXSIM). The microsimulation approach allows us to investigate the
causal e¤ects of di¤erent types of shocks on household disposable income, hold-
ing everything else constant (see Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006)). Thus we can
single out the role of automatic stabilization. This is much more di¢ cult in an
ex-post evaluation (or with macro level data) as it is not possible to disentangle the
e¤ects of automatic stabilizers, active scal and monetary policy and behavioral
responses like changes in labor supply or disability benet take-up in such a frame-
work. Our simulation analysis therefore complements the macro literature on the
relationship between government size and volatility (e.g., Galí (1994), Fatàs and
Mihov (2001)) by providing estimates for the size of automatic stabilizers based
on micro data.
We run two controlled experiments of macro shocks to income and employ-
ment. The rst is a proportional decline in household gross income by 5% (income
shock). This is the usual way of modeling aggregate shocks in microsimulation
studies analyzing automatic stabilizers and is also consistent with some of the
macro literature (e.g. Sachs and Sala-i Martin (1992)). However, economic down-
turns typically a¤ect households asymmetrically, with some households losing their
jobs and su¤ering a sharp decline in income and other households being much less
a¤ected, as wages are usually rigid in the short term. We therefore consider a
second shock where some households become unemployed, so that the unemploy-
ment rate increases such that total household income decreases by 5% (unem-
ployment shock). This idiosyncratic shock a¤ects each household in a di¤erent
way with income losses ranging between zero (if the household is not a¤ected)
and total household gross income (in case all members of the household become
unemployed). After identifying the e¤ects of these shocks on disposable income,
we use various methods to estimate the prevalence of credit constraints among
households. Among these is the approach by Zeldes (1989) where nancial wealth
is the determinant for credit constraints, but also alternative approaches which
are based on information regarding home ownership (Runkle (1991)) as well as
on direct survey evidence (Jappelli, Pischke and Souleles (1998)). On this basis,
1This chapter is based on Dolls, Fuest and Peichl (2012).
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we calculate how the stabilization of disposable income can translate into demand
stabilization.
As our measure of automatic stabilization, we extend the normalized tax change
(Auerbach and Feenberg (2000)) to include other taxes as well as social contribu-
tions and benets. Our income stabilization coe¢ cient relates the shock absorption
of the whole tax and transfer system to the overall size of the income shock. We
take into account personal income taxes (at all government levels), social insurance
contributions and payroll taxes paid by employers and employees, value added or
sales taxes as well as transfers to private households such as unemployment be-
nets.2 Computations are done according to the tax benet rules which were in
force before 2008 in order to avoid an endogeneity problem resulting from policy
responses after the start of the crisis.
What does the present paper contribute to the literature? First, previous stud-
ies have focused on proportional income shocks whereas our analysis shows that
automatic stabilizers work very di¤erently in the case of unemployment shocks,
which a¤ect households asymmetrically.3 This is especially important for assess-
ing the e¤ectiveness of automatic stabilizers in the recent economic crisis. Second,
we extend the micro data measure on automatic stabilization to di¤erent taxes
and benets. Our analysis includes a decomposition of the overall stabilization
e¤ects into the contributions of taxes, social insurance contributions and benets.
A further di¤erence between our study and Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) is that
we take into account unemployment benets and state level income taxes. This
explains why our estimates of overall automatic stabilization e¤ects in the US are
higher. In three extensions, we also consider consumption taxes, employers con-
tributions and in-kind benets. Third, to the best of our knowledge, our study
is the rst to estimate the prevalence of liquidity constraints for such a large set
of European countries based on household data.4 This is of key importance for
2We abstract from other taxes, in particular corporate income taxes. For an analysis of automatic
stabilizers in the corporate tax system see Devereux and Fuest (2009) and Buettner and Fuest
(2010).
3Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) do consider a shock where households at di¤erent income levels
are a¤ected di¤erently, but the results are very similar to the case of a symmetric shock. Our
analysis conrms this for the US, but not for Europe.
4There are several studies on liquidity constraints and the responsiveness of households to tax
changes for the US (see, e.g., Zeldes (1989), Parker (1999), Souleles (1999), Johnson, Parker
12 CHAPTER 2. AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS: US VS. EUROPE
assessing the role of automatic stabilizers for demand smoothing. Moreover, we
use several strategies for estimating liquidity constraints in order to explore the
sensitivity of demand stabilization results. Fourth, we extend the analysis to more
recent years and countries - including transition countries from Eastern Europe -
and we compare the US and Europe within the same microeconometric framework.
Finally, we explore whether macro indicators are a good proxy for our micro es-
timates with respect to the EU-US stabilization gap. We also investigate whether
larger governments or more open economies have higher or lower automatic sta-
bilizers.
We show that our extensions to previous research are important for the com-
parison between the U.S. and Europe as they help to identify the forces driving
di¤erences in automatic stabilizers. Our analysis leads to the following main res-
ults. In the case of an income shock, approximately 38% of the shock would be
absorbed by automatic stabilizers in the EU. For the US, we nd a value of 32%.
To some extent this result qualies the widespread view that automatic stabilizers
in Europe are much higher than in the US, at least as far as proportional macro
shocks on household income are concerned. When looking at the personal income
tax only, the values for the US are even higher than the EU average. Within
the EU, there is considerable heterogeneity, and results for overall stabilization of
disposable income range from a value of 25% for Estonia to 56% for Denmark.
In general, automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern European countries are
considerably lower than in Continental and Northern European countries. In the
case of the idiosyncratic unemployment shock, the stabilization gap between the
EU and the US is larger. EU automatic stabilizers absorb 47% of the shock
whereas the stabilization e¤ect in the US is only 34%. Again, there is considerable
heterogeneity within the EU. Compared to conventional macro estimates for the
size of automatic stabilization, the EU-US stabilization gap we nd is smaller in
case of the proportional income shock, whereas it is of similar magnitude for the
asymmetric unemployment shock.
How does this cushioning of shocks translate into demand stabilization? If
demand stabilization can only be achieved for liquidity constrained households,
the picture changes signicantly. Here, the results are sensitive with respect to
and Souleles (2006), Shapiro and Slemrod (1995, 2003, 2009))
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the method used for estimating liquidity constraints. For the income shock, the
cushioning e¤ect of automatic stabilizers is now in the range of 4-22% in the EU and
between 6-17% in the US. For the unemployment shock, however, we nd a larger
di¤erence. In the EU, the stabilization e¤ect substantially exceeds the comparable
US value for all liquidity constraint estimation methods. It ranges from 13-30%
whereas results for the US are between 7-20% and are similar to the values for
the income shock. These results suggest that social transfers, in particular the
rather generous systems of unemployment insurance in Europe, play a key role for
demand stabilization and explain an important part of the di¤erence in automatic
stabilizers between Europe and the US.
A nal issue we discuss in the paper is how scal stimulus programs of indi-
vidual countries are related to automatic stabilizers. In particular, we ask whether
countries with low automatic stabilizers have tried to compensate this by lar-
ger scal stimuli. We nd a weak (negative) correlation between the size of scal
stimulus programs and automatic stabilizers. Moreover, we nd that discretionary
scal policy programs have been smaller in more open economies.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we provide a short overview
of previous research with respect to automatic stabilization and comparisons of US
and European tax benet systems. In addition, we discuss how stabilization e¤ects
can be measured. Section 2.3 describes the microsimulation models EUROMOD
and TAXSIM and the di¤erent macro shock scenarios we consider. Section 5.5
presents the results on automatic stabilization which are discussed in Section 2.5
together with potential limitations of our approach. Section 4.5 concludes.
2.2 Previous research and theoretical framework
2.2.1 Previous research
There are two strands of literature which are related to our paper. The rst is
the literature on the analysis and measurement of automatic scal stabilizers. In
the empirical literature5, two types of studies prevail: macro data studies and mi-
5A theoretical analysis of automatic stabilizers in a real business cycle (RBC) model can be
found in Galí (1994). One issue of standard RBC models is that they are not able to explain
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cro data approaches.6 Simple macro indicators such as revenue and expenditure
to GDP ratios are used by IMF (2009) as a measure of automatic stabilization.
More sophisticated approaches measure the cyclical elasticity of di¤erent budget
components such as the income tax, social security contributions, the corporate
tax, indirect taxes or unemployment benets. Di¤erent empirical strategies have
been proposed, for example regressing changes in scal variables on the growth
rate of GDP or estimating elasticities on the basis of macro-econometric mod-
els.7 Sachs and Sala-i Martin (1992) and Bayoumi and Masson (1995) use time
series data and nd values of 30%-40% for disposable income stabilization in the
US. However, these approaches raise several issues, in particular the challenge of
separating discretionary actions from automatic stabilizers in combination with
identication problems resulting from endogenous regressors. Related to the lit-
erature on macro estimations of automatic stabilization are studies that focus on
the relationship between output volatility, public sector size and openness of the
economy (Cameron (1978), Galí (1994), Rodrik (1998), Fatàs and Mihov (2001),
Auerbach and Hassett (2002)).
Much less work has been done on the measurement of automatic stabilizers
with micro data. Kniesner and Ziliak (2002b) analyze (ex-post) the impact of
the US tax reforms of the 1980s on automatic stabilization of consumption and
nd a reduction in consumption stability of about 50% induced by ERTA81 and
TRA86. Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) use the NBERs microsimulation model
TAXSIM to estimate the automatic stabilization for the US from 1962-95 and
nd values for the stabilization of disposable income ranging between 25%-35%.
the stylized fact that the size of government (as a proxy for automatic stabilizers) is negatively
correlated with the volatility of business cycles. In fact, under some reasonable assumptions,
a standard RBC model produces a positive correlation (Andrés, Domenech and Fatas (2008)).
In addition, such models are not able to explain evidence that consumption responds positively
to increases in government spending (Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatàs and Mihov (2002)
or Perotti (2002)). These facts, however, can be easily explained by a simple textbook IS-
LM model as well as by large-scale macroeconometric models (van den Noord (2000), Buti and
van den Noord (2004)). Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2007) and Andrés et al. (2008) show that
both facts can only be explained in a RBC model by adding Keynesian features like nominal
and real rigidities in combination with rule-of-thumb consumers to the analysis.
6Early estimates on the responsiveness of the tax system to income uctuations are discussed
in the Appendix of Goode (1976). More recent contributions include Fatàs and Mihov (2001),
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Mélitz and Zumer (2002).
7Cf. van den Noord (2000) or Girouard and André (2005).
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Auerbach (2009) has updated this analysis and nds a value of around 25% for
more recent years. Mabbett and Schelkle (2007) conduct a similar analysis for 15
Western European countries in 1998 and nd higher stabilization e¤ects than in
the US, with results ranging from 32%-58%.8 How does this smoothing of dispos-
able income a¤ect household demand? To the best of our knowledge, Auerbach
and Feenberg (2000) is the only simulation study which estimates the demand ef-
fect taking into account liquidity constraints. They use the method suggested by
Zeldes (1989) and nd that approximately two thirds of all households are likely
to be liquidity constrained. Given this, the contribution of automatic stabilizers to
demand smoothing is reduced to approximately 15% of the initial income shock.
The second strand of related literature focuses on international comparisons
of income tax systems in terms of e¤ective average and marginal tax rates, and
individual tax wedges between the US and European countries. This literature
has mainly relied on micro data and the simulation approach in order to take
into account the heterogeneity of the population. Piketty and Saez (2007) use
a large public micro-le tax return data set for the US to compute average tax
rates for ve federal taxes and di¤erent income groups. They complement the
analysis for the US with a comparison to France and the UK. A key nding from
their analysis is that today (and in contrast to 1970), France, a typical continental
European welfare state, has higher average tax rates than the two Anglo-Saxon
countries. The French tax system is also more progressive. Immvervoll (2004)
discusses conceptual issues with regard to macro- and micro-based measures of the
tax burden and compares e¤ective tax rates in fourteen EU Member States. In
general, he nds a large heterogeneity across countries with average and marginal
e¤ective tax rates being lowest in southern European countries. Other studies
take as given that European tax systems reveal a higher degree of progressivity
(e.g. Alesina and Glaeser (2004)) or higher (marginal) tax rates in general (e.g.
Prescott (2004) or Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005)) and discuss to what
extent di¤erences in economic outcomes such as hours worked can be explained
8Mabbett and Schelkle (2007) rely for their analysis (which is a more recent version of Mabbett
(2004)) on the results from an ination scenario taken from Immvervoll, Levy, Lietz, Mantovani
and Sutherland (2006) who use the microsimulation model EUROMOD to increase earnings
by 10% in order to simulate the sensitivity of poverty indicators with respect to macro level
changes.
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by di¤erent tax structures. By providing new measures of the average e¤ective
marginal tax rate (EMTR) both at the intensive and extensive margin for the US
and 19 European countries, this paper sheds further light on existing di¤erences
between the US and European tax and transfer systems.
2.2.2 Theoretical framework
The extent to which automatic stabilizers mitigate the impact of income shocks on
household demand essentially depends on two factors. First, the tax and transfer
system determines the way in which a given shock to gross income translates into a
change in disposable income. For instance, in the presence of a proportional income
tax with a tax rate of 40%, a shock on gross income of one hundred Euros leads to
a decline in disposable income of 60 Euros. In this case, the tax absorbs 40% of the
shock to gross income. A progressive tax, in turn, would have a stronger stabilizing
e¤ect. The second factor is the link between current disposable income and current
demand for goods and services. If the income shock is perceived as transitory and
current demand depends on some concept of permanent income, and if households
can borrow or use accumulated savings, their demand will not change. In this
case, the impact of automatic stabilizers on current demand would be equal to
zero. Things are di¤erent, though, if some households are liquidity constrained
or acting as rule-of-thumbconsumers (Campbell and Mankiw (1989)). In this
case, their current expenditures do depend on disposable income so that automatic
stabilizers play a role.
A common measure for estimating automatic stabilization is the normalized
tax change used by Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) which can be interpreted
as the tax systems built-in exibility (Pechman (1973, 1987)). It shows how
changes in market income translate into changes in disposable income through
changes in personal income tax payments. We extend the concept of normalized
tax change to include other taxes as well as social insurance contributions and
transfers like e.g. unemployment benets. We take into account personal income
taxes (at all government levels), social insurance contributions as well as payroll
taxes and transfers to private households such as unemployment benets.
Market income Y Mi of individual i is dened as the sum of all incomes from
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market activities:
Y Mi = Ei +Qi + Ii + Pi +Oi (2.2.1)
where Ei is labour income, Qi business income, Ii capital income, Pi property
income, and Oi other income. Disposable income Y Di is dened as market income
minus net government intervention Gi = Ti + Si  Bi :
Y Di = Y
M
i  Gi = Y Mi   (Ti + Si  Bi) (2.2.2)
where Ti are direct taxes, Si employee social insurance contributions, and Bi are
social cash benets (i.e. negative taxes). Note that an extended analysis including
employer social insurance contributions and consumption taxes is presented in
Section 2.4.4.
We analyze the impact of automatic stabilizers in two steps. The rst is the
stabilization of disposable income and the second is the stabilization of demand.
Consider rst the stabilization of disposable income. Throughout the rest of the
paper, we refer to our measure of this e¤ect as the income stabilization coe¢ cient
 I . We derive  I from a general functional relationship between disposable income
and market income:
 I =  I(Y M ; T; S;B): (2.2.3)
The derivation can be either done at the macro or at the micro level. On the
macro level, the aggregate change in market income (Y M) is transmitted via  I
into an aggregate change in disposable income (Y D):
Y D =
 
1   IY M (2.2.4)
However, one issue when computing  I based on the change of macro level
aggregates is that macro data changes include behavioral and general equilibrium
e¤ects as well as discretionary policy measures. Therefore, a measure of automatic
stabilization based on macro data changes captures all these e¤ects. Thus, it is
not possible to disentangle the automatic stabilization from stabilization through
discretionary policies or changes in behavior because of endogeneity and identic-
ation problems. That is why in these studies the correlation between government
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size and output volatility is analyzed as a proxy for automatic stabilization.
To complement the macro literature and in order to isolate the impact of auto-
matic stabilization from other e¤ects, we compute  I using arithmetic changes ()
in total disposable income (
P
i Y
D
i ) and market income (
P
i Y
M
i ) based on mi-
cro data information taken from a microsimulation tax-benet calculator, which
- by denition - avoids endogeneity problems by simulating exogenous changes
(Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006))9:
X
i
Y Di = (1   I)
X
i
Y Mi
 I = 1 
P
i Y
D
iP
i Y
M
i
=
P
i
 
Y Mi  Y Di
P
i Y
M
i
=
P
i GiP
i Y
M
i
(2.2.5)
where  I measures the sensitivity of disposable income, Y Di ; with respect to market
income, Y Mi . The higher 
I , the stronger the stabilization e¤ect. For example,
 I = 0:4 implies that 40% of the income shock is absorbed by the tax benet
system. Thus,  I can be interpreted as a measure of income insurance provided by
the government, (1  I) as a measure of vulnerability to income shocks. Note that
the income stabilization coe¢ cient is not only determined by the size of government
(e.g. measured as expenditure or revenue in percent of GDP) but also depends on
the structure of the tax benet system and the design of the di¤erent components.
The denition of  I is close to the one of an average e¤ective marginal tax
rate (EMTR), see e.g. Immvervoll (2004). In the case of the proportional income
shock,  I can be interpreted as the EMTR along the intensive margin, whereas in
the case of the unemployment shock, it resembles the EMTR along the extensive
margin (participation tax rate, see, e.g., Saez (2002), Kleven and Kreiner (2006)
or Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner and Saez (2007)).
Another advantage of the micro data based approach is that it enables us to
explore the extent to which di¤erent individual components of the tax transfer
9Note that a potential drawback of this approach is that we neglect general equilibrium e¤ects
as well as behavioral adjustments as a response to an income shock. This, however, is done on
purpose, as we do not aim at quantifying the overall adjustment to a shock but to single out
the size of automatic stabilizers, which - by denition - automatically smooth incomes without
taking into account the e¤ects of discretionary policy action or behavioral responses.
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system contribute to automatic stabilization. Comparing tax benet systems in
Europe and the US, we are interested in the weight of each component in the
respective country. We therefore decompose the coe¢ cient into its components
which include taxes, social insurance contributions and benets:
 I =
X
f
 If = 
I
T+
I
S+
I
B =
P
i TiP
i Y
M
i
+
P
i SiP
i Y
M
i
 
P
i BiP
i Y
M
i
=
P
i (Ti + Si  Bi)P
i Y
M
i
(2.2.6)
Consider next the second step of the analysis, the impact on demand. In order
to stabilize nal demand and output, the cushioning e¤ect on disposable income
has to be transmitted to expenditures for goods and services. If current demand
depends on some concept of permanent income, demand will not change in re-
sponse to a transitory income shock. Things are di¤erent, though, if households
are liquidity constrained and cannot borrow. In this case, their current expendit-
ures do depend on disposable income so that automatic stabilizers play a role.
Following Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), we assume that households who face
liquidity constraints fully adjust consumption expenditure after changes in dispos-
able income while no such behavior occurs among households without liquidity
constraints.10 This is a strong assumption leading to a lower bound for demand
stabilization which would be higher if non-liquidity constrained households adjus-
ted their consumption as well. Furthermore, we implicitly assume that the shock
is completely temporary. If the shock was permanent and all household changed
their consumption accordingly, demand stabilization would equal income stabiliz-
ation (upper bound).11 Hence, the realstabilization will be a weighted sum of
the two stabilization coe¢ cients depending on the share of households adjusting
their consumption.
The adjustment of liquidity constrained households is such that changes in
10Note that the term liquidity constraintdoes not have to be interpreted in an absolute inability
to borrow but can also come in a milder form of a substantial di¤erence between borrowing
and lending rates which can result in distortions of the timing of purchases. Note further that
our demand stabilization coe¢ cient does not predict the overall change of nal demand, but
the extent to which demand of liquidity constrained households is stabilized by the tax benet
system.
11Of course, in the presence of a permanent shock the consumption reaction of households would
also depend on their expectations regarding the adjustment of public expenditures and, hence,
future tax burdens.
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disposable income are equal to changes in consumption. Hence, the coe¢ cient
which measures stabilization of aggregate demand becomes:
C = 1 
P
i C
LQ
iP
i Y
M
i
(2.2.7)
where CLQi denotes the consumption response of liquidity constrained house-
holds. In the following, we refer to C as the demand stabilization coe¢ cient.
In the literature on the estimation of the prevalence of liquidity constraints,
several approaches have been used. Recent surveys of the di¤erent methods show
that there is no perfect approach since each approach has its own drawbacks (see
Jappelli et al. (1998) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010)). Therefore, in order to
explore the sensitivity of our estimates of the demand stabilization coe¢ cient with
respect to the way in which liquidity constrained households are identied, we
choose three di¤erent approaches. In the rst one, we use the same approach
as Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) and follow Zeldes (1989) to split the samples
according to a specic wealth to income ratio. A household is liquidity constrained
if the households net nancial wealth Wi (derived from capitalized asset incomes)
is less than the disposable income of at least two months, i.e:
LQi = 1

Wi  2
12
Y Di

(2.2.8)
The second approach makes use of information regarding homeowners in the
data and classies those households as liquidity constrained who do not own their
home (see, e.g. Runkle (1991)).12 However, common points of criticism on sample
splitting techniques based on wealth are that wealth is a good predictor of liquidity
constraints only if the relation between the two is approximately monotonic and
that assets and asset incomes are often poorly measured (see, e.g. Jappelli et al.
(1998)). Therefore, in a third approach we use direct information from household
surveys for the identication of liquidity constrained household (Jappelli et al.
12When modifying this approach such that in addition to non-homeowners also households with
outstanding mortgage payments on their homes are classied as liquidity constrained, the
results change and are much closer to the Zeldes criterion. As an additional robustness check,
we also dened unemployed people as liquidity constrained. The results are similar to the
non-homeowners approach.
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(1998)). Our data for the US, the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), contains
questions about credit applications which have been either rejected, not fully ap-
proved or which have not been submitted because of the fear of rejection. In the
third approach, we classify all US households as liquidity constrained who answer
one of the questions above with yes. As no comparable information is avail-
able in our data for European countries, we rely on EU SILC data and conduct
a logit estimation with the binary variable capacity to face unexpected nancial
expensesas dependent variable. In a next step, making an out-of-sample predic-
tion13, we are able to detect liquidity constrained households in our data for the
European countries.14
A recent survey of the vast literature on consumption responses to income
changes can be found in Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010). A key nding from this
literature is that the heterogeneity of households has to be taken into account
in the analysis of consumption responses since liquidity constraints of population
subgroups can explain di¤erent consumption responses. We are aware that the
approaches we have chosen to account for such constraints can only be approxim-
ations for real household behavior in the event of income shocks. They provide a
range for demand stabilization due to automatic stabilization. The rst approach
is likely to give an upper bound since the provision of government insurance re-
duces incentives to engage in precautionary savings and holdings of liquid assets.
Conversely, estimates based on the third approach, i.e. identication of liquidity
constrained households through direct survey evidence, are likely to give a lower
bound given estimates found in the literature (cf. Jappelli et al. (1998)).
13Results of these estimations are available from the authors upon request.
14To check the robustness of the third approach and to make sure that the estimation of liquidity
constraints based on survey evidence is comparable between the US and the EU, we make two
extensions. First, we employ a similar question in the SCF as used in the EU SILC data
(in an emergency, could you get nancial assistance of $3000 or more (...)?). Using this
question for the US, we nd exactly the same amount of demand stabilization as obtained with
the questions about credit applications. Second, we make a further robustness check for the
EU SILC data and exploit information about arrears on mortgage payments, utility bills and
hire purchase instalments yielding similar shares of liquidity constrained households and thus
similar stabilization results. These two extensions support our view that the estimations based
on survey evidence are robust and, at least to some extent, comparable between the US and
the EU.
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2.3 Data and methodology
2.3.1 Microsimulation using TAXSIM and EUROMOD
We use microsimulation techniques to simulate taxes, benets and disposable in-
come under di¤erent scenarios for a representative micro-data sample of house-
holds. Simulation analysis allows conducting a controlled experiment by changing
the parameters of interest while holding everything else constant (cf. Bourguignon
and Spadaro (2006)). We therefore do not have to deal with endogeneity problems
when identifying the e¤ects of the policy reform under consideration.
Simulations are carried out using TAXSIM - the NBERs microsimulation
model for calculating liabilities under US Federal and State income tax laws from
individual data - and EUROMOD, a static tax-benet model for 19 EU coun-
tries, which was designed for comparative analysis.15 The models can simulate
direct taxes and most benets (on all levels of government) except those based on
previous contributions as this information is usually not available from the cross-
sectional survey data used as input datasets. Information on these instruments
is taken directly from the original data sources. Both models assume full benet
take-up and tax compliance, focusing on the intended e¤ects of tax-benet sys-
tems. The main stages of the simulations are the following. First, a micro-data
sample and tax-benet rules are read into the model. Then for each tax and be-
net instrument, the model constructs corresponding assessment units, ascertains
which are eligible for that instrument and determines the amount of benet or
tax liability for each member of the unit. Finally, after all taxes and benets in
question are simulated, disposable income is calculated.
15For more information on TAXSIM see Feenberg and Coutts (1993) or visit
http://www.nber.org/taxsim/. For further information on EUROMOD see Suther-
land (2001, 2007). There are also country reports available with detailed informa-
tion on the input data, the modeling and validation of each tax benet system, see
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod. The tax-benet systems included in the
model have been validated against aggregated administrative statistics as well as national tax-
benet models (where available), and the robustness checked through numerous applications
(see, e.g., Bargain (2006)).
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2.3.2 Scenarios
The existing literature on stabilization so far has concentrated on increases in earn-
ings or gross incomes to examine the stabilizing impact of tax benet systems. In
the light of the recent economic crisis, there is much more interest in a downturn
scenario. Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009) stress that recessions which follow a nancial
crisis have particularly severe e¤ects on asset prices, output and unemployment.
Therefore, we are interested not only in a scenario of a uniform decrease in in-
comes but also in an increase of the unemployment rate. We compare a scenario
where gross incomes are proportionally decreased by 5% for all households (income
shock) to an idiosyncratic shock where some households are made unemployed and
therefore lose all their labor earnings (unemployment shock). In the latter scen-
ario, the unemployment rate increases such that total household income decreases
by 5% as well in order to make both scenarios as comparable as possible.16
Our scenarios can be seen as a conservative estimate of the impact of the
recent crisis (see Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009) for e¤ects of previous crises). The
(qualitative) results are robust with respect to di¤erent sizes of the shocks. The
results for the unemployment shock do not change much when we model it as
an increase of the unemployment rate by 5 percentage points for each country.
It would be further possible to derive more complicated scenarios with di¤erent
shocks on di¤erent income sources or a combination of income and unemployment
shock. However, this would only have an impact on the distribution of changes
which are not relevant in the analysis of this paper. Therefore, we focus on these
two simple scenarios in order to make our analysis as simple as possible.
The increase of the unemployment rate is modeled through reweighting of our
samples.17 The weights of the unemployed are increased while those of the em-
16One should note, though, that our analysis is not a forecasting exercise. We do not aim at
quantifying the exact e¤ects of the recent economic crisis but of stylized scenarios in order to
explore the build-in automatic stabilizers of existing pre-crisis tax-benet systems. Conducting
an ex-post analysis would include discretionary government reactions and behavioral responses
(see, e.g., Aaberge, Björklund, Jäntti, Pedersen, Smith and Wennemo (2000) for an empirical
ex-post analysis of a previous crisis in the Nordic countries) and we would not be able to
identify the role of automatic stabilization.
17For the reweighting procedure, we follow the approach of Immvervoll et al. (2006), who have
also simulated an increase in unemployment through reweighting of the sample. Their ana-
lysis focuses on changes in absolute and relative poverty rates after changes in the income
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ployed with similar characteristics are decreased, i.e., in e¤ect, a fraction of em-
ployed households is made unemployed. With this reweighting approach we control
for several individual and household characteristics that determine the risk of be-
coming unemployed (see Appendix 2.7.2). The implicit assumption behind this
approach is that the socio-demographic characteristics of the unemployed remain
constant.18
2.4 Results
2.4.1 US vs. Europe
We start our analysis by comparing the US to Europe. Our simulation model
includes 19 European countries which we treat as one single country (i.e. the
United States of Europe). All of them are EU member states, which is why we
refer to this group as the EU, bearing in mind that some EU member countries
are missing. We also consider the countries of the Euro area and refer to this
group as Euro. Figure 2.4.1 summarizes the results of our baseline simulation,
which focuses on the income tax, social insurance contributions (or payroll taxes)
paid by employees and benets. Consider rst the proportional income shock.
Approximately 38% of such a shock would be absorbed by automatic stabilizers
in the EU (and Euroland). For the US, we nd a slightly lower value of 32%.
This di¤erence of just six percentage points is noteworthy in so far as automatic
stabilizers in Europe are usually considered to be much higher than in the US.19
Our results qualify this view to a certain degree, at least as far as proportional
income shocks are concerned. Figure 2.4.1 shows that taxes and social insurance
contributions are the dominating factors which drive  in case of a uniform income
distribution and the employment rate.
18Cf. Deville and Särndal (1992) and DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996). This approach is
equivalent to estimating probabilities of becoming unemployed (see, e.g., Bell and Blanchower
(2009)) and then selecting the individuals with the highest probabilities when controlling for
the same characteristics in the reweighting estimation (see Herault (2010)). The reweighting
procedure is to some extent sensitive to changes in control variables. However, this mainly
a¤ects the distribution of the shock (which we do not analyze) and not the overall or mean
e¤ects which are important for the analysis in this paper.
19Note that for the US the value of the stabilization coe¢ cient for the federal income tax only
is below 25% which is in line with the results of Auerbach and Feenberg (2000).
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shock. Benets are of minor importance in this scenario.
Figure 2.4.1: Decomposition of stabilization coe¢ cient for both scenarios
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In the case of the idiosyncratic unemployment shock, the stabilization gap
between the EU and the US increases. EU automatic stabilizers now absorb 47%
of the shock (49% in the Euro zone) whereas the stabilization e¤ect in the US is
only 34%. This di¤erence can be explained with the importance of unemployment
benets (duration and generosity) which account for a large part of stabilization in
Europe in this scenario.20 Table 2.7.2 in the Appendix shows that benets alone
absorb 19% of the shock in Europe compared to just 7% in the US.
20Note that in our baseline analysis we do not account for the Extended Benets (EB) program
in the US because it does not kick in automatically in all states. The EB program provides
an additional 13 to 20 weeks of unemployment benets to workers receiving unemployment
insurance in states that meet certain thresholds in terms of their unemployment rates. This
increased duration of unemployment benets slightly increases the stabilization coe¢ cient for
the US and, thus, reduces the di¤erence to the EU.
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2.4.2 Country decomposition
The results for the stabilization coe¢ cient vary considerably across countries, as
can be seen from Figure 2.4.2 (and Tables 2.7.1 and 2.7.2 in the Appendix). In the
case of the income shock, we nd the highest stabilization coe¢ cient for Denmark,
where automatic stabilizers cushion 56% of the shock. Belgium (53%), Germany
(48%) and, surprisingly, Hungary (48%) also have strong automatic stabilizers.
The high stabilization value for Hungary stems from the rather high progressivity
of the income tax, at least compared to the other countries from Eastern Europe
which have (partial) at tax systems. The lowest values are found for Estonia
(25%), Spain (28%) and Greece (29%). With the exception of France, taxes seem
to have a stronger stabilizing role than social security contributions. France is an
interesting case as it has a very progressive tax schedule which, however, is levied
on a very narrow tax base. This leads to a rather low level of income tax revenue,
whereas the share of social security contributions (to total tax revenue or GDP)
is much higher.
In case of the asymmetric unemployment shock, the stabilization coe¢ cients
are larger for the majority of countries. The variation across countries can be
explained mainly with the generosity and duration of (unemployment) benet
receipt. Again, the highest value emerges for Denmark (82%), followed by Sweden
(68%), Germany (62%) Belgium (61%) and Luxembourg (59%). The relatively
low value of stabilization from (unemployment) benets in Finland compared to
its neighboring Nordic countries might be surprising at a rst glance but can be
explained with the fact that Finland has the least generous unemployment benets
of the Nordic countries (see Aaberge et al. (2000)). Hungary (47%) is now at the
EU average due to the relatively low level of unemployment benets. At the other
end of the spectrum, there are some countries with values below the US level of
34%. These include Estonia (23%) and, to a lesser extent, Italy (31%) and Poland
(33%).
When looking only at the personal income tax, it is noteworthy that the values
for the US (federal and state level income tax combined) are higher than the EU
average. To some extent, this qualies the widespread view that tax progressivity
is higher in Europe (e.g., Alesina and Glaeser (2004) or Piketty and Saez (2007)).
2.4. RESULTS 27
Figure 2.4.2: Decomposition of income stabilization coe¢ cient in both scenarios for
di¤erent countries
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Of course, this can be partly explained by the considerable heterogeneity within
Europe. But still, only a few countries like Belgium, Germany and the Nordic
countries have higher contributions of stabilization coming from the personal in-
come tax.
An interesting question is to what extent the results for the stabilization coef-
cient are driven by the existing tax and transfer systems or by the demographic
characteristics in each country. To investigate this issue, we recalculate the in-
come stabilization coe¢ cients for each country under the given tax and transfer
system, but with the socio-demographic characteristics of each other country in
our analysis. This analysis yields a 20*20 matrix where the respective tax and
transfer systems are given in the columns and the demographics of each country in
the rows. As can be seen in Table 2.7.6, the income stabilization coe¢ cients com-
puted under a xed tax and transfer system but with varying characteristics of the
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population do not vary much. There is much more variation within a certain row
(showing the income stabilization coe¢ cients calculated with demographic char-
acteristics of a certain country but varying tax and transfer systems) than within
a certain column (xed tax and transfer system of a certain country, but varying
population characteristics). Interestingly, the income stabilization coe¢ cient for
the US is highest with the socio-demographic characteristics of the US population
whereas income stabilization is (almost) lowest in countries such Italy, Portugal,
Slovenia or the UK with their given population characteristics.21 Thus, we con-
clude that the tax and transfer rules and not the demographic characteristics are
the main determinants of the income stabilization coe¢ cient.
2.4.3 Demand stabilization
How does this cushioning of shocks translate into demand stabilization? The res-
ults for stabilization of aggregate demand in the EU and the US are shown in Table
2.4.1 and Figure 2.4.3.22 The demand stabilization coe¢ cients are lower than the
income stabilization coe¢ cients since demand stabilization can only be achieved
for liquidity constrained households. Moreover, there is considerable variation for
the demand stabilization coe¢ cient depending on the respective approach for the
identication of liquidity constrained households. For the income shock (IS), res-
ults range from 4-22% for the EU and from 6-17% for the US. Taking the Zeldes
criterion, i.e. net wealth (based on asset income), as the determinant for liquidity
constraints, demand stabilization is 22% in the EU and 17% in the US. Demand
stabilization coe¢ cients which are based on direct survey evidence with respect
to liquidity constraints on average give the lower bound whereas those based on
home ownership information usually lie in between. For the unemployment shock
(US), the EU-US gap widens again. While in the US demand stabilization coe¢ -
cients mostly remain on their level of the income shock, they are now substantially
higher for the EU-group reaching a peak of 30%. These results suggest that the
transfers to the unemployed, in particular the rather generous systems of unem-
21We obtain similar results for the unemployment shock and the demand stabilization coe¢ cient.
22Note that in Tables 2.4.1 and 2.7.3 as well as in Figure 2.4.3, the rst approach for the identi-
cation of liquidity constraints refers to the nancial wealth criterion (Zeldes), the second to
the real estate property criterion (Runkle) and the third refers to survey evidence.
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ployment insurance in Europe, play a key role for demand stabilization and drive
the di¤erence in automatic stabilizers between Europe and the US.
Table 2.4.1: Demand stabilization coe¢ cients
C1 IS 
C
2 IS 
C
3 IS 
C
1 US 
C
2 US 
C
3 US 
IIS  IUS
AT 0.363 0.170 0.036 0.497 0.271 0.138 0.439 0.585
BE 0.345 0.097 0.021 0.442 0.184 0.105 0.527 0.612
DK 0.285 0.135 0.020 0.592 0.257 0.230 0.558 0.823
EE 0.242 0.030 0.008 0.225 0.029 0.063 0.253 0.233
FI 0.248 0.097 0.033 0.352 0.191 0.119 0.396 0.519
FR 0.115 0.146 0.048 0.259 0.304 0.164 0.370 0.568
GE 0.143 0.246 0.080 0.253 0.380 0.235 0.481 0.624
GR 0.230 0.078 0.007 0.263 0.087 0.027 0.291 0.322
HU 0.455 0.035 0.121 0.448 0.035 0.185 0.476 0.467
IR 0.186 0.037 0.034 0.243 0.083 0.132 0.363 0.387
IT 0.283 0.068 0.019 0.233 0.057 0.033 0.346 0.311
LU 0.256 0.115 0.025 0.440 0.149 0.098 0.374 0.593
NL 0.227 0.094 0.025 0.288 0.170 0.119 0.397 0.452
PL 0.296 0.144 0.056 0.324 0.164 0.097 0.301 0.329
PT 0.240 0.073 0.007 0.313 0.140 0.008 0.303 0.386
SI 0.090 0.021 0.030 0.227 0.036 0.083 0.317 0.431
SP 0.183 0.039 0.014 0.264 0.060 0.057 0.277 0.376
SW 0.201 0.318 0.028 0.409 0.544 0.159 0.420 0.678
UK 0.263 0.063 0.024 0.349 0.186 0.164 0.352 0.415
EU 0.221 0.124 0.041 0.297 0.207 0.132 0.378 0.469
EURO 0.195 0.131 0.040 0.270 0.212 0.126 0.385 0.485
USA 0.174 0.058 0.056 0.197 0.111 0.073 0.322 0.337
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM. Notes: C : demand
stabilization coe¢ cient,  I : income stabilization coe¢ cient, IS: income shock, US:
unemployment shock. The rst approach for the identication of liquidity constraints
refers to the nancial wealth criterion (Zeldes), the second to the real estate property
criterion (Runkle) and the third refers to survey evidence.
For a more in-depth analysis taking into account country-specic results, it
is useful to consider rst the shares of liquidity constrained households for each
approach as depicted in Table 2.7.3 in the Appendix. The Zeldes approach would
suggest that households are more likely to be liquidity constrained in Eastern than
in Western European countries because nancial wealth is typically lower in the
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new member states. Our estimates conrm this as can be seen in Table 2.7.3.23 For
this reason, automatic stabilizers will be more important for demand stabilization
in these countries, at least if the Zeldes criterion is used for the identication of
liquidity constrained households. A di¤erent picture emerges if home ownership is
the determinant for liquidity constraints. It is remarkable that the share of house-
holds who own their homes is relatively high in Eastern and Southern European
countries. This suggests a lower share of liquidity constrained households and thus
a lower contribution of automatic stabilizers to demand stabilization.
Figure 2.4.3: Income vs. demand stabilization
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Finally, focusing on results for individual EU countries, there is large hetero-
geneity in demand stabilization across countries and, at least for some countries,
23As, according to the Zeldes criterion, liquidity constrained households are those households
with low nancial wealth and thus typically low income, one can expect that their share of
income (IShare1) is lower than their share in the total population. In our data, this is true for
all countries (see Table 2.7.3).
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across the di¤erent approaches for the identication of liquidity constraints. If
nancial wealth is the determinant for liquidity constraints, demand stabilization
is highest in Hungary (46%) and the stabilization e¤ect is above the EU average
for Poland (30%) and Estonia (24%), although disposable income stabilization
is below the EU average in these two countries. Relatively low values for auto-
matic stabilization e¤ects of the tax and transfer systems on demand are found
in countries where households are relatively wealthy, so that liquidity constraints
are less important. These include Sweden, with a stabilization coe¢ cient of 20%,
and in particular Germany (14%) and France (11%). However, as indicated by the
relatively low share of liquidity constrained households in Eastern and Southern
European countries according to the homeowner approach, automatic stabiliza-
tion of demand is weaker in these countries if this approach is employed. In this
case, automatic stabilization of demand is below the EU average in all countries
of Eastern and Southern Europe, whereas demand stabilization in countries such
as Denmark, Germany or Sweden is above the EU average.24
2.4.4 Extensions: Employer social insurance contributions,
consumption taxes and in-kind benets
One limitation of our analysis is that we neglect various taxes which are certainly
relevant as automatic stabilizers and which di¤er in their relevance across countries.
In this section, we extend our analysis to account for employer social insurance
contributions, consumption taxes which include value added, excise and sales
taxes as well as in-kind benets. We did not include these taxes in our baseline
simulations because they raise specic conceptual issues.
Employer contributions
Consider rst the case of employer social insurance contributions (or payroll taxes).
Including them requires us to make an assumption on their incidence. So far, we
have assumed that all taxes and transfers are borne by employees, so that a smooth-
ing of shocks through the tax and transfer system actually benets the employees.
24Note that this holds for both the income shock as well as for the unemployment shock.
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We will make the same assumption for employer social insurance contributions.
This implies that, in a hypothetical situation without taxes, social insurance con-
tributions and transfers, the income of household i would be gross income, which
we dene as follows:
Y Gi = Y
M
i + S
ER
i (2.4.1)
where Y Gi is gross income, Y
M
i market income and S
ER
i employer social insurance
contributions. We now consider a shock to gross income and ask which part of
this shock is absorbed by the tax and transfer system. The income stabilization
coe¢ cient is now given by
 I =
X
f
 If =
P
i
 
Ti + Si + S
ER
i  Bi
P
i Y
G
i
:
How does the inclusion of employer social insurance contributions a¤ect the
stabilization e¤ects? For the EU, the income stabilization coe¢ cient is now equal
to 48% for the income shock and 56% for the unemployment shock. For the US, we
nd respective values of 36% for the income shock and 39% for the unemployment
shock. The results by country are given in Table 2.7.4 in the Appendix. In
countries such as Italy or Sweden, employer social insurance contributions make
up a large proportion of total contributions leading to a substantial increase in
stabilization through SIC in these countries. Note that, when comparing these
results to those of our baseline simulation, it has to be taken into account that
we now consider a shock on Y Gi , not on Y
M
i . This explains, for instance, why the
measured stabilization coe¢ cient of income taxes is now lower.
Consumption taxes
How can consumption taxes be integrated into this framework? In order to make
the results comparable to our baseline simulations, we return to the case where we
exclude employer social insurance contributions from the analysis. The data we
use includes no information on consumption expenditures of households, so that
the consumption taxes actually paid cannot be calculated directly. Instead, we
use implicit tax rates (ITR) on consumption taken from European Commission
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(2009b) for European countries and McIntyre, Denk, Francis, Gardner, Gomaa,
Hsu and Sims (2003) for the US. The ITR is a measure for the e¤ective tax burden
which includes several consumption taxes such as VAT or sales taxes, energy and
other excise taxes. This implicit tax rate relates consumption taxes paid to overall
consumption. Given this, we can write the budget constraint of household i as
Y Mi = Ci(1 + t
C) + Ai + Ti + Si  Bi
where tC is the implicit consumption tax rate, TC = tCC the consumption tax
payments, and Ai represents savings.
What is the role of the consumption tax for automatic stabilization? This
depends on the reaction of consumption to the income shock. Our analysis as-
sumes that only liquidity constrained households will adjust their consumption
to an income shock. An automatic stabilization e¤ect of consumption taxes can
only occur for these households, where changes in disposable income are equal to
changes in consumption and, hence, consumption tax payments. Given this, we
focus on demand, rather than income stabilization through the consumption tax.
The demand stabilization coe¢ cient can now be written as:
Ct =
P
h
 
TCh + Th + Sh  Bh
P
i Y
M
i
(2.4.2)
where h is the index for the liquidity constrained households.
The results are given in Table 2.7.5 in the Appendix: Demand stabilization
through the consumption tax (according to the nancial wealth criterion) is higher
in the EU than in the US. Within the EU, we nd highest stabilization coe¢ cients
in Eastern European countries which can again be explained by the high proportion
of liquidity constrained households and a relatively higher share of direct taxes.
In-kind benets
One limitation of the microsimulation models we use is that in-kind benets are
not taken into account due to data limitations.25 As the levels of non-cash transfers
25An exception is Paulus, Sutherland and Tsakloglou (2010) who impute in-kind benets in
EUROMOD for 5 countries.
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di¤er across countries (see, e.g., Garnkel, Rainwater and Smeeding (2006)), this
has implications for the cross country di¤erences in the size of automatic stabilizers.
Part of the EU-US taxation gap can be explained by the fact that non-cash benets
are on average higher (in relative terms) in Europe than in the US (see e.g. Marical,
dErcole, Vaalavuo and Verbist (2006), p. 12). The impact on the di¤erences in
automatic stabilizers is, however, less clear as it depends on various factors.
First, the distribution of these benets across households matters. Usually,
they are more evenly distributed than cash benets (Garnkel et al. (2006), Mar-
ical et al. (2006)). Second, the (automatic) change of non-cash benets over the
business cycle plays a key role. Here the available empirical evidence is thin. The
standard assumption in the literature on automatic stabilization is that in-kind
benets do not automatically change over the business cycle (Auerbach and
Feenberg (2000), Perotti (2002)). Darby and Melitz (2008) nd that, empirically,
health care expenditure is slightly countercyclical. The explanation they give is
that the opportunity cost of using health care services is lower in recessions people
have more time to see the doctor.26 If it is true that in-kind benets increase in
a downturn (Darby and Melitz (2008)), the stabilization coe¢ cients calculated in
the preceding sections, which neglect in-kind benets, would underestimate the
true stabilization e¤ect.
In order to address the issue of non-cash transfers, we conduct a rather rough
imputation of in-kind benets in our simulation models following the approach of
Paulus et al. (2010). Marical et al. (2006) report in Table A.8 the ratio between
in-kind benets from public services (health, education, public housing) and dis-
posable income of households for each quintile of the income distribution. We
use this ratio to assign to each household (depending on its position in the income
distribution) the average value of in-kind benets in the baseline. In the next step,
we assume that these in-kind benets increase by a certain factor in the two shock
scenarios.27 We then recompute the income stabilization coe¢ cients. Figure 2.7.1
26Another explanation would be that this is driven by discretionary policy measures, so that it
would not be part of automatic stabilizers.
27We use a factor of 1.00459 which is derived from estimates of Darby and Melitz (2008). In Table
3, they report a coe¢ cient of 0.0918 in a regression of the output gap on health expenditure.
This coe¢ cient is multiplied by 0.05, i.e. the percentage reduction in income in our shock
scenarios.
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reports the results. As expected, the income stabilization coe¢ cients increase, but
the ordering of countries is hardly a¤ected.28 The increase is more pronounced in
countries where in-kind benets make up a larger share of disposable income.29 On
average, income stabilization coe¢ cients in European countries increase in rel-
ative terms twice as much as in the US.30 This also implies that the calculations
in the preceding sections slightly understate the EU-US stabilization gap.31
2.5 Discussion of the results
In this section, we discuss a number of possible objections to and questions raised
by our analysis. These include the relation of our results to widely used macro
indicators of automatic stabilizers, the correlation between automatic stabilizers
and other macro variables like e.g. openness and, nally, the association between
discretionary scal stimulus programs and automatic stabilizers as well as open-
ness.
2.5.1 Stabilization coe¢ cients and macro estimates
One could argue that macro measures such as e.g. the tax revenue to GDP ra-
tio reveal su¢ cient information on the magnitude of automatic stabilizers in the
di¤erent countries. For instance, the IMF (2009) has recently used aggregate tax
to GDP ratios as proxies for the size of automatic stabilizers in G-20 countries.
28The only exceptions are France and Luxembourg and Finland and the Netherlands who change
the position.
29A comparison of Finland and the Netherlands - two countries with similar stabilization coef-
cients - illustrates this relationship. In Finland, the share of in-kind benets relative to
disposable income is higher in each quintile of the income distribution (cf. Table A.8 in Mar-
ical et al. (2006) who report ratios for 17 of 20 countries of our analysis). This explains why
income stabilization including non-cash benets is above the regression line (dotted line) in
Finland and below in the Netherlands (see Figure 2.7.1).
30It would be possible to simulate di¤erent shocks (including di¤erent changes across countries),
but the qualitative points made here do not change whereas the quantitative results depend
on the arbitrary assumption about the automatic change in in-kind benets.
31We have assumed here that the relative increase in in-kind benets is identical in all countries.
If, in addition, the countercyclicality in non-cash benets was larger in Europe than in the US,
the EU-US stabilization gap would be even larger. But to our knowledge there is no evidence
available supporting this claim.
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A further widely-used macro measure for automatic stabilization is provided by
the OECD (Girouard and André (2005)) who estimate semi-elasticities measuring
the overall cyclical sensitivity of the budget. It summarizes reduced-form estim-
ates for four revenue (corporate tax, personal tax, indirect tax, social security
contributions) and one expenditure item (unemployment compensation).32
The left panel of Figure 2.5.1 depicts the relation between the ratio of average
revenue to GDP for the period 2007-2010 and the income (demand) stabiliza-
tion coe¢ cients for the proportional income shock in the upper (lower) left panel,
whereas the right panel shows the corresponding relations between the stabiliza-
tion coe¢ cients for the unemployment shock with the semi-elasticities taken from
Girouard and André (2005).33 With a correlation of 0.58 for the income shock, one
can conclude that government size is indeed a good predictor for the amount of
automatic stabilization. The picture changes, however, if stabilization of aggreg-
ate household demand is considered, i.e. if we account for liquidity constraints.
As shown in Figure 2.5.1 (lower left panel), with a coe¢ cient of 0.26 government
size and stabilization of aggregate household demand (Zeldes criterion) are only
weakly correlated. Another interesting point arises from Figure 2.5.1 when mak-
ing vertical comparisons between similar countries. For instance, Denmark and
Sweden, and - to some extent - Belgium and France have similar levels of revenue
to GDP ratios. However, the stabilization is higher in Denmark and Belgium. In
both countries, the importance of the (progressive) income tax is higher, whereas
Sweden and France rely more on (proportional) social insurance contributions.
Therefore, not only the size but also the structure of the tax benet system is
important for its automatic stabilization e¤ects.
The correlations between income and demand stabilization coe¢ cients for the
unemployment shock and macro measures for automatic stabilization are higher.
This is conrmed in the right panel of Figure 2.5.1 for the semi-elasticities and
32It is calculated by combining elasticities of tax receipts and expenditures with respect to their
bases with elasticities of tax and expenditure bases with respect to cyclical indicators. The
former elasticity estimates are based on information regarding statutory tax rates and the
income distribution while the latter estimates are regression-based.
33All gures and correlations in this section are population-weighted in order to control for
di¤erent country sizes. However, results are similar to those without population-weighting.
We also obtained similar results when using the government spending to GDP ratio instead of
revenue as a measure for the size of the government.
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Figure 2.5.1: Government size and stabilization coe¢ cients
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Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM, European Commission
(2009a), Girouard and André (2005).
in Table 2.7.7 in the Appendix. Interestingly, the correlations between the macro
estimates - semi-elasticities, revenue and expenditure to GDP ratios - are almost 1.
Conversely, the correlations between the stabilization coe¢ cients and each of the
three macro estimates are smaller and depend on the type of shock and whether
income or demand stabilization is considered.
These simple correlations suggest that macro indicators like tax revenue to
GDP ratios or semi-elasticities are useful indicators for the stabilization e¤ect of the
tax and transfer system on disposable income but can be misleading as indicators
of the stabilization e¤ect on household demand. The reason is that the latter
depends on the presence of liquidity constraints. The income share of liquidity
constrained households (Zeldes criterion), however, is negatively correlated with
the size of government. In our analysis, we nd a correlation of -0.25 (Figure 2.7.2
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in the Appendix).
EU-US stabilization gap How do micro and macro estimates compare with
respect to the EU-US stabilization gap? Figure 2.7.3 in the Appendix shows
that in the case of the proportional income shock our baseline micro estimates
of the EU-US gap (the EU-US di¤erence in the income and demand stabilization
coe¢ cients based on nancial wealth and survey evidence shown in the upper three
lines and expressed in percentage points) are smaller than the gap predicted by
the macro measures, but are of similar magnitude in case of the unemployment
shock. The gap is smallest for the demand stabilization coe¢ cients, in particular
the one which is based on survey evidence, and it increases when we turn to
the income stabilization coe¢ cients. Compared with the income shock, the EU-
US gap in terms of income stabilization is approximately twice as large for the
unemployment shock.
The inclusion of employer social insurance contributions and consumption taxes
into our micro measures (lower two lines for income and unemployment shock)
leads to an increase in the EU-US gap for both types of shocks, but does not change
the conclusion that the gap is larger for the unemployment shock. Our results thus
demonstrate that EU-US comparisons of automatic stabilizers crucially depend
both on the type of macro shock that hits the economy and whether income or
demand stabilization is considered. These di¤erentiated results cannot be achieved
with conventional macro estimates for automatic stabilization.
2.5.2 Automatic stabilizers and openness
Our results show that automatic stabilizers di¤er signicantly within Europe. In
particular, automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern European countries are
much weaker than in the rest of Europe. One factor contributing to this is that
government size is often positively correlated with per capita incomes, at least in
Europe. The stabilization of disposable incomes will therefore be higher in high
income countries, just as a side e¤ect of a larger public sector.
But di¤erences in automatic stabilizers across countries might also have other
reasons. In particular, the e¤ectiveness of demand stabilization as a way of sta-
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Figure 2.5.2: Income stabilization coe¢ cient and openness of the economy
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bilizing domestic output is smaller, the more open the economy. In very open
economies, domestic output will depend heavily on export demand and higher de-
mand by domestic households will partly lead to higher imports. Clearly, openness
of the economy has a number of other implications for the tax and transfer system,
including the view that more open economies need more insurance against shocks
as argued, e.g., by Rodrik (1998). Figure 2.5.2 depicts the relationship between in-
come stabilization coe¢ cients for the unemployment shock and openness as meas-
ured by the ratio of exports plus imports over GDP. As Figure 2.5.2 shows, it
is not the case that more open economies have weaker automatic stabilizers, the
correlation is even positive (0.51). Our results thus support the hypothesis of
Rodrik (1998) that income stabilization is higher in more open economies. For the
income stabilization coe¢ cients of the income shock and the demand stabilization
coe¢ cients, we nd similar correlations.
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2.5.3 Automatic stabilizers and discretionary scal policy
In the debate on scal policy responses to the crisis, some countries have been
criticized for being reluctant to enact scal stimulus programs in order to stabilize
demand, in particular Germany. One reaction to this criticism was to argue that
automatic stabilizers in Germany are more important than in other countries,
so that less discretionary action is required. This raises the general question of
whether countries with weaker automatic stabilizers have taken more discretionary
scal policy action. To shed some light on this issue, we relate the size of scal
stimulus programs - the change in the general government structural balance from
2007 to 2008-11 - as measured by the OECD (2010) to stabilization coe¢ cients.
Figure 2.5.3: Discretionary measures and income stabilization coe¢ cient
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Figure 2.5.3 shows that income stabilization coe¢ cients (for the unemployment
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shock) are negatively correlated to the size of scal stimulus programs (-0.28).34
The same holds for the income stabilization coe¢ cients of the income shock, de-
mand stabilization coe¢ cients (see Figure 2.7.4 in the Appendix) or - with a larger
negative correlation - for the macro measures of automatic stabilization discussed
in Section 2.5.1.
A further concern in the policy debate put forward by supporters of large
and coordinated discretionary measures was that countries could limit the size
of their programs at the expense of countries with more generous scal policy
responses. The idea behind this argument was that some countries might show
a free-rider behavior and prot from spill-over e¤ects of discretionary measures.35
Therefore, we ask whether more open countries which are supposed to benet
more from spill-over e¤ects indeed passed smaller stimulus programs. We nd a
negative correlation of -0.49 between discretionary measures and the coe¢ cient
for openness. This supports the hypothesis (cf. Figure 2.7.5 in the Appendix),
but one should bear in mind that these simple correlations do not reveal anything
about causality.
2.6 Conclusions
In this paper we have used microsimulation models for the tax and transfer systems
of 19 European countries (EUROMOD) and the US (TAXSIM) to investigate the
extent to which automatic stabilizers cushion household disposable income and
household demand in the event of macroeconomic shocks. Our baseline simula-
tions focus on the personal income tax, employee social insurance contributions
and benets. We nd that the amount of automatic stabilization depends strongly
on the type of income shock. In the case of a proportional income shock, approx-
imately 38% of the shock would be absorbed by automatic stabilizers in the EU.
For the US, we nd a value of 32%. Within the EU, there is considerable hetero-
geneity, and results range from a value of 25% for Estonia to 56% for Denmark.
34The correlation slightly increases if Hungary which experienced a scal tightening between
2007 and 2008-11 is dropped from the sample.
35In that sense, a scal stimulus program can be seen as a positive externality since potential
positive e¤ects are not limited to the country of origin.
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In general automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern European countries are
considerably lower than in Continental and Northern European countries.
In the case of an unemployment shock, which a¤ects households asymmetric-
ally, the di¤erence between the EU and the US is larger. EU automatic stabilizers
absorb 47% of the shock whereas the stabilization e¤ect in the US is only 34%.
Again, there is considerable heterogeneity within the EU. This result implies that
European welfare states provide higher insurance against idiosyncratic shocks than
the US does. In addition, our analysis shows that the results for the proportional
income shock do not di¤er much to a proportional income increase (results avail-
able from the authors upon request). Hence, the di¤erence between the income
shock and the unemployment shock can also be interpreted as the di¤erent size of
automatic stabilization in good and bad times.
These results suggest that social transfers, in particular the rather generous
systems of unemployment insurance in Europe, play a key role for the stabiliza-
tion of disposable incomes and household demand and explain a large part of the
di¤erence in automatic stabilizers between Europe and the US. This is conrmed
by the decomposition of stabilization e¤ects in our analysis. In the case of the un-
employment shocks, benets alone absorb 19% of the shock in Europe compared
to just 7% in the US, whereas the stabilizing e¤ect of income taxes (taking into
account state taxes in the US as well) is similar. To some extent, this qualies the
view that automatic stabilizers are larger in Europe than in the US. This is only
true for countries like Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany or Sweden.
How does this cushioning of shocks translate into demand stabilization? Since
demand stabilization can only be achieved for liquidity constrained households, the
picture changes signicantly. For the proportional income shock, the cushioning
e¤ect of automatic stabilizers ranges from 4-22% in the EU. For the US, we nd
values between 6-17%, which is again rather similar. The values for the Euro area
are close to those for the EU. For the unemployment shock, however, we nd a
large di¤erence. In the EU, the stabilization e¤ect ranges from 13-30% whereas
the values for the US (7-20%) are close to those for the income shock.
A second key result of our analysis is that demand stabilization di¤ers consider-
ably from disposable income stabilization. This has important policy implications,
also for discretionary scal policy. Focusing on income stabilization may lead poli-
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cymakers to overestimate the e¤ect of automatic stabilizers.
A third important result is that automatic stabilizers are very heterogenous
within Europe. Interestingly, Eastern and Southern European countries are char-
acterized by rather low automatic stabilizers. This is surprising, at least from an
insurance point of view because lower average income (and wealth) implies that
households are more vulnerable to income shocks. One explanation for this nd-
ing could be that countries with lower per capita incomes tend to have smaller
public sectors. From this perspective, weaker automatic stabilizers in Eastern and
Southern European countries are a potentially unintended side e¤ect of the lower
demand for government activity including redistribution. Another potential ex-
planation, the idea that more open economies have weaker automatic stabilizers
because domestic demand spills over to other countries, seems to be inconsist-
ent with the data, at least as far as the simple correlation between stabilization
coe¢ cients and trade to GDP ratios is concerned.
Finally, we have discussed the claim that countries with smaller automatic sta-
bilizers have engaged in more discretionary scal policy action. According to our
results, there is a weak negative correlation between scal stimulus programs of
individual countries and stabilization coe¢ cients. Moreover, we nd that more
open countries and countries with higher budget decits have passed smaller stim-
ulus programs. All in all, our results suggest that policymakers did not take
into account the forces of automatic stabilizers when designing active scal policy
measures to tackle the recent economic crisis.
These results have to be interpreted in the light of various limitations of our
analysis. Firstly, the role of tax and transfer systems for stabilizing household
demand, not just disposable income, is based on strong assumptions on the link
between disposable income and household expenditures. Although we have used
what we believe to be the best available methods for estimating liquidity con-
straints, considerable uncertainty remains as to whether these methods lead to an
appropriate description of household behavior. Secondly, our analysis abstracts
from automatic stabilization through other taxes, in particular corporate income
taxes. Thirdly, our analysis is purely positive. We abstract from normative welfare
considerations about the optimal size of automatic stabilization. Taxes are dis-
tortionary and hence imply a trade-o¤ between insurance against shocks through
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redistribution and e¢ ciency considerations. Finally, we have abstracted from the
role of labor supply or other behavioral adjustments for the impact of automatic
stabilizers. We intend to pursue these issues in future research.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Additional results
Table 2.7.1: Decomposition income stabilization coe¢ cient for income shock
FEDTax StateTax SIC BEN Total
AT 0.294 0.000 0.139 0.006 0.439
BE 0.382 0.000 0.131 0.014 0.527
DK 0.455 0.000 0.086 0.018 0.558
EE 0.228 0.000 0.021 0.004 0.253
FI 0.340 0.000 0.050 0.006 0.396
FR 0.153 0.000 0.181 0.036 0.370
GE 0.351 0.000 0.118 0.012 0.481
GR 0.203 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.291
HU 0.307 0.000 0.160 0.009 0.476
IR 0.310 0.000 0.039 0.014 0.363
IT 0.254 0.000 0.079 0.013 0.346
LU 0.265 0.000 0.097 0.012 0.374
NL 0.270 0.000 0.116 0.011 0.397
PL 0.168 0.000 0.118 0.015 0.301
PT 0.203 0.000 0.090 0.010 0.303
SI 0.289 0.000 0.031 0.028 0.317
SP 0.240 0.000 0.035 0.001 0.277
SW 0.368 0.000 0.040 0.012 0.420
UK 0.267 0.000 0.054 0.031 0.352
EU 0.260 0.000 0.100 0.017 0.378
EURO 0.263 0.000 0.108 0.015 0.385
USA 0.240 0.049 0.039 -0.006 0.322
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM
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Table 2.7.2: Decomposition income stabilization coe¢ cient for unemployment shock
FEDTax StateTax SIC BEN Total
AT 0.163 0.000 0.171 0.252 0.585
BE 0.240 0.000 0.123 0.249 0.612
DK 0.116 0.000 0.092 0.615 0.823
EE 0.173 0.000 0.023 0.036 0.233
FI 0.221 0.000 0.049 0.248 0.519
FR 0.075 0.000 0.190 0.303 0.568
GE 0.209 0.000 0.145 0.269 0.624
GR 0.093 0.000 0.150 0.079 0.322
HU 0.203 0.000 0.191 0.073 0.467
IR 0.178 0.000 0.036 0.173 0.387
IT 0.164 0.000 0.105 0.042 0.311
LU 0.127 0.000 0.080 0.387 0.593
NL 0.104 0.000 0.171 0.178 0.452
PL 0.134 0.000 0.166 0.030 0.329
PT 0.146 0.000 0.097 0.143 0.386
SI 0.152 0.000 0.221 0.073 0.431
SP 0.124 0.000 0.068 0.184 0.376
SW 0.199 0.000 0.027 0.452 0.678
UK 0.191 0.000 0.061 0.163 0.415
EU 0.156 0.000 0.124 0.188 0.469
EURO 0.150 0.000 0.133 0.202 0.485
USA 0.174 0.041 0.051 0.071 0.337
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM
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Table 2.7.3: Shares of liquidity constrained households
Population share Income share
Wealth Home Survey Wealth Home Survey
AT 0.844 0.481 0.302 0.827 0.401 0.088
BE 0.702 0.297 0.228 0.633 0.177 0.039
DK 0.581 0.432 0.218 0.516 0.238 0.039
EE 0.975 0.158 0.264 0.955 0.121 0.028
FI 0.696 0.356 0.334 0.585 0.235 0.089
FR 0.365 0.452 0.340 0.296 0.374 0.120
GE 0.328 0.593 0.392 0.287 0.494 0.159
GR 0.845 0.260 0.318 0.808 0.282 0.053
HU 0.973 0.073 0.620 0.958 0.073 0.282
IR 0.663 0.176 0.396 0.538 0.102 0.091
IT 0.762 0.235 0.330 0.733 0.191 0.076
LU 0.708 0.307 0.210 0.692 0.309 0.066
NL 0.637 0.451 0.240 0.570 0.247 0.058
PL 0.985 0.463 0.560 0.982 0.434 0.192
PT 0.861 0.334 0.215 0.800 0.261 0.023
SI 0.661 0.103 0.440 0.522 0.080 0.108
SP 0.709 0.180 0.306 0.681 0.151 0.066
SW 0.528 0.674 0.201 0.472 0.752 0.062
UK 0.793 0.320 0.263 0.735 0.164 0.062
EU 0.641 0.383 0.346 0.596 0.305 0.106
EURO 0.561 0.387 0.333 0.513 0.313 0.101
USA 0.743 0.369 0.269 0.486 0.173 0.168
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM. Notes: The rst
approach for the identication of liquidity constraints refers to the nancial wealth
criterion (Zeldes), the second to the real estate property criterion (Runkle) and the
third refers to survey evidence.
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Table 2.7.4: Decomposition income stabilization coe¢ cient including employer SIC
TaxIS SICIS BenIS TBIS TaxUS SICUS BenUS TBUS
AT 0.253 0.258 0.006 0.517 0.136 0.304 0.211 0.652
BE 0.317 0.278 0.012 0.607 0.200 0.272 0.207 0.678
DK 0.447 0.101 0.017 0.566 0.115 0.103 0.607 0.826
EE 0.174 0.257 0.003 0.433 0.128 0.276 0.027 0.431
FI 0.281 0.215 0.005 0.501 0.181 0.221 0.203 0.606
FR 0.092 0.508 0.022 0.622 0.047 0.498 0.188 0.732
GE 0.314 0.211 0.010 0.535 0.182 0.254 0.235 0.672
GR 0.187 0.157 0.000 0.345 0.084 0.235 0.071 0.390
HU 0.243 0.335 0.007 0.585 0.160 0.361 0.058 0.579
IR 0.295 0.087 0.013 0.395 0.171 0.077 0.165 0.413
IT 0.210 0.238 0.011 0.458 0.132 0.280 0.034 0.446
LU 0.243 0.173 0.011 0.427 0.118 0.144 0.360 0.622
NL 0.267 0.124 0.011 0.402 0.093 0.255 0.160 0.508
PL 0.148 0.223 0.013 0.384 0.115 0.283 0.025 0.423
PT 0.170 0.239 0.009 0.417 0.124 0.232 0.122 0.478
SI 0.287 0.038 0.028 0.321 0.133 0.319 0.064 0.503
SP 0.205 0.175 0.001 0.382 0.099 0.256 0.147 0.502
SW 0.286 0.254 0.010 0.549 0.152 0.258 0.345 0.754
UK 0.246 0.128 0.029 0.403 0.179 0.122 0.152 0.453
EU 0.223 0.241 0.014 0.478 0.132 0.275 0.153 0.560
EURO 0.222 0.265 0.011 0.497 0.123 0.305 0.158 0.587
USA 0.289 0.077 -0.006 0.360 0.215 0.102 0.071 0.388
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM
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Table 2.7.5: Demand stabilization coe¢ cient including consumption taxes
CT1 IS 
C incl:CT
1 IS 
CT
1 US 
C incl:CT
1 US
AT 0.103 0.466 0.072 0.570
BE 0.061 0.406 0.043 0.485
DK 0.077 0.363 0.008 0.601
EE 0.158 0.400 0.160 0.386
FI 0.095 0.344 0.069 0.421
FR 0.037 0.152 0.007 0.266
GE 0.027 0.169 0.005 0.257
GR 0.090 0.319 0.083 0.346
HU 0.133 0.588 0.135 0.583
IR 0.083 0.268 0.072 0.315
IT 0.078 0.360 0.099 0.332
LU 0.104 0.360 0.070 0.510
NL 0.083 0.310 0.073 0.361
PL 0.134 0.430 0.129 0.453
PT 0.111 0.351 0.089 0.401
SI 0.041 0.131 0.062 0.289
SP 0.078 0.262 0.068 0.333
SW 0.072 0.273 0.014 0.424
UK 0.090 0.353 0.084 0.434
EU 0.072 0.293 0.060 0.357
EURO 0.059 0.253 0.046 0.316
USA 0.020 0.194 0.025 0.222
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM
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Table 2.7.7: Correlation between micro and macro estimates
Semi-Ela Rev/GDP Exp/GDP
 IIS 0.60 0.58 0.51
 IUS 0.67 0.69 0.64
C1 IS 0.22 0.26 0.25
C2 IS 0.59 0.55 0.46
C3 IS -0.24 -0.24 -0.27
C1 US 0.57 0.65 0.64
C2 US 0.55 0.56 0.52
C3 US 0.51 0.49 0.48
Semi-Ela 1
Rev/GDP 0.96 1
Exp/GDP 0.91 0.97 1
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM, Girouard and André
(2005), European Commission (2009). Notes: C : demand stabilization coe¢ cient,  I :
income stabilization coe¢ cient, IS: income shock, US: unemployment shock. The
rst approach for the identication of liquidity constraints refers to the nancial wealth
criterion (Zeldes), the second to the real estate property criterion (Runkle) and the
third refers to survey evidence.
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Figure 2.7.1: Income stabilization incl. in-kind benets
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Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
Figure 2.7.2: Income share of liquidity constrained households and government revenue
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Figure 2.7.3: EU-US stabilization gap
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Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM, European Commission
(2009a), Girouard and André (2005). Notes: Dem. Stab. 1: nancial wealth criterion,
Dem. Stab. 3: survey evidence, Dem. Stab. CT: incl. consumption taxes, In-kind: Inc.
stab. incl. in-kind benets, ER-SIC: Inc. stab. incl. employer contributions.
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Figure 2.7.4: Discretionary measures and demand stabilization
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Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM, OECD (2010). Notes:
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Figure 2.7.5: Discretionary measures and openness of the economy
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2.7.2 Reweighting procedure for increasing unemployment
In order to increase the unemployment rate while keeping the aggregate counts of
other key individual and household characteristics constant, we follow the approach
taken by Immvervoll et al. (2006). The increase of the unemployment rates is
modeled through reweighting of our samples while controlling for several individual
and household characteristics that determine the risk of becoming unemployed.
We follow Immvervoll et al. (2006) and dene the unemployed as people aged
1959 declaring themselves to be out of work and looking for a job. The within-
database national unemployment rateis calculated as the ratio of these unem-
ployed to those in the labor force, dened as the unemployed plus people aged
1959 who are (self)employed. The increased total number of unemployed people
is calculated such that total household income decreases by 5% within each coun-
try.
In EUROMOD, the baseline household weights supplied with the national data-
bases have been calculated to adjust for sample design and/or di¤erential non-
response (see Sutherland (2001) for details). Weights are then recalculated using
the existing weights as a starting point, but (a) using the increased (decreased)
number of unemployed (employed) people as the control totals for them, and (b)
also controlling for individual demographic and household composition variables
using the existing grossed-up totals for these categories as control totals. The
specic variables used as controls are:
 employment status
 age (018, 1924, 2549, 5059, 60+)
 gender
 marital status and household size
 education
 region
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This method implies that the households without any unemployed people that
are similar to households with unemployed people (according to the above vari-
ables) will have their weights reduced. In other words, these are the households
who are made unemployedin our exercise.
Chapter 3
Automatic stabilizers, economic
crisis and income distribution in
Europe
3.1 Introduction
Throughout Europe, the current economic and nancial crisis has had a severe
impact on incomes and employment. While the magnitude of the shocks is usually
measured at the macro level, the resulting welfare e¤ects depend not only on the
total size of losses but also on their distribution across di¤erent groups of society
and the cushioning e¤ect of the tax benet system. This chapter investigates to
what extent the tax and transfer system protects households at di¤erent income
levels and in di¤erent European countries against income losses and unemploy-
ment.1 As micro data for an ex-post distributional analysis of the current crisis
will only become available after a considerable time lag, it is interesting to ex-
plore the e¤ects of stylized shocks on the income distribution ex-ante in order to
assess the likely distribution of changes in market income and how they translate
to changes in disposable income. While this is not a forecasting exercise, our ap-
proach does help to understand potential distributional implications of the current
economic crisis.
1This section is based on Dolls, Fuest and Peichl (2011).
57
58CHAPTER 3. AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS AND INCOMEDISTRIBUTION
What can we learn from past recessions in terms of distributional consequences?
Heathcote et al. (2010) refer to the period from 1967-2006 and show for the US that
low income households su¤er the largest earnings declines in recessions. House-
holds from top percentiles are much less a¤ected which in turn leads to an in-
crease in earnings equality. However, inequality in disposable income rises less
than earnings inequality since government transfers, which constitute a large part
of disposable income for households at the bottom of the earnings distribution,
partly o¤set income losses. The cushioning role of the government in mitigating
increases in earnings inequality can be substantial as is shown by Domeij and
Floden (2010) for Sweden, a country with a larger government compared to the
US. In Swedens severe 1992 recession, earnings inequality increased dramatically
whereas inequality in disposable income almost remained at its before-crisis level.
Given the experience from past recessions, the question is whether the current
economic crisis will have similar distributional consequences. Heathcote et al.
(2010), who use the latest US data, show that inequality in disposable income
went up slightly in 2008. However, data for 2009 are not available yet, so it is
too early for an overall ex-post evaluation of the current crisis. Other simulation
studies provide a range of scenarios to assess likely distributional e¤ects. Bargain,
Immvervoll, Peichl and Siegloch (2012) use matched employer-employee data to
estimate labor demand in Germany and predict employment e¤ects in response
to output shocks. They nd that low-skilled and part-time/irregular workers face
higher risks of employment cuts. In some sectors, but not on average, the same
is true for younger and older workers. Callan, Nolan and Walsh (2011) analyze
the distributional impact of recent public sector pay cuts in Ireland and conclude
that they have an immediate inequality reducing e¤ect, though further conclusions
depend on the specic implementation.
It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the e¤ects of macro shocks on the in-
come distribution and the role of the tax benet system to cushion these impacts.
We focus on 19 European countries for which a European multi-country microsim-
ulation model is available (EUROMOD). We run two controlled experiments of
macro shocks to income and employment in a common microeconometric frame-
work. The rst shock is a proportional decline in household gross income by ve
per cent (income shock). This is the usual way of modeling shocks in simulation
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studies analyzing automatic stabilizers (Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), Mabbett
and Schelkle (2007), Dolls et al. (2012)). But economic downturns typically a¤ect
households asymmetrically, with some households losing their jobs and su¤ering a
sharp decline in income and other households being much less a¤ected, as wages
are usually rigid in the short term. We therefore consider a second macro shock
where the unemployment rate increases such that total household income decreases
by 5% (unemployment shock).
It is important to note that all income sources from market activity (labor,
business, capital, property and other income) are reduced by the same proportion.
In principle, it would be possible to design scenarios which take into account the
observed change in di¤erent income sources in the di¤erent countries to construct
country specic scenarios. However, as we do not aim at conducting an ex-post
analysis of the actual development during the recent crisis but rather want to
analyze stylized scenarios which are comparable across countries, we refrain from
simulating country specic scenarios. How would results change if the di¤erent
income sources were a¤ected asymmetrically? In the hypothetical case that, e.g.
capital income, went down substantially, whereas one other income source, say
labor income, did not change at all while the total income loss were equal to the
scenario with a proportional reduction of all income sources by 5 per cent, stabil-
ization results would di¤er depending on the tax rates levied on capital and labor
income. If capital income were taxed with a lower rate than labor income, auto-
matic stabilization would be lower in this case. Furthermore, as capital incomes
are concentrated more on the top of the income distribution, a decrease of capital
incomes would, ceteris paribus, reduce income inequality.
For both scenarios, we compute measures of inequality, poverty and richness
to assess the distributional impact of the macro shocks. This analysis enables
us to explore diverse e¤ects of the shock scenarios. Further on, we identify how
much weight existing pre-crisis tax benet systems put on di¤erent income groups
to protect them from income losses. In the next step, we compare the e¤ects
across countries in order to evaluate the cushioning e¤ect of di¤erent welfare state
regimes and to cluster the countries according to their stabilizing e¤ect on the
income distribution.
We nd that the proportional income shock leads to a reduction in inequal-
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ity whereas distributional implications of the asymmetric unemployment shock
crucially depend on which income groups are a¤ected by rising unemployment.
Both shocks increase the headcount ratio for poverty and decrease the counter-
part for richness. Turning next to subgroup decompositions, we conclude that
European tax benet systems place unequal weights on the extent how di¤erent
income groups are protected. In case of the unemployment shock, some East-
ern and Southern European countries provide little income stabilization for low
income groups whereas the opposite is true for the majority of Nordic and contin-
ental European countries. With respect to the relationship between income sta-
bilization and redistribution, we nd that tax benet systems with high build-in
automatic stabilizers are also those which are more e¤ective in mitigating existing
inequalities in market income.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide an institutional
overview of tax and transfer systems in Europe and briey show empirical evid-
ence on pre- and post-tax inequality in European countries as was the case before
the start of the current economic crisis. Section 3.3 presents the results of the
distributional analysis and Section 4.5 concludes.
3.2 Tax and transfer systems in Europe
3.2.1 Tax benet systems
The existing income tax systems in the 19 European countries under consid-
eration o¤er considerable variety. As Table 3.2.1 shows, all Western European
countries in our sample have graduated rate schedules with a number of brackets
ranging from 2 (Ireland) to 16 (Luxembourg), with the top marginal income tax
rate ranging from 38% (Luxembourg) to 59% in Denmark. There are also con-
siderable di¤erences across the Eastern European countries. Estonia has a at
tax system, with a single rate of 22% and a basic allowance of 1.304 Euro, while
the other Eastern European countries in our sample apply graduated tax sched-
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ules with a comparatively small number of brackets (2-3) and relatively low top
marginal rates. Interestingly, Slovenia and Poland have very similar income tax
schedules as the Western European countries, with highest rates around 40%, but
with a lower amount belonging to the 0% bracket.
Table 3.2.1: Income tax systems 2007
No of brackets Lowest rate Highest rate Form of main tax relief
AT 4 38.3% 50.0% 0% bracket (10,000 EUR)
BE 5 25.0% 50.0% tax allowance (6,040 EUR)
DK 3 state 5.48%. state 15%. tax allowance
local 24.6% local 24.6%
EE at tax 22.0% 22.0% basic allowance 1,304 EUR
FI 4 state 8.5%. state 31.5%. 0% bracket (12,600 EUR). state
local 16% local 21% tax allowance. local
FR 4 5.5% 40.0% 0% bracket (5,614 EUR)
GE formula 15.8% 44.3% 0% bracket (7,664 EUR)
GR 3 15.0% 40.0% 0% bracket (12,000 EUR)
HU 2 18.0% 36.0% tax credit
IR 2 20.0% 41.0% tax allowance
IT 5 23.0% 43.0% tax credit
LU 16 8.0% 38.0% 0% bracket (10,335 EUR)
NL 4 33.6% 52.0% tax credit
PL 3 19.0% 40.0% 0% bracket (3,091 EUR)
PT 6 10.5% 40.0% tax credit
SI 3 16.0% 41.0% tax allowance (2,800 EUR)
SP 4 24.0% 43.0% tax allowance (5,151 EUR)
SW 2 state 20%. state 25%. tax allowance
local 31.6% local 31.6%
UK 3 10.0% 40.0% tax allowance (5,225 EUR)
Source: Eurostat.
European countries do not only di¤er in their income tax schedules but also in
the design of their system of social protection and redistribution. In each country,
direct and indirect taxes as well as social insurance contributions (SIC) are used
to nance the welfare state (see Table 3.2.2 for an overview). The weight in the
tax mix of these components depends on the structural design of the tax benet
system in each country. For the Continental countries it is evident that the SIC
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are more important to nance the welfare state than the direct taxes. This is also
true for Eastern Europe, while in the Nordic countries the SIC play only a minor
role. Denmark relies almost exclusively on taxes for nancing the welfare state.
In Southern European countries, indirect taxes tend to play the most important
role. This is even more true for Eastern Europe. With few exceptions, there is
a north-to-south and west-to-east decline with respect to the ratio of direct taxes
and social insurance contributions to indirect taxes. The level of social protection
(in terms of expenditures as % of GDP) is high in Nordic and Continental countries
(an exception is Luxembourg) and particularly low in Eastern Europe as well as
Ireland. A perhaps trivial but still interesting observation from Table 2 is that the
level of social expenditures is correlated with the level of taxes and contributions.
Table 3.2.2: Tax benet mix (as % of GDP) in 2005
Total Indirect Direct Social Dir. Taxes+SIC Social
Taxes Taxes Taxes Contr. /Ind. Taxes Expen.
AT 42.0 14.7 12.9 14.5 1.9 28.8
BE 45.5 13.9 17.8 13.9 2.3 29.7
DK 50.3 17.9 31.4 1.1 1.8 30.1
EE 30.9 13.5 7.1 10.4 1.3 12.5
FI 43.9 14.1 17.9 12.0 2.1 26.7
FR 44.0 15.8 11.9 16.4 1.8 31.5
GE 38.8 12.1 10.3 16.3 2.2 29.4
GR 34.4 12.9 9.5 12.1 1.7 24.2
HU 38.5 15.8 9.1 13.6 1.4 21.9
IR 30.8 13.6 12.4 4.8 1.3 18.2
IT 40.6 14.5 13.5 12.6 1.8 26.4
LU 38.2 13.4 14.1 10.7 1.9 21.9
NL 38.2 13.1 11.9 13.1 1.9 28.2
PL 34.2 13.9 7.0 13.7 1.5 19.6
PT 35.3 15.3 8.6* 11.3 1.3 24.7*
SI 40.5 16.4 9.3 14.8 1.5 23.4
SP 35.6 12.5 11.4 12.2 1.9 20.8
SW 51.3 17.3 20.1 13.8 2.0 32.0
UK 37.0 13.3 16.8 6.9 1.8 26.8
Source: Eurostat. Notes: * Numbers for Portugal are from 2004
3.2. TAX AND TRANSFER SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 63
3.2.2 Distribution and Redistribution
How do European countries di¤er in terms of pre-tax and post-tax inequality?
The rst column of Table 3.2.3 indicates that inequality in market income, Y Mi ,
as measured by the Gini coe¢ cient, displays huge disparities among the European
countries of our sample. Coe¢ cients range from 0.39 to 0.55, with values above
0.5 in some Southern and Eastern European countries (Estonia, Greece, Hungary,
Poland, Portugal and Slovenia). At the lower end, the Netherlands is the only
country with a Gini coe¢ cient for equivalent market income which is below 0.4.
Closest to the Netherlands are Sweden and Austria, both with values below 0.45.
Column 2 shows that post-tax inequality, i.e. the Gini coe¢ cient based on
disposable income, is substantially lower than pre-tax inequality in all countries.
Thus, existing inequalities in market income are mitigated by European tax be-
net systems through a substantial degree of redistribution. Although there are
signicant di¤erences in the size of redistribution, the overall inequality ranking
of the countries basically remains the same.
Finally, the last two columns of Table 3.2.3 show the absolute and relative
di¤erences between the pre- and post-tax Gini coe¢ cients as measures of redistri-
bution (see also Fuest, Niehues and Peichl (2010)). In countries such as Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Hungary or Luxembourg, tax benet systems reduce inequal-
ities in market income by almost 50%. At the other end of the spectrum, we
nd lowest redistribution in Portugal and Italy with a reduction in inequality of
approximately 30%.
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Table 3.2.3: Distribution and redistribution in the baseline
GY
M
B G
Y D
B G
Y D YM
B %G
Y D YM
B
AT 0.441 0.227 -0.214 -48.569
BE 0.491 0.247 -0.244 -49.704
DK 0.457 0.232 -0.226 -49.344
EE 0.509 0.324 -0.185 -36.403
FI 0.484 0.269 -0.215 -44.464
FR 0.487 0.260 -0.226 -46.523
GE 0.494 0.268 -0.225 -45.667
GR 0.502 0.323 -0.179 -35.590
HU 0.547 0.274 -0.273 -49.885
IR 0.459 0.309 -0.150 -32.642
IT 0.498 0.348 -0.149 -30.024
LU 0.472 0.243 -0.229 -48.459
NL 0.386 0.247 -0.139 -35.902
PL 0.545 0.332 -0.213 -39.102
PT 0.507 0.361 -0.146 -28.784
SI 0.504 0.270 -0.234 -46.353
SP 0.467 0.294 -0.172 -36.924
SW 0.437 0.234 -0.203 -46.523
UK 0.496 0.306 -0.190 -38.353
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
3.3 E¤ects of shocks on income distribution
3.3.1 Overall distribution
What are the distributional consequences of the two macro shocks described
above? Table 3.3.1 shows the percentage changes in the Gini coe¢ cient and in the
headcount ratios for being poor or rich, all based on equivalent disposable income.
While the proportional income shock (IS) leads to a reduction of the Gini
coe¢ cient in all countries, the asymmetric unemployment shock (US) increases
inequality in 15 out of 19 countries. In the latter case, we nd a reduction of the
Gini coe¢ cient only in Denmark, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden. In the case
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of the income shock, the largest reductions of the Gini coe¢ cient occur in Belgium,
Denmark, Sweden and the UK (all >2%), the smallest ones in Greece and Slovenia
(each <0.5%). In the case of the unemployment shock, distributional implications
crucially depend on which income groups are hardest hit by unemployment and
income losses. If low income groups are the rst who loose their jobs during a
recession, one can expect an increase in inequality. However, if also middle or
upper income groups are a¤ected which seems to be relevant especially in long-
lasting recessions such as the current one, distributional implications become more
ambiguous. This ambiguity in terms of distributional e¤ects of an asymmetric
shock is reected in the positive and negative signs of the Gini change.
Comparing the headcount ratios2 for both shock scenarios, we can conclude
that, not surprisingly, in case of the unemployment shock richness is decreasing
less than in the case of the proportional income shock.3 With the exception of
Slovenia, the percentage reduction of rich people is substantially higher in the
latter shock scenario. However, no such clear conclusion can be drawn considering
the percentage change in poverty. In countries such as Ireland or the United
Kingdom, the asymmetric unemployment shock leads to a much stronger increase
in the headcount for the poor than the income shock. However, the opposite is true
for countries such as Greece, Luxembourg or the Netherlands. Here, distributional
implications depend again crucially on which income groups are actually the rst
who become unemployed in a recession.
What is the e¤ect of the two shock scenarios on market income inequality and
the amount of redistribution achieved by the tax and transfer system? Table 3.3.2
sheds further light on the implications for the overall income distribution. The
rst column shows the percentage change of the Gini coe¢ cient based on equi-
valent market income between the unemployment shock scenario and the baseline
((GY
M
US   GYMB )=GYMB ).4 With the exception of Portugal, we nd an increase in
inequality which is highest in Ireland, Denmark, the UK and Sweden (all > 2%)
2 People are classied as poor (rich) if their equivalent disposable income is less than 60% (more
than twice) the median equivalent disposable income in the population.
3 The reweighting approach used for modeling an increase in unemployment is implicitly based on
the assumption that the socio-demographic characteristics of the unemployed remain constant.
A more in-depth description of the approach can be found in the Appendix.
4 Note that the Gini coe¢ cient of market income does not change in case of the proportional
shock.
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Table 3.3.1: E¤ect of shocks on income distribution
Income shock Unemployment shock
Gini Poor Rich Gini Poor Rich
AT -1.297 4.760 -12.088 0.304 4.421 -3.619
BE -2.270 2.673 -16.241 0.126 3.869 -4.322
DK -2.064 3.838 -18.903 -0.218 1.176 -5.054
EE -1.622 4.529 -11.508 0.914 6.542 -2.989
FI -1.806 5.622 -13.981 0.347 7.104 -3.428
FR -1.422 7.458 -9.947 0.210 4.083 -2.409
GE -1.489 4.141 -12.982 0.445 6.245 -3.469
GR -0.338 7.288 -11.355 0.166 2.509 -2.820
HU -0.604 5.701 -9.241 0.518 5.612 -3.861
IR -1.335 3.701 -12.591 1.154 10.295 -7.285
IT -0.735 4.910 -5.857 0.507 3.567 -2.234
LU -1.233 9.994 -14.276 -0.225 1.335 -3.843
NL -1.232 10.629 -16.256 0.652 7.892 -3.985
PL -0.923 6.749 -9.692 0.281 3.757 -2.639
PT -0.611 4.693 -6.055 -0.709 1.528 -2.667
SI -0.318 0.273 -1.290 0.327 4.354 -2.931
SP -0.693 6.343 -13.806 0.590 3.545 -3.003
SW -2.050 4.215 -15.446 -0.154 3.444 -3.774
UK -2.219 3.753 -13.001 1.074 7.895 -2.873
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
and lowest in Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Slovenia (all < 1%).
The last two columns of Table 3.3.2 show how the di¤erence between the Gini
coe¢ cients based on equivalent disposable and market income has changed com-
paring the income shock and the base scenario (column 3) and the unemployment
shock and the base scenario (column 4), respectively ((GY
D
Shock  GYMShock)  (GY DB  
GY
M
B )). The negative values indicate that both shocks lead to higher di¤erences
between the Gini coe¢ cients based on equivalent disposable and market income.
One conclusion of this nding is that post-shock inequalities in market income are
even more reduced than in the base scenario, i.e. the automatic stabilizers in-
crease the redistributive e¤ects of the tax benet systems in all countries in both
scenarios.
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Table 3.3.2: Change in distribution and redistribution
%GY
M
US B (G
Y D  GYM )IS B (GY D  GYM )US B
AT 1.564 -0.003 -0.006
BE 1.509 -0.006 -0.007
DK 2.673 -0.005 -0.013
EE 1.347 -0.005 -0.004
FI 1.737 -0.005 -0.007
FR 1.416 -0.004 -0.006
GE 1.827 -0.004 -0.008
GR 0.632 -0.001 -0.003
HU 0.836 -0.002 -0.003
IR 3.342 -0.003 -0.012
IT 0.798 -0.003 -0.002
LU 1.022 -0.003 -0.005
NL 1.766 -0.003 -0.005
PL 0.733 -0.003 -0.003
PT -0.353 -0.002 -0.001
SI 0.810 -0.001 -0.003
SP 1.178 -0.002 -0.004
SW 2.176 -0.005 -0.010
UK 2.204 -0.006 -0.008
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
3.3.2 Stabilization of di¤erent income groups
In this section, we refer to the income stabilization coe¢ cient from chapter
2, but focus on the stabilization of disposable income for di¤erent income groups.
The income stabilization coe¢ cient for quantile q based on equivalent disposable
income becomes:
 Iq = 1 
P
q;i Y
D
q;iP
i Y
M
i
=
P
q;i
 
Y Mq;i  Y Dq;i
P
i Y
M
i
=
P
q;i Gq;iP
i Y
M
i
(3.3.1)
Note that in the denominator, changes in market income for the total popula-
tion are added up. Hence, the sum of the ve quantile coe¢ cients yields the overall
income stabilization coe¢ cient. Table 3.3.3 shows that in case of the proportional
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income shock, the stabilization coe¢ cients are an increasing function of the income
quantiles. This result is due to higher changes between market and disposable in-
come for high income groups. It is worth mentioning that even a proportional
tax would yield increasing coe¢ cients for higher quantiles, i.e. progressivity of the
income tax is not required for this result.
In contrast to the increasing stabilization by income quantile for the income
shock, stabilization results for the unemployment shock follow a somewhat di¤erent
pattern as demonstrated in Table 3.3.4. Here, with the exception of some Eastern
and Southern European countries, we nd high stabilization also for the lowest
income groups. As the unemployment shock is modeled through reweighting of
our sample taking into account individual characteristics of the unemployed, a
large part of the newly unemployed comes from lower income quantiles. The fact
that tax and transfer systems in countries such as Estonia, Greece, Italy, Poland,
Portugal, Slovenia or Spain provide only weak stabilization for low income groups
can be explained by rather low unemployment benets in these countries.
To further investigate which components of the tax and transfer systems drive
the results for the ve income quantiles, we decompose the income stabilization
coe¢ cient  Iq into its components income taxes, social insurance contributions
(SIC) and benets (Tables 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 in the Appendix). First, consider Table
3.5.1 for the income shock scenario. Clearly, taxes and, to a smaller extent SIC,
play a large stabilizing role for higher income quantiles whereas benets are of
minor importance for these income groups. This holds for all countries in our
sample. Only in France, SIC are almost as important (fth quantile) or even
more important (fourth quantile) than taxes for stabilization of disposable income
which can be explained with the progressive incidence of SIC. At the bottom of
the distribution, stabilization of disposable income is rather low due to smaller
changes in market income.
A di¤erent picture emerges again for the unemployment shock (Table 3.5.2).
In this shock scenario, benets play an important role, especially for low income
quantiles. The decomposition convincingly shows which component of the tax and
transfer systems causes the di¤erence between Southern and Eastern European
countries on the one hand and its neighbors on the other. The former group of
countries has a rather low level of income stabilization mainly because unemploy-
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Table 3.3.3: Stabilization of income groups - Proportional Income Shock
TAU Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
AT 0.439 0.023 0.045 0.072 0.107 0.192
BE 0.527 0.022 0.051 0.082 0.128 0.244
DK 0.558 0.017 0.046 0.088 0.135 0.273
EE 0.253 0.010 0.019 0.036 0.063 0.126
FI 0.396 0.010 0.031 0.063 0.099 0.192
FR 0.370 0.032 0.036 0.053 0.079 0.171
GE 0.481 0.019 0.045 0.072 0.116 0.228
GR 0.291 0.004 0.015 0.033 0.063 0.176
HU 0.476 0.029 0.041 0.056 0.097 0.254
IR 0.363 0.009 0.026 0.048 0.084 0.197
IT 0.346 0.010 0.035 0.051 0.077 0.173
LU 0.374 0.019 0.022 0.042 0.082 0.208
NL 0.397 0.020 0.040 0.062 0.093 0.182
PL 0.301 0.017 0.032 0.047 0.060 0.145
PT 0.303 0.012 0.013 0.029 0.055 0.194
SI 0.317 0.022 0.010 0.008 0.037 0.240
SP 0.277 0.006 0.020 0.036 0.062 0.153
SW 0.420 0.022 0.041 0.066 0.096 0.196
UK 0.352 0.010 0.034 0.047 0.079 0.182
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
ment benets are substantially less generous in these countries.5
3.3.3 Income stabilization and redistribution
It is interesting to explore the relationship between the degree of income sta-
bilization and redistribution which is achieved by the respective tax and transfer
systems. Are systems with high automatic stabilizers also those which provide
signicant redistribution? To answer this question, we relate the degree of re-
distribution measured by the percentage di¤erence in the Gini coe¢ cients based
5 Note that the income stabilization coe¢ cients in case of the unemployment shock depend on
the coverage of the newly unemployed by unemployment benets. Stabilization might be under-
estimated if the newly unemployed are eligible for unemployment benets and if the unemployed
whose weights are increased through the reweighting procedure are long-term unemployed with
exhausted eligibility. However, the bias might have the opposite sign if the newly unemployed
are mainly not eligible for unemployment benets (for example school leavers).
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Table 3.3.4: Stabilization of income groups - Unemployment Shock
TAU Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
AT 0.585 0.111 0.094 0.069 0.130 0.181
BE 0.612 0.143 0.087 0.067 0.101 0.215
DK 0.823 0.095 0.189 0.166 0.196 0.177
EE 0.233 0.062 0.019 0.019 0.041 0.091
FI 0.519 0.118 0.057 0.074 0.093 0.176
FR 0.568 0.102 0.102 0.088 0.092 0.185
GE 0.624 0.144 0.078 0.090 0.118 0.193
GR 0.322 0.016 0.031 0.040 0.071 0.164
HU 0.467 0.091 0.045 0.048 0.071 0.212
IR 0.387 0.101 0.049 0.044 0.061 0.132
IT 0.311 0.011 0.021 0.047 0.081 0.151
LU 0.593 0.148 0.177 0.056 0.070 0.142
NL 0.452 0.123 0.048 0.054 0.088 0.140
PL 0.329 0.031 0.035 0.048 0.066 0.150
PT 0.386 0.014 0.005 0.040 0.075 0.252
SI 0.431 0.045 0.038 0.056 0.083 0.210
SP 0.376 0.038 0.049 0.065 0.076 0.148
SW 0.678 0.160 0.109 0.109 0.110 0.190
UK 0.415 0.142 0.034 0.030 0.060 0.150
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
on market and disposable income to the income stabilization coe¢ cients for the
income shock (Figure 3.3.1) and the unemployment shock (Figure 3.5.1 in the Ap-
pendix). The strong relationship between income stabilization and redistribution
is reected in very high (population-weighted) correlations of 0.67 (IS) and 0.86
(US).
Next, we consider the relationship between the income stabilization coe¢ cient
and the ratio of direct to indirect taxes. We nd a strong positive correlation of
0.67 (Figure 3.3.2). This is not surprising since the income stabilization coe¢ cient
positively depends on the level of direct taxes. In contrast, the mechanism how in-
direct taxes provide automatic stabilization is di¤erent as discussed in Dolls et al.
(2012). There, we assume that only liquidity constrained households will adjust
their consumption to an income shock and indirect taxes contribute to demand
rather to income stabilization. We also nd a positive relationship between the
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Figure 3.3.1: Income Stabilization IS and Redistribution
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income stabilization and government size and openness of the economy6, respect-
ively, whereas no correlation is found between automatic stabilizers and active
scal policy measures passed during the current economic crisis.
Table 3.3.5 shows the results of regressing the income stabilization coe¢ cient
(of the income shock) on our measure for redistribution, a measure for openness
and the ratio of direct to indirect taxes. Redistribution is again measured as
the percentage di¤erence in the Gini coe¢ cients based on market and disposable
income and openness as the average ratio of exports and imports to GDP from
2000-2004.
Due to the very small sample size (N = 19), this inference should be inter-
preted with caution. Having this in mind, the signicant positive relationships
between automatic stabilizers and each of the variables is also conrmed by this
naïveregression.
6 Openness is measured as the ratio of imports and exports to GDP.
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Figure 3.3.2: Income Stabilization IS and Ratio Direct to Indirect Taxes
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3.3.4 Cluster Analysis
In order to compare the clustering of countries with respect to the di¤erent meas-
ures of automatic stabilization and controlling for several variables, we conduct
a hierarchical cluster analysis to group countries that have similar characteristics
across a set of variables. When performing a cluster analysis, a number of tech-
nical decisions have to be made. First, all variables have been standardized from 0
to 1 using z-scores, to prevent that the results are driven by large absolute values
of some variables. Our method of grouping the countries is the common Wards
linkage, which combines such clusters which minimally increase the squared sum of
errors. Our results will be illustrated in a so-called dendrogram, which graphically
presents the information concerning which observations are grouped together at
various levels of (dis)similarity. At the bottom of the dendrogram, each observation
is considered as its own cluster. Vertical lines extend up for each observation, and
at various (dis)similarity values these lines are connected to the lines from other
observations with a horizontal line. The observations continue to combine, until,
at the top of the dendrogram, all observations are grouped together. The height
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Table 3.3.5: Regressions on income stabilization coe¢ cient IS
dep. var.: TAU Income Shock (1) (2) (3) (4)
Redistribution 0.787*** 0.441**
(0.21) (0.19)
Openness 0.109* 0.082*
(0.06) (0.04)
Ratio Direct to Indirect Taxes 0.203*** 0.154***
(0.06) (0.05)
Constant 0.060 0.302*** 0.004 -0.140
(0.09) (0.04) (0.10) (0.09)
adjusted R2 0.417 0.114 0.410 0.651
dof 17 17 17 15
F 13.9 3.3 13.5 12.2
N 19 19 19 19
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
Note: S.E. in parentheses. Signicance level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
of the vertical lines and the range of the (dis)similarity axis give visual clues about
the strength of the clustering. In our case, the measure for the distance between
cases is the common squared Euclidean. Generally, long vertical lines indicate
more distinct separation between groups, short lines more similarity, respectively.7
We perform a cluster analysis on the basis of the stabilization coe¢ cients
for the income and unemployment shock combined with inequality in market in-
come and the ratio of direct to indirect taxes. The dendogram is illustrated in
Figure 3.3.3. In accordance with the classical typology of welfare state regimes
(Esping-Andersen (1990) and Ferrera (1996)), the dendogram groups Continental
and Nordic countries to the left and Anglo-Saxon, Southern and Eastern European
countries to the right. The former group is characterized by a rather high level of
income stabilization, modest inequality in market income and an important role
of direct taxes and SIC, whereas countries from the latter group tend to rank at
the other end of the spectrum.
7 Note that the general clustering results presented here are robust to di¤erent linkage or dissim-
ilarity measure specications. We report the results for the most common combination found
in the literature.
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Figure 3.3.3: Cluster Analysis
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3.4 Conclusions
This paper investigates the extent to which the tax and transfer system mit-
igates negative income and employment shocks at di¤erent income levels and in
di¤erent countries. We have considered the distributional consequences of two
types of shocks: a proportional shock on all incomes and an increase in unem-
ployment which a¤ects households asymmetrically. In both scenarios, post-shock
inequalities in market income are even more reduced through the tax and transfer
system than in the base scenario, i.e. the redistributive e¤ects of the tax benet
systems increase in all countries.
Further, we investigate the degree of income stabilization for di¤erent income
groups. In case of the proportional income shock, stabilization for higher income
groups contributes relatively more to overall stabilization than stabilization for
low income groups, but this is due to the larger absolute shock on gross income for
the former group. A di¤erent pattern emerges in case of the unemployment shock.
With the exception of some Eastern and Southern European countries, we nd
relatively high income stabilization coe¢ cients also for low income groups. The
stabilization for high income groups is mainly driven by the income tax. A notable
exception to this is France where (progressive) social insurance contributions are
most important for stabilization. For low income groups whose tax payments
are negligible, benets play a central role. As they are more generous in the
Scandinavian and Western European countries, they contribute substantially more
to stabilization of disposable income for lower income groups. We thus conclude
that European tax benet systems put unequal weights on the extent di¤erent
income groups are protected against macro shocks.
With respect to the relationship between income stabilization and redistribu-
tion, we nd that tax benet systems with high automatic stabilizers are also those
which are more e¤ective in mitigating existing inequalities in market income. A
simple regression of income stabilization on measures for openness, redistribution
and the ratio of direct to indirect taxes conrms a signicant positive relationship
between the automatic stabilizers and each of the variables.
These results have to be interpreted in the light of various limitations of our
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analysis. Firstly, by modeling the unemployment shock through reweighting of
the sample, we implicitly assume that the socio-demographic characteristics of the
unemployed remain constant. Secondly, our analysis abstracts from automatic
stabilization through other taxes, in particular corporate income taxes.8 Thirdly,
we have abstracted from the role of labor supply or other behavioral adjustments
for the impact of automatic stabilizers. Furthermore, one should note, though,
that our analysis is not a forecasting exercise. We do not aim at quantifying the
exact e¤ects of the current economic crisis but of stylized scenarios based on sim-
ulations in order to explore the build-in automatic stabilizers of existing pre-crisis
tax-benet systems. Conducting an ex-post analysis would include discretionary
government reactions and behavioral responses (see, e.g., Aaberge et al. (2000) for
an empirical ex-post analysis of a previous crisis in the Nordic countries) and we
would not be able to identify the role of automatic stabilization. We intend to
pursue these issues in future research.
8 For an analysis of automatic stabilizers in the corporate tax system see Devereux and Fuest
(2009) and Buettner and Fuest (2010).
3.5. APPENDIX 77
3.5 Appendix
Figure 3.5.1: Income Stabilization US and Redistribution
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Chapter 4
Tax policy and income inequality
in the US, 1978-2009: A
decomposition approach
4.1 Introduction
Over the past decades, household incomes have become more unequally distributed
in most OECD countries. The United States is among the countries recording the
largest levels and increases in inequality (cf. OECD (2008)). The usual approach
for evaluating the role of taxation as a driver of overall inequality trends is to
compare income inequality measures before and after taxes (see e.g. Gottschalk
and Smeeding (1997) or Heathcote et al. (2010)). However, tax burdens and their
impact on the income distribution are determined by both tax schedule and tax
base. For instance, a given progressive income tax schedule redistributes more
when the distribution of taxable incomes becomes more dispersed, and very little
if everybody earns about the same (Musgrave and Thin (1948) and Dardanoni and
Lambert (2002)). At the same time, the U.S. tax system has seen a large number
of changes due to policy reforms (such as lower marginal tax rates and a reduced
number of tax brackets in the 1980s or a more generous Earned Income Tax Credit,
EITC, in the 1990s). Given the importance of the distribution of market income
for redistribution, it is however unclear how much of an observed change in tax
80
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burdens is due to policy reforms and what part is due to other factors, notably the
underlying distribution of market income (as well as other taxrelevant population
characteristics, such as family structures).1
We assess the e¤ect of tax reforms on economic inequality in the U.S. over the
19782009 period.2 We pay special attention to separating the direct e¤ects of
policy reforms from other factors, including indirect policy e¤ects due to beha-
vioral responses (Poterba (2007)). To isolate the pure policy e¤ects, we perform
a series of detailed counterfactual simulations that show what the income distri-
bution would have been if either tax policy or, alternatively, the distribution of
the tax base had remained unchanged between two given years. In combination
with a decomposition analysis based on Shorrocks (1999)s reinterpretation of the
Shapley value, these simulation results enable us to split changes in inequality
into a direct tax policy e¤ect and other factors which impact on income distribu-
tion.3 By repeating the analysis for each year, this method allows us to reassess
whether major U.S. tax reforms during the past three decades have either slowed
or exacerbated the trend towards greater income inequality.
This paper adds to the literature analyzing preand posttax income inequality
in the U.S. since the late 1970s by using micro data from the Current Population
Survey (CPS).4 Our analysis is a natural followup of the study by Piketty and
Saez (2007). While they use the NBERs TAXSIM calculator to compute changing
tax burdens over time and assess their impact on changes in progressivity of the
federal income tax system, we investigate their impact on changes in inequality.
The novelty of our paper is that we explicitly distinguish between the measured
redistributive e¤ect of tax reforms (as a combination of tax policy and tax base
1Note that even without changes to the tax schedule, the tax system becomes more progressive
if taxable incomes grows faster than the indexation of tax brackets this is known as bracket
creep(see e.g. Saez (2003) and Immervoll (2005)).
2This chapter is based on Bargain, Dolls, Immervoll, Neumann, Peichl, Pestel and Siegloch
(2011).
3Our approach formalizes analyses of policy e¤ects, as performed for instance by Clark and
Leicester (2004) for the United Kingdom. See also Bargain and Callan (2010) for France and
Ireland. A related concept for the comparison of tax regimes with respect to progressivity the
transplant-and-compare procedure (Dardanoni and Lambert (2002))  is applied by Lambert
and Thoresen (2009) for Norway. They isolate the tax policy e¤ect by comparing pre-tax income
distributions which have been adjusted to a common base.
4See e.g. Heathcote et al. (2010), Meyer and Sullivan (2010), Meyer and Sullivan (2011) for
studies also based on CPS data and Piketty and Saez (2007) who use tax return data.
82 CHAPTER 4. TAX POLICY AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE US
distribution changes) on the one hand and the pure policy e¤ect on the other hand.
The former emerges from simple comparisons of preand posttax income, whereas
the latter results from our decomposition analysis based on counterfactual policy
simulations using the TAXSIM model. We quantify the distributional impact of
specic tax policy changes and compare its magnitude to other drivers of inequality
changes.
Our main ndings are as follows. The increase in posttax income inequality
was slower than that of pretax inequality indicating that the redistributive role
of the tax system has increased over time. However, our decomposition reveals
that most of this increase in redistribution was not due to the policy e¤ect but
a mechanical consequence of the rising inequality in pretax income. Indeed, the
e¤ects of policy changes more or less canceled out over the period as a whole 
which is a direct consequence of partisan politics. Our ndings are in line with
popular perceptions regarding the political cycle, with disequalizing (equalizing)
e¤ects observed for policy changes implemented during Republican (Democrat)
administrations (see Bartels (2008)). The results for some subperiods show large
e¤ects for actual policy changes sometimes accounting for more than 50 percent
of the increase in posttax inequality (Tax Reform Act of 1986). There are also
signicant di¤erences between results for the lower and upper parts of the distri-
bution. Policy reforms enacted in the early and mid 1990s reduced income gaps
at the bottom to below their 1978 values. The equalizing e¤ect of tax policy on
inequality at the lower half of the distribution is maintained until the end of the
observation period and even enforced by provisions enacted through the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act. By contrast, no equalizing e¤ects of policies can
be discerned for the upper part of the distribution. Instead, for the period as
a whole, tax policy changes a¤ecting topincome earners appear to have slightly
exacerbated trends towards widening income gaps at the top.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the existing
U.S. income inequality literature and particularly focuses on the impact of tax
policy on the income distribution. The decomposition analysis, the data and
income concepts are described in section 4.3. Results are presented in section 5.5.
Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 Literature
Rising income inequality in the U.S. has stimulated a large body of research ex-
amining the underlying driving factors. In this literature, several strands have
emerged which focus on di¤erent types of inequality. While the focus of this paper
is on redistribution and the impact of tax policy on trends in posttax income
inequality, the latter cannot be comprehensively assessed without taking into ac-
count trends in pretax inequality.
The development of wage and earnings inequality has triggered a vast amount
of research. A key result of the literature is that wage inequality increased sub-
stantially during the late 1970s and early 1980s. For instance, Gottschalk and
Danziger (2005) nd that the development of male wage and family income in-
equality were largely comparable over the period 1975 to 2002.5 Autor, Katz and
Kearney (2008) provide an overview of the literature on U.S. wage inequality and
discuss if the substantial increase since the 1980s can be considered as an episodic
event or a continuous development.6
Two explanations for a rising wage dispersion are globalization and skillbiased
technological change. Both may have a negative e¤ect on wages of lowskilled
workers, but a positive one on those of the highskilled. While there is a direct
channel from individual wage to family income inequality, other trends than those
a¤ecting individual wage inequality clearly coexist and impact trends in family
income. Among those, the labor force participation of women, assortative mating
and other aspects of family formation have been discussed in the literature.7
Moving from the individual to the household level, income inequality widened
5They further report that male wage and earnings inequality had similar trends, though earnings
inequality showed a cyclical pattern due to changes in hours worked at the bottom of the
distribution. Contrary, caused by the increase in hours worked of females at the bottom of the
distribution, female earnings inequality decreased over the last three decades and thus reversed
the trend of growing wage inequality.
6See e.g. Card and DiNardo (2002) for the former argument, whereas Autor et al. (2008) nd
support for the latter. They show that while male wage inequality in the lower half of the
distribution grew strongly in the rst half of the 1980s and declined afterwards, inequality in
the upper half of the distribution kept growing in the 1990s and 2000s.
7It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a general discussion of the sources contributing to
an increase in inequality or to quantify the contributions of certain factors a¤ecting inequality
(see e.g. Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) for the rst and Burtless (1999), Daly and Valletta
(2006) or Larrimore (2010) for the latter point).
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in the 1970s (cf. Lindert (2000)) and continued to rise sharply in the 1980s.
Studies using the CPS nd that total income inequality, i.e. inequality in pretax,
posttransfer income rose sharply in the 1980s, and that this growth continued
at a reduced pace in the 1990s and early 2000s.8 Evidence for the trend in pre
tax income inequality since the 1990s that seems to be contrasting at rst glance,
however, is reported by Piketty and Saez (2003) (updated 2008) who build series
of top income shares based on tax return data from the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS). They nd that the share of income held by the richest groups grew in
the 1990s, and with the exception of the period 20002002, continued to rise in
the following years.9 Burkhauser, Feng, Jenkins and Larrimore (2012) seek to
reconcile some of the ndings from these two data sources. They use internal
CPS data which are  compared with publicuse CPS much less a¤ected by
topcoding (although a number of other measurement and conceptual di¤erences
remain) and apply similar income denitions as Piketty and Saez (2003) do, namely
pretransfer, taxunit income. They conclude that the rise in inequality from
1993 onwards is mainly due to gains made by the top 1 percent of the income
distribution.
Recent studies which analyze trends in posttax income inequality and redis-
tribution in the U.S. are Meyer and Sullivan (2010) and Heathcote et al. (2010).
The former nd that posttax income inequality started to increase later (in the
late 1970s) than that of pretax income and that its increase in the 1980s occurred
at a slower rate. Somewhat contrasting, one nding of the latter is that trends
in pre and posttax income inequality had been similar in the 1980s, but the
gap widened (and redistribution therefore increased) in the 1990s.10 A large part
of redistribution in the U.S. takes place through tax expenditures. Since 1986,
8See e.g. Gottschalk and Danziger (2005), Burkhauser, Feng and Jenkins (2009), Meyer and
Sullivan (2010), Heathcote et al. (2010), Burkhauser, Feng, Jenkins and Larrimore (2011).
Di¤erences between these studies exist with regard to the denition of the income unit (family
vs. household), sample selection (full population vs. working-age population) and whether or
not topcoding in the public-use CPS is accounted for.
9Further studies relying on IRS tax return data are Slemrod (1992), Feenberg and Poterba
(1993), DeBacker, Heim, Panousi and Vidangos (2010) and Bakija, Cole and Heim (2012) who,
in particular, look at top incomes, though this list is not exhaustive.
10Note that a key di¤erence between these two studies is the selection of the sample. While
Meyer and Sullivan (2010) use the full CPS sample, the household-level sample in Heathcote
et al. (2010) is restricted to those households with at least one member in working-age.
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the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has been extended in several steps and
nowadays represents an important element of the federal tax system in terms of
redistribution to the workingpoor.11 However, the redistributive capacity of the
income tax system does depend besides tax expenditures on many factors such
as the degree of progressivity, the relative importance of certain components and
the distribution of pretax income.12
Our paper contributes to the strand of the literature which examines the impact
of tax policy on posttax income inequality. By extracting the direct policy e¤ect
through counterfactual simulations, we complement analyses conducted by Piketty
and Saez (2007) or the Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2010). In these studies,
shares of posttax income and average federal tax rates are calculated for all
income groups and similar time periods, but the estimates do not allow to isolate
the direct policy e¤ect since they reect both legislative changes as well as other
factors which inuence tax rates. Some studies have conducted socalled what if
calculations (cf. Poterba (2007), p. 630) but to the best of our knowledge, none of
these papers have sought to identify a policy e¤ect on a yearbyyear basis over
a long time period. We are aware of two contributions which explicitly consider 
via counterfactual simulations the impact of tax policy on the posttax income
distribution. In an analysis of policy changes during the 1980s, Gramlich, Kasten
and Sammartino (1993) apply tax and transfer policies of 1980 and 1985 to the
pretax income distribution of 1990. They report that 16 percent of the increase
in the Gini coe¢ cient from 1980 to 1990 are due to changes in taxes and transfers,
although the exact scope of their study in terms of simulated taxes and transfers
is not clear. More recently, Poterba (2007) conducts conceptually similar policy
swaps by applying 2004 e¤ective tax rates to the 2000 pretax income distribution
and vice versa and examines the resulting e¤ects on the share of posttax (but
before payroll tax) income accruing to various income groups. A key nding from
11See e.g. Hotz and Scholz (2003), Meyer (2010) and Eissa and Hoynes (2011) who document
the growing redistributive impact of this program.
12For studies examining the progressivity of the tax system, see e.g. Kasten, Sammartino and
Toder (1994), Bishop, Chow, Formby and Ho (1997), Alm, Lee and Wallace (2005) and Piketty
and Saez (2007). The latter nd that the progressivity of the overall federal tax system declined
substantially at the top of the income distribution since the 1960s. Mitrusi and Poterba (2000)
describe the growing importance of payroll taxes relative to the income tax since the early
1980s.
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this analysis is that the impact of changes in the pretax income distribution is
approximately four times as large as the policy e¤ect of changes in e¤ective tax
rates.13
4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Decomposition
We follow the decomposition approach by Bargain and Callan (2010). Consider
a data matrix y containing information on individualspretax income from dif-
ferent sources as well as various individual and household characteristics which
are relevant for the calculation of income and payroll taxes. The tax function d
represents the rules and structure of the tax system (e.g., marginal tax and con-
tribution rates) while vector p accounts for all the monetary parameters (e.g., tax
band limits). In this way, the distribution of posttax income is represented by
di(p
j; yl) for tax rules of year i, tax parameters of year j and nominal incomes of
year l. We shall also consider the possibility of nominally adjusting income levels
and/or parameters p by an uprating factor . For instance, the counterfactual
situation dt+1(pt+1; t+1yt) represents posttax incomes obtained by applying tax
rules and parameters of year t+ 1 on year t data nominally adjusted to year t+ 1.
This backdrop, where the new policy is evaluated while holding the population
constant, is used in the decomposition below. Symmetrically, we may evaluate the
distribution obtained with the initial policy applied to the new population. For
this, we need to construct a counterfactual dt(t+1pt; yt+1) where tax parameters
are uprated using the same factor t+1 as used to scale up the distribution of
13Further studies examining the degree of redistribution of the U.S. income tax system by means
of policy swaps are Kasten et al. (1994), Mitrusi and Poterba (2000), Alm et al. (2005), Leigh
(2008b) and Meyer (2010). However, these studies do not quantify how much of an observed
change in posttax income inequality is due to policy changes. Instead, the focus of these
contributions is on the changing importance of income and payroll taxes over time (Mitrusi
and Poterba (2000)), on the progressivity of the income tax (Kasten et al. (1994) and Alm
et al. (2005)), the redistributiveness of state taxes (Leigh (2008b)) and the distributional e¤ect
of the EITC reform enacted through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(Meyer (2010)).
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gross income between period t and t + 1.14 As further explained below, policy
changes under study possibly combine changes in policy structure d and changes
in parameters p (the uprating policy).
In the empirical part, we are interested in relative inequality indices I, com-
puted as a function I

di(p
j; yl)

of the simulated distribution of posttax income.
The advantage of the present approach is that we may use any inequality measure
and not only those with specic properties (i.e., decomposable indices). In general,
it is possible to decompose any scalar I, e.g. average and e¤ective marginal tax
rates, measures of tax redistribution or automatic stabilization. Characterize total
change I in the inequality index I between initial and nal period as
 = I

dt+1(p
t+1; yt+1)
  I dt(pt; yt) (4.3.1)
and notice that the last term can also be written I[dt(t+1pt; t+1yt)] since function
d is linearly homogenous in p and y.15 Then, the total change between periods
t and t + 1 can be decomposed into the contributions of changing policy and of
changing data (i.e., changing the underlying gross income distribution due to all
e¤ects not directly due to tax reforms). The policy e¤ect can be assessed on end
period data yt+1, and in this case, the data or other e¤ect is assessed on the
base period tax system, yielding the decomposition I:
I = I[dt+1(p
t+1; yt+1)]  I[dt(t+1pt; yt+1)]| {z }
policy e¤ect I
+ I[dt(
t+1pt; yt+1)]  I[dt(t+1pt; t+1yt)]| {z }
other e¤ect I
Notice that in this case, base period tax parameters are applied to end period data
yt+1 after nominal adjustment, i.e., writing parameters as t+1pt: Symmetrically,
14A measure dt(pt; yt+1) would not be consistent since base-period parameters would be arti-
cially applied to end-period income levels. For instance, previous tax band thresholds would
be applied to new and possibly higher income levels, thereby generating articial scal drag
(see Saez (2003) or Immervoll (2005)).
15Converting tax parameters and income from dollars into euros does not change the relative
location of households in the distribution of posttax income.
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the decomposition can be written as a policy e¤ect assessed on base year data
followed by a change in underlying data conditional on the new policy. This
decomposition II is thus written as:
I = I[dt+1(p
t+1; yt+1)]  I[dt+1(pt+1; t+1yt)]| {z }
other e¤ect II
+ I[dt+1(p
t+1; t+1yt)]  I[dt(t+1pt; t+1yt)]| {z }
policy e¤ect II
:
In this case, the endperiod tax system is evaluated on nominallyadjusted base
period data t+1yt.
As the decompositions are path dependent, we simply average policy and other
e¤ects respectively over the decompositions I and II. Doing so corresponds to
the suggestion of Shorrocks (1999) of using a Shapley value procedure whereby
the contribution of a given factor (to a change in the statistic I) is obtained by
extracting the marginal contribution of eliminating this factor and averaging these
marginal contributions over all possible elimination sequences. In the empirical
sections, however, we shall verify that results based on decompositions I and II are
not too di¤erent to each other and to the average Shapley decomposition result.
In the decompositions, it is important to understand that the nominally
adjusted tax schedule, t+1pt, is not identical to the actual set of parameters pt+1
as decided by the policymaker. Hence, the policy e¤ect does not only capture
the e¤ect of changes in policy structure (dt to dt+1) on the income distribution
but also the actual uprating policy (shift from pt to pt+1) against a scenario where
parameters are adjusted in line with the uprating factor t+1. The way tax brack-
ets are uprated by governments can have important implications for the income
distribution and public spending in the long run. Standard practice consists in one
of the three following options: (1) no uprating, (2) uprating according to the level
of price ination, (3) uprating according to the level of earnings growth. With
nonindexation of tax brackets in progressive systems, or price indexation when
incomes rise faster than prices, the total number of tax payers (and the number
of higherrate taxpayers) increases. This phenomenon of scal dragor bracket
creepmust a¤ect the nal distribution of posttax income (see Saez (2003) and
4.3. METHODOLOGY 89
Immervoll (2005)). In our empirical application, we use changes in the consumer
price index. This reference situation is extensively used in policy analyses of tax
reforms (cf., discussion in Clark and Leicester (2004)). This choice is also justi-
ed on historical ground as it aims to guarantee some continuity in the evaluation
of policies (see Sutherland, Hancock, Hills and Zantomio (2008)). In a robust-
ness check (see section 4.4.3), we rely on a more conservative approach based on
nominal wage growth, i.e., a distributionallyneutral backdrop (cf. Bargain and
Callan (2010)). A related issue is the question whether it is interesting to further
decompose our policy e¤ect into the contributions of structural changes and up-
rating policy, respectively. For some types of reforms, these two components are
usually intertwined in a way that makes the distinction irrelevant and arbitrary.
For instance, a change in the maximum amount of EITC, other monetary para-
meters being held constant, also entails a necessary change in the phasein and
phaseout rates. Classifying the former as uprating policy change and the latter
as structuralpolicy change is probably meaningless. However, in the empirical
results, we should pay attention to periods where uprating policies were subject to
specic changes, typically priceindexation policies during high ination periods.
With the present approach, we are able to account for direct e¤ects of tax policy
changes but dont consider the indirect response to changes in tax policy (Poterba
(2007), p. 632633, Slemrod (1992), p. 108).16 For instance, reforms may a¤ect
labor supply behavior and hence the distribution of gross income. In particular, the
EITC reforms have been shown to change substantially participation rates among
married couples and single mothers (cf., Eissa and Hoynes (2006), among others).
In addition to adjustments in participation or work hours, tax reforms may a¤ect
many di¤erent other margins (e.g., tax evasion) and change the tax base at all levels
and in particular at the top of the distribution. This point is investigated in the
new tax responsiveness literature (Feldstein (1995), Gruber and Saez (2002) and
Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012)). Hence, further research may account for this
indirect e¤ect, which could be handled in the present decomposition framework.
However, as we look at yeartoyear changes, the other e¤ect should more or
16Piketty and Saez (2007), p.9, however, argue that given the controversy about behavioral
responses to taxation "[...] considering the basic case with no behavioral response is a useful
starting place".
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less equal the indirect, behavioral e¤ect as other, structural changes are unlikely
to occur in the shortrun.
4.3.2 Data
Several data sources have been used in studies focusing on the impact of taxation
on income inequality, in particular tax return data (e.g. Piketty and Saez (2007))
and household surveys such as the CPS (e.g. Alm et al. (2005)). It is wellknown
that there are pros and cons for both types of data sources (Poterba (2007)).
In brief, tax return data allow to precisely calculate top income shares, but do
not contain information about nonling households (typically at the bottom of
the distribution) and lack certain (taxrelevant) components of household income.
The CPS is a rich microdata set of U.S. households and a primary data source
for investigating income and distribution trends. It is also the source for o¢ cial
U.S. government statistics on (un)employment and poverty. However, it does not
contain information with respect to itemized deductions which might a¤ect our
results. Further, for condentiality reasons, the U.S. Census Bureau top codes
(i.e. censors) all income sources, with di¤erences in methods between some years.
This can cause a downward bias of income inequality estimates.
In this study, we use data from IPUMSCPS (Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series, Current Population Survey) which is a harmonized set of data of the Annual
Social and Economic MarchSupplement (ASEC) comprising the years 19622010.
The CPS is a monthly U.S. household survey representative of the civilian non
institutional population and jointly conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau and the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Importantly, we are able to overcome the shortcomings
associated with this data source. First, to alleviate the problem of topcoding, we
use an extended series of cell means constructed from internal CPS (see Larrimore,
Burkhauser, Feng and Zayatz (2008) and Burkhauser, Feng and Larrimore (2010))
which enables us to closely replicate inequality trends found in the internal CPS
data.17 Further, we focus our analysis on percentile ratios such as the 90/10 ratio
which is standard in the U.S. income inequality literature (see e.g. Gottschalk
17Note that even internal CPS data is censored. However, Burkhauser et al. (2012) show that
with internal CPS data, it is possible to match top income shares reported by Piketty and Saez
(2003) who use Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax return data.
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and Danziger (2005), Meyer and Sullivan (2010)). Second, for the imputation of
itemized deductions we use data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). These
are representative microlevel tax return les compiled annually by the Statistics
of Income (SOI) division of the IRS. In a sensitivity check, we explore how our
results are a¤ected by this imputation (see section 4.4.3).
4.3.3 Sample selection, income concepts and the calcula-
tion of counterfactual scenarios
Our sample solely includes nonelderly households meaning that at least one mem-
ber of the household is in workingage, i.e. between the ages of 15 and 64. The
motivation for this sample selection is driven by the fact that our analysis entirely
focuses on taxpolicy and does not consider the policy e¤ect of transfers targeted
to the elderly. In a robustness check, we recalculate our results for the full pop-
ulation. We use the square root of household size as equivalence factor in order
to account for economies of scale within households (see e.g. Atkinson, Rainwater
and Smeeding (1995) or Burkhauser et al. (2009)).
Throughout this paper, we focus on preand posttax income inequality which
are dened as commonly done in the literature (e.g., Heathcote et al. (2010) and
Meyer and Sullivan (2010)). Pretax income is taken from the data and follows the
Census denition of money income that is used to measure poverty and inequality.
It is computed as the sum of market income (sum of pre-tax wage and salary
income, business and farm income, interest, investment, and rental income) plus
private (e.g. alimony) and public transfers (e.g. unemployment benets, Social
Security, SSI, welfare payments). Posttax income is dened as pretax income
minus the simulated components of the income tax system including federal income
taxes, state income taxes, employee social insurance contributions (payroll taxes),
and tax credits (e.g. EITC).
For the calculation of the baseline as well as for counterfactual scenarios and
the isolation of the tax policy e¤ect  i.e. applying policy parameters from the
base period to the population of the end period or policy parameters from the end
period to the population of the base period we use NBERs simulation model
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TAXSIM.18 The simulation approach allows conducting a controlled experiment by
changing the parameters of interest while holding everything else constant which
avoids endogeneity problems when identifying the e¤ects of the policy reform under
consideration (cf. Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006)). When assessing the isolated
role of tax policy on income inequality, we are thus able to account for changes in
federal and state level income taxes as well as payroll taxes and tax credits such
as the EITC. Our analysis spans the period 1978 until 2009.
4.3.4 Tax history
In this section, we briey outline the major changes in the U.S. federal income
tax system from 1978 until 2009 which are also summarized in Table 1. We con-
centrate on large legislative changes which drive the tax policy e¤ect described
later in this section. Reforms of interest are the Revenue Act of 1978 (RA78),
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA81), the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA86), the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 and 1993 (OBRA90
and OBRA93), the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), the Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA01), the Jobs and Growth
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA03) and the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA09).
The aim of RA78 was to enhance real GDP growth (Romer and Romer (2010)).
For that purpose, by widening tax brackets and reducing the number of tax rates,
individual taxes were reduced. Further, at that time ination was relatively high
and individual income tax parameters were not xed for ination so that bracket
creep led to increases in income tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. RA78 to
some extent attenuated this e¤ect and caused a yearly reduction in tax revenue of
on average 0.83 percent of GDP in the four years after the reform (c.f. Tempalski
(2006) for estimates of revenue e¤ects mentioned in this section).
ERTA81 introduced the indexation of individual income tax parameters which
became e¤ective in 1985. Tax cuts were phased in over the years 19821984, with a
reduction of top marginal tax rates from 70 to 50 percent in 1982 and of other tax
18For more information on TAXSIM see Feenberg and Coutts (1993) or visit
http://www.nber.org/taxsim/.
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rates by 23 percent in three annual steps. Further, the income threshold for the top
rate substantially increased from $85,600 in 1982 to $109,400 (1983) and $162,400
(1984) for married couples ling jointly. Similar threshold increases occurred for
couples ling separately and singles. The reduction in tax revenue amounting to
2.89 percent of GDP (four year average) was substantially larger than for RA78.
The motivation of TRA86 was to make the tax system simpler and more con-
ducive to longrun growth (Auerbach and Slemrod (1997) and Romer and Romer
(2010)). Key aspects of the reform were the broadening of the tax base and reduc-
tions in marginal tax rates. Consequently, the reform was almost revenue neutral.
TRA86 further lowered the top marginal rate to 38.5 percent in 1987 and to 28 per-
cent in 1988, reduced the number of tax brackets from 15 in 1986 to four in 1988,
but also substantially expanded the EITC with nancial benets for lowincome
households.
Reforms in the 1990s which had considerable direct policy e¤ects are OBRA90,
OBRA93 and TRA97. OBRA90 contained increases in income taxes as well as
expansions of the EITC and other lowincome credits. Further, payroll taxes
were increased by lifting the taxable maximum for Hospital Insurance which were
nally abolished in 1994. OBRA93 then led to the largest single expansion of the
EITC (cf. Eissa and Hoynes (2011)), and further increases in income tax rates
were implemented, e.g. the top rate rose from 31 to 39.6 percent in 1993. The
EITC became much more generous in 1994 with higher maximum credits and an
expansion to single workers with no children. These EITC expansions continued in
the next years. The revenue e¤ect of OBRA90 and OBRA93 was again evaluated
on a four year average positive and amounted to 0.5 and 0.63 percent of GDP,
respectively. TRA97 lowered capital gains tax rates and introduced additional tax
credits (child and education tax credits).
EGTRRA01 and JGTRRA03 were characterized by reductions in marginal
tax rates, both for low and highincome families, expansions of the child tax
credits, and reductions in taxes on dividends. In 2003, JGTRRA accelerated those
provisions of EGTRRA which were not set to become e¤ective until 2006. Both
reforms had a revenuedecreasing e¤ect (0.71 and 0.57 percent of GDP, 4 year
average).
Finally, ARRA09 was a countercyclical scal stimulus program in response to
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the severe economic contraction in 2008/2009. It contained, among other meas-
ures, individual tax cuts and adjustments of the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT)
which, together with some business tax incentives, accounted for $263.3 billion of
the total $787 billion program at the end of December 2009 (see e.g. Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors (2010a)). Important tax measures were the creation of the Making
Work Pay Credit, a refundable tax credit of up to $400 for working individuals
and up to $800 for married taxpayers ling jointly, the American Opportunity Tax
Credit, EITC expansions and an extension of the AMT relief to 2009 as well as an
increase in the AMT tax exemption (Council of Economic Advisors (2010b), Tax
Policy Center (2011)).
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Trends in average tax rates and income inequality
Before we turn to the decomposition analysis, we rst describe the general trend
in average tax rates and income inequality during the observation period. For
the calculation of average tax rates, we group households by quintiles of market
income and calculate the share of income paid in federal and state level income
taxes.19 We account for tax expenditure on the federal and state level. Results
are reported in Figure 4.6.1. Compared with the average tax rates for households
at the top and the bottom of the income distribution, those for the second to
fourth income quintile show less variation and are combined in one series. The
average tax rate for the highest quintile decreased from a peak in 1981 (almost 30
percent) until reaching the trough in 1990 (23 percent). It constantly increased
in the 1990s reaching again the 30 percent level in 2000 before it started to fall
in the following years. Contrary, the average tax rate for households in the lowest
income quintile was almost constant until 1990 and turned negative afterwards.
It decreased dramatically in the period from 1990 to 1996 due to expansions of
the EITC. After a slight increase in the second half of the 1990s, it fell again
19Cf. Piketty and Saez (2007) who also rank families by market income, but focus on federal
taxes. Contrary, estimates for average tax rates of the Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2010) are
based on comprehensive household income including cash transfers and in-kind benets.
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after 2000. Marked changes in average tax rates occured especially during the
Great Recession period of 2008/2009. While the average tax rate for the lowest
quintile increased sharply in 2008, the drop in 2009 was even larger. The increase
in 2008 was due to the substantial decline in market income of households at
the bottom of the distribution (see also Figure 4.6.2) which was caused by an
unprecedented rise in the unemployment rate. In fact, this trend continued in
2009 with the unemployment rate reaching a peak of 10.1 percent in October
2009 (U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010)), but at the
same time, discretionary policy measures enacted through ARRA09 (cf. section
4.3.4 and Table 1) became e¤ective and led to a sharp decline in tax liabilities,
particularly for low income households (Council of Economic Advisors (2010b)).
Income inequality in the United States has increased dramatically over the past
30 years. For instance, for households headed by workingage individuals, market
incomes in the upper part of the distribution show an upwards trend in almost all
periods since 1978, while they increased remarkably little in the middle and show
large and sustained declines at the bottom during and after recessions (cf. Figure
4.6.2). This is particularly true for the recent economic crisis.
The following analysis is essentially based on three percentile ratios which cap-
ture di¤erent parts of the income distribution (90/10, 90/50 and 50/10) and spans
the period from 1978 to 2009. Importantly, we now focus on preand posttax in-
come instead of on market income (cf. section 4.3.3). We rst describe the overall
trend in pretax inequality. Figure 4.6.3 reports the percentile ratios at each point
in time while Figures 4.6.44.6.7 show the absolute change relative to the starting
year 1978 (black dots). The 90/10 ratio for household pretax incomes increases
by roughly 3.2 points (from 6.1 to 9.3, or by 52 percent) over the period as a whole.
The upper and lower half of the distribution equally contribute to this increase.
In line with other studies on inequality trends, the increase was particularly steep
until the earlymid 1990s (see section 4.2). The gap between the 90th and the
10th percentiles then dropped until 2000 before rising again at a reduced pace in
the years before the Great Recession and accelerating during the 2008-2009 period
(cf. Burkhauser and Larrimore (2011)).
Posttax inequality series closely follow the pretax series, but with some dif-
ferences between the three ratios as is illustrated in Figures 4.6.44.6.7. The dark
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triangles show the di¤erence between the series for preand post tax inequality
(i.e. the line measured redistributiongives the di¤erential between pretax in-
equality in period t relative to its base year value in 1978 and posttax inequality
in t relative to the base year). Although there are some uctuations, the overall
picture is one of a rather constant (in case of 90/10 and 50/10 ratio) or slightly de-
creasing (90/50) di¤erence in preand posttax inequality in the 1980s. Beginning
in the early 1990s, however, the di¤erence started to increase for all three measures
until reaching a peak in the late 1990s (90/10 and 50/10 ratio) or the early 2000s
(90/50 ratio). After a slight reduction, all three series remained constant until the
mid 2000s. This development is in line with previous research, see e.g. Heathcote
et al. (2010) who report similar trends for the Gini coe¢ cient. During the Great
Recession period, posttax inequality increased signicantly in 2008, whereas part
of this increase was reversed in 2009 due to the tax cuts enacted through ARRA09.
The fact that the di¤erence between pre and posttax income inequality
largely remained constant during the 1980s and became larger in certain peri-
ods (in particular during 19891994 for the 90/10 and 50/10 ratio and until the
early 2000s for the 90/50) shows that the overall redistributive capacity of the U.S.
income tax system signicantly rose during these periods (see e.g. Heathcote et al.
(2010)). However, it can be suspected that this increased redistributive e¤ect was
driven by the very pronounced increase in pretax inequality over time. Clearly,
actual policy e¤ects and the indirect role of pretax income changes cannot be dis-
entangled with a simple comparison of preand posttax inequality. As explained
in our methodology section, the decomposition analysis that follows allows us to
separate both e¤ects by controlling for the underlying pretax income distribution.
4.4.2 Decomposition results
We rst illustrate the decomposition procedure with Tables 24. In each of these
tables, we compare two years, i.e., before and after important legislation changes
have been enacted (base and end year). We decompose the total change in post
tax inequality into two components. The rst is due to tax policy reforms (tax
policy e¤ect) while the second is due to changes in the underlying data (other
e¤ect). Precisely, the latter e¤ect accounts for changes in the distribution of market
4.4. RESULTS 97
income (labor or capital income), in the population (participation rates, household
structure which a¤ects equivalence scales) and in replacement incomes which are
included in pretax income (e.g. unemployment benets or welfare payments). For
instance, Table 2 analyzes changes in inequality which occurred between the base
year 1978 the year when the RA78 reform was enacted and year 1980 when it
was fully phasedin. The left part of the table reports the di¤erent components
of the decomposition as detailed in section 4.3, including base and end period
scenarios ((0)/(1) and (4) respectively) as well as all the relevant counterfactuals
(scenario (2) answers the question how large inequality would have been, had the
tax system of 1978 been in place in 1980; (3) is the counterfactual scenario of the
1980 tax system being in place in 1978). The column labeled (4)(0)shows the
total change in inequality over time. The right part of the Table reports both the
policy and othere¤ect for decompositions I, II and the Shapleyvalue approach.
The other e¤ect. To understand the decomposition results, we start with the
othere¤ect which is shown in the last column of Tables 24 for the Shapleyvalue
decomposition. A substantial part of the increase in posttax income inequality
which can be observed in those periods during which the large tax reforms were
phasedin was due to changes in the pretax income distribution. For example,
the 90/10 ratio would have increased by 0.28 points from 1978 to 1980 if no tax
policy change had occurred (cf. Table 2 for the years 19781980). The sign of
the inequality change due to the other e¤ect is also positive for the reform periods
19811984 and 19861988. This partly captures income shifting from the corporate
to the individual sector, especially after TRA86 (see e.g. Feenberg and Poterba
(1993) and Slemrod (1996)). The other e¤ect is even more pronounced for some of
the following reform periods, especially for the period from 1989 to 1994 which was
characterized by a steep increase in inequality (see last section). In this period,
the 90/10 ratio of posttax income would have increased by 0.54 points a larger
e¤ect as was actually observed (cf. Table 4 for the period 19891994)  in the
absence of any changes in tax policy.
The direct policy e¤ect. Following a chronological order, we start with RA78
to assess the e¤ect of legislative changes in tax policy on posttax income in-
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equality. As can be seen from the Shapleyvalue policy e¤ect, RA78 counteracted
the trend of growing inequality. However, the inequalitydecreasing e¤ect of tax
policy was not large enough to o¤set the overall trend of growing inequality. The
tax policy e¤ect led to a reduction in all inequality measures considered in our
analysis. Results for decompositions I and II yield almost identical e¤ects.20
A di¤erent picture emerges for the two large tax reforms in the 1980s. The
e¤ect of ERTA81 was to exacerbate the trend of growing inequality over the years
19811984, with 3550 percent of the increase in posttax inequality depending
on the chosen inequality measure due to the reform (i.e. the taxpolicy e¤ect
divided by the total change in posttax inequality).
Contrary to ERTA81, TRA86 certainly contained both inequalityincreasing
(reduction in top marginal tax rates) and decreasing elements (expansion of
EITC, tax base broadening). This can be seen in the last two columns of Table
3 (19861988). The policy e¤ect of TRA86 led to a slight decrease (increase) in
inequality at the bottom (top) of the distribution (50/10 and 90/50 ratio). Inter-
estingly, the inequalityincreasing e¤ect of TRA86 on the Gini coe¢ cient as well
as the 90/10 and 90/50 ratios was even larger than the increase due to changes
in the pretax income distribution. The contribution of tax policy to the growing
posttax inequality ranges between 6776 percent for this period.
The period in the early 1990s was then characterized by steep increases in pre
and posttax income inequality. OBRA90 and OBRA93 counteracted at least to
some extent the rapidly growing inequality at that time. Comparing the years
1989 and 1994, i.e. the year before OBRA90 was enacted with the year when
OBRA93 was e¤ective (cf. Table 4, 19891994), one can conclude that the overall
e¤ect of these reforms was inequalitydecreasing, especially in the lower half of the
distribution due to large expansions of the EITC. The tax policy e¤ect worked in
the opposite direction as changes in the pretax income distribution and made up
75 percent of the other e¤ect for the lower part of the distribution, whereas it was
negligible for the upper part of the distribution.
20The comparison of columns (4) and (2) of Table 2 (1978-1980) reveals that, without RA78,
inequality in 1980 would have been higher as it actually was in that year. The second coun-
terfactual reported in this table is shown in column (3). If the tax system of 1980 had been
in place in 1978, inequality would have been lower compared with the observed inequality in
1978 (compare columns (3) and (1)).
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Finally, we show in the lower part of Table 4 (20002004) that the e¤ect of
EGTRRA01 and JGTRRA03 was to increase inequality, in particular in the middle
and at the top of the distribution through reductions in marginal tax rates. How-
ever, overall the policy e¤ect was moderate compared with the increase in inequal-
ity due to changes in the pretax income distribution and accounted for up to
22.2 percent of the total increase in posttax inequality. An overall assessment
of the policy e¤ect of ARRA09 is not possible yet as its measures extend to 2010
for which no data are available at the time of writing of this paper. However, its
impact on average tax rates is discussed in the following section.
Policy e¤ect on average tax rates. Average tax rates are inuenced by
changes in tax policy and the distribution of pretax income in the same way
as the inequality measures discussed above. Hence, we isolate the policy e¤ect and
report the (cumulative) hypothetical change in average tax rates (in percentage
points) if the pretax income distribution would have remained constant during the
whole observation period in Figure 4.6.9. Strikingly, in the 1980s the policy e¤ect
on average tax rates was strongest for households in the highest income quintile.
Taken together, ERTA81 and TRA86 (time period 1981-1988) reduced average tax
rates by 10 percentage points for the fth quintile, by 6 percentage points for the
fourth quintile, by 4 percentage points for the third quintile, but only by 1 (3)
points for the second (rst) quintile. The EITC reforms starting with OBRA90
and OBRA93 led to considerable reductions in average tax rates for low income
households while tax reforms in the early 2000s further reduced average tax rates
at the top of the distribution. Tax changes implemented through ARRA09, e.g.
extensions of existing tax credits (EITC) and the implementation of new credits
(Making Work Pay Credit), further reduced average tax rates, in particular at the
bottom of the distribution.
Yeartoyear analysis. We have replicated the decomposition analysis for all
years in the data and report the results in Figures 4.6.104.6.13. In these graphs,
policy and othere¤ects are presented as percent of posttax income inequality of
the previous year. The total e¤ect, which is simply the sum of both e¤ects, is the
percentage change between two consecutive years. Conrming the results presen-
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ted above for specic policy events, these graphs demonstrate that the policy e¤ect
was usually smaller than the other e¤ect in years where policy reforms occurred
(and obviously zero in years with no or minor changes in the tax schedule). In
certain periods, tax policies actually aggravated the increase in pretax income
inequality, while they were more countercyclicalin other times. The former was
particularly true for the 1980s when the tax cuts of ERTA81 and TRA86 became
e¤ective (the policy e¤ect actually outweighed the othere¤ect in 1983 for 90/10
and 90/50 and in 1987 for 90/10). This was also the case, for the 90/10 and 50/10
ratios, in some of the years after 1993 when pretax income inequality went down
and taxpolicy enforced this trend. The latter an inequalityreducing e¤ect 
was pronounced in the late 1970s (RA78), in the period 19901993 (OBRA90 and
OBRA93), mainly due to expansions of the EITC, as well as in 2009 (ARRA09).
Figure 4.6.14 extracts the policy e¤ect (again relative to the inequality measure
of the previous year) for all three percentile ratios. It conrms that the di¤erent
parts of the distribution were a¤ected simultaneously, with some exceptions. In
particular, the 90/50 ratio showed very little response to the policy changes in
the 1990s. This reects the fact that EITC extensions concerned more the lower
incomes.
Comparison to the literature. There is no comparable study which covers
such a long time period in a consistent framework as we do. Previous research has
been partial in the sense that it focused on one policy event or a much shorter time
period. Gramlich et al. (1993) and Poterba (2007) who discuss the relative size
of the policy e¤ect relative to the changes in the pretax income distribution, are
the studies closest to ours. First, it must be stressed that a comparison with these
studies has to be handled with some caution given the di¤erences with respect to
simulated policies, inequality measures, income concepts and data used. Never-
theless, the policy analyst might gain some insight about the quantitative impact
of tax policy on income inequality. Gramlich et al. (1993) nd that 16 percent of
the increase in the Ginicoe¢ cient in the 1980s was due to changes in policies, yet
it seems these authors account for a broader policy e¤ect that includes transfers.21
21Gramlich et al. (1993) argue that with policy parameters of 1980 still in place in 1990, the
post-tax Gini in 1990 would have increased by only 0.057 points instead of by 0.068 points as
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When focusing on changes in the tax system only, we nd a contribution of the
policy e¤ect of 37 percent to the total change in the Gini.22 This implies that
changes in transfer policies to some extent counteracted the increase in inequality
in that period. Similarly, Poterba (2007) calculates counterfactuals for the years
2000 and 2004. While focusing on top incomes, the author also reports changes
for di¤erent quintiles. Poterba (2007) concludes that policy changes had a very
minor e¤ect compared to changes in pretax income inequality, which is totally in
line with our results (see Table 4).
Comparing e¤ects over time. Finally, we reconsider the questions of rst
how the overall redistributive capacity of the income tax system has changed
and second how reforms over the whole period 19782009 have a¤ected income
inequality in total. Therefore, we go back to Figures 4.6.4, 4.6.6 and 4.6.7 and
focus on measured redistribution (dark triangles) and the pure policy e¤ect (hollow
triangles). For the interpretation of the pure policy e¤ect in Figures 4.6.4, 4.6.6
and 4.6.7, it is important to note that the hollow triangles in each year t show
the cumulative policy e¤ect from starting year 1978 to year t. As discussed in the
introduction and shown in many contributions since Musgrave and Thin (1948), in
a progressive tax system, one would expect a comovement of tax redistribution
(dark triangles) and income inequality before taxes. In other words, given no
changes in the tax system between two periods, a progressive tax system cushions
changes in pretax inequality such that the change in posttax inequality is less
pronounced.23 In Figure 4.6.4, such a link is indeed apparent during periods when
income gaps widened rapidly (19801982, 19891993 and 2009) or narrowed (late
1990s). Importantly, a comparison with the pure policy e¤ect conveys that this
automaticincrease in redistribution has been the main (and sometimes the only)
it actually did, i.e. the policy change accounted for 16 percent of the Gini increase.
22Following the same line of arguing as Gramlich et al. (1993), we nd that with tax policy
parameters of 1980 still in place in 1990, the Gini coe¢ cient would have increased by 0.0303
points instead of the observed rise by 0.0481 points. Thus, according to our calculations, 63
percent of the increase were due to changes in the pre-tax income distribution and 37 percent
due to tax policy.
23This property of a progressive tax system is also known as automatic stabilization (see, e.g.,
Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) or Dolls et al. (2012)). Contrary, with a regressive system the
change in posttax inequality would be larger, whereas changes in preand posttax inequality
would be equal with a proportional system.
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reason for the tax system to slow down the growth in posttax inequality. Policy
changes implemented in 1982, 1987 and the early 2000s were disequalizing, while
the reforms of the late 1970s, early 1990s and 2009 made income taxes more
redistributive. Over the time period as a whole, these direct e¤ects of policy
changes more or less canceled out. The results for the upper and lower parts of
the distribution (Fig. 4.6.6 and 4.6.7) show that the equalizing e¤ect of policy in
the earlytomid 1990s was a result of changes that improved the situation of low
income earners, notably the increased generosity of the EITC. By contrast, from
19821988, policy congurations exacerbated the income gaps in the upper part
of the distribution (between the 90th and the 50th percentile), had the population
and pretax distribution remained unchanged. The (only) reason why the tax
system nevertheless compensated some of the growing pretax income disparities
in the upper income segment is that the builtin progressivity made the tax system
more redistributive as income inequalities grew and this e¤ect was stronger than
the weakening of the redistributive e¤ect produced by policy reforms.
Given the data quality issues discussed in section 4.3, there are good reas-
ons for basing an analysis of longerterm trends on inequality measures that are
not unduly inuenced by measurement errors at the top (or the bottom) of the
distribution. It is nevertheless interesting to compare the results of the decom-
position of interquintile ratios, such as the P90/P10, with more comprehensive
global inequality measures, such as the Gini coe¢ cient. Figure 4.6.8 shows that
the overall patterns are the same: a large increase in pretax income inequality,
increased redistribution which compensates some of this disequalizing e¤ect, and
little contribution of policy changes over the period as a whole. The important
di¤erence, however, is that taxes on incomes were much less able to counter the
increase in pretax inequality (both the policy e¤ect and the total change in redis-
tribution are close to zero and inequality therefore grew by about the same extent
whether measured in preor in posttax terms). The Gini coe¢ cient measures
income di¤erentials in all parts of the distribution and, compared to the P90/P10
ratio, gives (much) more weight to income disparities in the middle. The fact that
redistribution as measured by the Gini coe¢ cient compensated for only about 10
percent of the increase in pretax inequality suggests that the tax system is less
e¤ective at countering changes in the middle (e.g., due to a hollowing outof the
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middle classes), than at either end of the distribution.
Political cycles and inequality changes. We have seen that tax policy indeed
had an inequalityincreasing e¤ect in the 1980s and early 2000s and an inequality
decreasing e¤ect in the early 1990s and in 2009. These sub-periods can be broadly
classied by Republican and Democrat administrations. Our counterfactual sim-
ulations also show that during Republican administrations average tax rates fell
strongest for high income, but very little for low income households (Figure 4.6.9).
This paper therefore complements analyses conducted by Bartels (2008) as the
decomposition analysis enables us to control for changes in the pretax income
distribution and hence to single out the pure policy e¤ect. Bartels (2008) nds
that under Democratic presidents real incomes grew much faster at the bottom
and in the middle of the income distribution compared to Republican Admin-
istrations. He further shows that income growth was also much more equally
distributed under Democratic presidents than under Republicans, where incomes
of the rich increased by far the most. These ndings are also visible in Figures
4.6.24.6.8 where increases in inequality by and large coincide with Republican
presidents. This conrms the view by Krugman (2005) that partisan politics have
a major impact on the income distribution. This is true not only for pretax but
also for posttax incomes.
4.4.3 Robustness checks
Choice of the uprating factor. An interesting question is to what extent our
results depend on the choice of the uprating factor. As a sensitivity check, we
replicate the analysis for the period 19861988 with mean nominal wage growth as
uprating factor.24 The period after TRA86 is appropriate for a robustness check
for two reasons. First, the growth rates of mean nominal wages from 1986 to 1988
exceeded those of the CPI by 74 and 21 percent (6.38 vs. 3.66 percent and 4.93
vs. 4.08 percent), respectively. This was one of the largest di¤erences between
the two indices in the observation period which makes the choice of the uprating
24We choose the National Average Wage Index according to which the taxable maximum for
Social Security is automatically adjusted. See http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/AWI.html
for further information.
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factor a critical decision. Second, income brackets were adjusted due to changes
in tax rates, but not due to indexation. From 1986 to 1987 (1987 to 1988), the
number of tax brackets fell from 15 to 5 (5 to 4), see Table 1.
Results do not change much with nominal wage indexation as can be seen in
Table 3 (lower part). The policy e¤ect is slightly smaller for the Gini and P90/P10
and identical for the other two percentile ratios. Because of the larger growth rates,
scal dragin the counterfactual scenarios (2) and (3) is stronger for wage than
for price indexation as the propensity that taxpayers near the topend of a tax
bracket move in the upper bracket is higher. Hence, the inequalityincreasing
e¤ect of TRA86 is marginally cushioned when uprating with wage growth.
Itemized deductions. As the CPS lacks information with regard to itemized
deductions, we impute them from tax return data compiled by the Statistics of
Income (SOI) division of the IRS. The imputation procedure is based on Alm et al.
(2005) and consists of two steps. First, we calculate for each year and income group
the share of taxpayers who itemize by building 14 income groups in the SOI data
based on adjusted gross income (AGI). We follow Alm et al. (2005) and assume
that there are no itemizers with incomes below $10,000. Corresponding income
groups are constructed in the CPS and taxpayers are randomly drawn such that the
shares of itemizers per income group match between SOI and CPS data. Second,
the amount of itemized deductions is imputed by calculating itemized deductions
as a share of federal AGI in the SOI data and by multiplying this share with the
federal AGI of those who itemize in the CPS. With this adjustment, we rerun all
our calculations.
An important result of this sensitivity check is that posttax inequality slightly
increases. The reason is that the share of itemizers increases by income group, i.e.
it is more likely for taxpayers with high incomes to have itemized deductions ex-
ceeding the standard deduction. As a consequence, the measured redistribution
mechanically decreases as can be seen in Figure 4.6.5.25 The tax policy e¤ect for
25We only report results for the P90/P10 ratio due to space restrictions. Results for other
inequality measures as well as shares of itemizers and itemized deductions relative to adjusted
gross income per income group are available from the authors upon request. The series in
Figure 4.6.5 excludes all years after 2006 as we do not have access to SOI data for more recent
years.
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specic reform periods, however, changes only marginally (if at all) when item-
ized deductions are imputed. An exception is the period 19861988 in which the
share of itemizers decreased. This was due to TRA86 which led to an increase
of the standard deduction and a cut of certain itemized deductions (see Table 1
and Auten, Cilke and Randolph (1992)) limiting to some extent the inequality
increasing e¤ect of TRA86.
Income concept. Our measure of pretax income includes government trans-
fers, e.g. income from welfare (Aid to Families with Dependent Children, AFDC
/ Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, TANF), unemployment benets as
well as Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Alternatively, we have calculated a
variant which excludes transfers from the pretax income measure. In this variant,
pretax income is equal to market income which leads to an increase in pretax
inequality as well as measured redistribution. The reason is that in this case the
di¤erence between preand posttax income includes taxes and transfers. The
tax policy e¤ect, however, is una¤ected by the change in the denition of pretax
income.26
Sample selection. We additionally check if our results are sensitive to the
sample selection and recalculate the analysis for the full CPS sample instead of
focusing on the working-age population. The inequality measures and thus the
other e¤ect slightly deviate from our baseline results, but importantly, the policy
e¤ect is hardly a¤ected.27 The robustness checks thus reinforce that our results
and, in particular the tax policy e¤ect, are not sensitive to the choice of the up-
rating factor, the imputation of itemized deductions, the income concept and the
sample selection.
26It would be interesting to conduct additional simulations of di¤erent transfer policies in order
to single out the joint policy e¤ect of taxes and transfers. However, this would require strong
assumptions mainly with regard to eligibility when conducting policy swaps as there is only
limited information in the CPS data. Therefore, this paper focuses on the redistributive role
of tax policy.
27Results are available from the authors upon request.
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4.5 Conclusion
A question of particular policy relevance is to what extent observed changes in
income inequality can be attributed to direct policy action or to other factors that
are less easily inuenced by policymakers. For any given household, the tax bur-
den has a direct impact on the resources available for consumption. However, the
assessment of trends in the redistributive properties of tax policies is complicated
by the fact that pretax incomes and the population change at the same time as
policy parameters. Since tax burdens depend on both incomes and population
characteristics, a given tax system can become more or less e¤ective at reducing
inequalities, even if policy rules remain unchanged.
In this paper, we have asked how tax policy has a¤ected posttax income
inequality in the U.S. from 1978 to 2009. For this purpose, we have conducted a
set of comprehensive counterfactual simulations by applying on a yearly basis
tax policy parameters of a certain base year to the pretax income distribution
of the end year and vice versa. The decomposition analysis has enabled us to
quantify the direct e¤ect of tax policy on the posttax income distribution. A
main nding of this paper is that the measured redistribution increased over the
whole time period, but this was mainly due to the pronounced increase in pretax
inequality. The direct e¤ects of policy changes almost canceled out. Focusing on
selected time periods, we nd that tax policy indeed had an inequalityincreasing
e¤ect in the 1980s and early 2000s and an inequalitydecreasing e¤ect in the early
1990s and in 2009. These subperiods can be broadly classied by Republican and
Democrat administrations with disequalizing e¤ects observed for the former and
equalizing e¤ects for the latter.
Throughout this paper, we have focused on the direct policy e¤ect and have
neglected behavioral responses to tax policy. This is done on purpose in order to
isolate the pure policy e¤ect the e¤ect which is controlled by the policymaker.
In future research, it would be interesting to separate the residual e¤ect into the
indirect, behavioral policy e¤ect and a population e¤ect. However, we argue that
the latter is more important in the long-run than for the year-to-year analysis that
we have conducted here. Moreover, it would be interesting to further analyze the
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political economy of partisan tax politics.28
Against the background of a sharp increase in inequality resulting from the
Great Recession and in light of the recently reached budget deal between Demo-
crats and Republicans, one crucial question is which groups of American society
will have to bear the scal burden of the budget cuts in the next few years. Our
results have shown that tax cuts enacted in the early 2000s had an inequality-
increasing e¤ect (e.g., without the tax reforms of 2001 and 2003, inequality would
have increased by a quarter less). This suggests that an expiration of the 2001/2003
tax cuts at the end of 2012 would not only lead to increased tax revenue, but also
counteract the recent increase in inequality.
28Cf. chapter 5.
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4.6 Appendix
Table 4.6.1: Tax Legislation
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
In c o m e  Tax
Number of tax brackets* 26 16 16 16 13 14
Lowest individual income tax rate** 14%*** 14%*** 14%*** 13.83%*** 12%*** 11%***
Lowest individual income single tax
bracket
$2,200-$2,700 $2,300-$3,400 $2,300-$3,400 $2,300-$3,400 $2,300-$3,400 $2,300-$3,400
Lowest individual income joint tax
bracket
$3,200-$4200 $3,400-$5500 $3,400-$5,500 $3,400-$5,500 $3,400-$5,500 $3,400-$5,500
Other individual income tax brackets
(percent)*, ****
15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 25,
28, 32, 36, 39, 42, 45,
48, 50, 53, 55, 58, 60,
62, 64, 66, 68, 69,
16, 18, 21, 24, 28,
32 37, 43, 49, 54,
59, 64, 68
16, 18, 21, 24, 28, 32
37, 43, 49, 54, 59, 64,
68
16, 18, 21, 24, 28,
32 37, 43, 49, 54,
59, 64, 68
14, 16, 19, 22, 25,
29, 33, 39, 44, 49
13, 15, 17, 19, 23,
26, 30, 35, 40, 44,
48
Highest individual income tax bracket
rate
70% 70% 70% 70% 50% 50%
Rate on long-term capital gains
40% of individual rate,
maximum 39.875%
40% of individual
rate, maximum 28%
40% of individual
rate, maximum 28%
40% of individual
rate, maximum 20%
40% of individual
rate, maximum 20%
40% of individual
rate, maximum 20%
Rate on dividends  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates
Limitations on personal exemption and
itemized deductions
N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Standard Deduction
$2,200 (single person)
/ $3,200 (married
couple)
$2,300 (single
person) / $3,400
(married couple)
$2,300 (single person)
/ $3,400 (married
couple)
$2,300 (single
person) / $3,400
(married couple)
$2,300 (single
person) / $3,400
(married couple)
$2,300 (single
person) / $3,400
(married couple)
AMT exemption***** $20,000 for joint and
single filers
$20,000 for joint
and single filers
$20,000 for joint and
single filers
$20,000 for joint
and single filers
$30,000 for single
filers, $40,000 for
joint filers
$30,000 for single
filers, $40,000 for
joint filers
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1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Tax c re d its
Child tax credit N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Child and dependent care tax credit
(non-refundable)*****
$400 for each of first 2
dependents, maximum
20% of expenditures
$400 for each of
first 2 dependents,
maximum 20% of
expenditures
$400 for each of first
2 dependents,
maximum 20% of
expenditures
Maximum
expenditure eligible
for credit is $2,400
for one child,
$4,800 for two or
more; maximimum
credit is 20%-30%
of expenditures
Maximum
expenditure eligible
for credit is $2,400
for one child,
$4,800 for two or
more; maximimum
credit is 20%-30%
of expenditures
Maximum
expenditure eligible
for credit is $2,400
for one child,
$4,800 for two or
more; maximimum
credit is 20%-30%
of expenditures
EITC rate and maximum credit 10%, max. $400 10%, max. $500 10%, max. $500 10%, max. $500 10%, max. $500 10%, max. $500
EITC phaseout range and rate $6,000-$10,000,
12.5%
$6,000-$10,000,
12.5%
$6,000-$10,000,
12.5%
$6,000-$10,000,
12.5%
$6,000-$10,000,
12.5%
$6,000-$10,000,
12.5%
So c ia l Se c u rity  [a]
Social Security tax rate (OASDI) [b] 10.1% 10.16% 10.16% 10.7% 10.8% 10.8%
Hospital Insurance tax rate (HI) [c] 2.0% 2.1% 2.1% 2.6% 2.6% 2.6%
OASDI taxable maximum earnings 17,700 22,900 25,900 29,700 32,400 35,700
HI taxable maximum earnings [d] 17,700 22,900 25,900 29,700 32,400 35,700
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
In c o m e  Tax
Number of tax brackets* 15 15 15 5 4 4
Lowest individual income tax rate** 11%*** 11%*** 11%*** 11% 15% 15%
Lowest individual income single tax
bracket
$2,300-$3,400 $2,390-$3,540 $2,480-$3,670 $0-$1,800 $0-$17,850 $0-$18,550
Lowest individual income joint tax
bracket
$3,400-$5,500 $3,540-$5,720 $3,670-$5,940 $0-$3,000 $0-$29,750 $0-$30,950
Other individual income tax brackets
(percent)*, ****
12, 14, 16, 18, 22,
25, 28, 33, 38, 42,
45, 49
12, 14, 16, 18, 22,
25, 28, 33, 38, 42,
45, 49
12, 14, 16, 18, 22,
25, 28, 33, 38, 42,
45, 49
15, 28, 35 28, 33 28, 33
Highest individual income tax bracket
rate
50% 50% 50% 38.5% 28% 28%
Rate on long-term capital gains
40% of individual
rate, maximum
20%
40% of individual
rate, maximum 20%
40% of individual
rate, maximum
20%
Ordinary rates Ordinary rates Ordinary rates
Rate on dividends  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates
Limitations on personal exemption and
itemized deductions
N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Standard Deduction
$2,300 (single
person) / $3,400
(married couple)
$2,400 (single
person) / $3,550
(married couple)
$2,480 (single
person) / $3,670
(married couple)
$2,540 (single
person) / $3,760
(married couple)
$3,000 (single
person) / $5,000
(married couple)
$3,100 (single person)
/ $5,200 (married
couple)
AMT exemption*****
$30,000 for single
filers, $40,000 for
joint filers
$30,000 for single
filers, $40,000 for
joint filers
$30,000 for single
filers, $40,000 for
joint filers
$30,000 for single
filers, $40,000 for
joint filers
$30,000 for single
filers, $40,000 for
joint filers
$30,000 for single
filers, $40,000 for
joint filers
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1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Tax c re d its
Child tax credit N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Child and dependent care tax credit (non-
refundable)*****
Maximum
expenditure eligible
for credit is $2,400
for one child,
$4,800 for two or
more; maximimum
credit is 20%-30%
of expenditures
Maximum
expenditure eligible
for credit is $2,400
for one child,
$4,800 for two or
more; maximimum
credit is 20%-30%
of expenditures
Maximum
expenditure eligible
for credit is $2,400
for one child,
$4,800 for two or
more; maximimum
credit is 20%-30%
of expenditures
Maximum
expenditure eligible
for credit is $2,400
for one child,
$4,800 for two or
more; maximimum
credit is 20%-30%
of expenditures
Maximum
expenditure eligible
for credit is $2,400
for one child,
$4,800 for two or
more; maximimum
credit is 20%-30%
of expenditures
Maximum expenditure
eligible for credit is
$2,400 for one child,
$4,800 for two or
more; maximimum
credit is 20%-30% of
expenditures
EITC rate and maximum credit 10%, max. $500 11%, max. $550 11%, max. $550
14%, max. $851,
indexed for inflation 14%, max. $874 14%, max. $910
EITC phaseout range and rate
$6,000-$10,000,
12.5%
$6,500-$11,000,
12.22%
$6,500-$11,000,
12.22%
$6,920-$15,432,
indexed for
inflation, 10%
$9,840-$18,576,
10%
$10,240-$19,340,
10%
So c ia l Se c u rity  [a]
Social Security tax rate (OASDI) [b] 11.4% 11.4% 11.4% 11.4% 12.12% 12.12%
Hospital Insurance tax rate (HI) [c] 2.6% 2.7% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9%
OASDI taxable maximum earnings 37,800 39,600 42,000 43,800 45,000 48,000
HI taxable maximum earnings [d] 37,800 39,600 42,000 43,800 45,000 48,000
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
In c o m e  Tax
Number of tax brackets* 4 3 3 5 5 5
Lowest individual income tax rate** 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%
Lowest individual income single tax
bracket
$0-$19,450 $0-$20,350 $0-$21,450 $0-$22,100 $0-$22,750 $0-$23,350
Lowest individual income joint tax
bracket
$0-$32,450 $0-$34,000 $0-$35,800 $0-$36,900 $0-$38,000 $0-$39,999
Other individual income tax brackets
(percent)*, ****
28, 33 28 28 28, 31, 36 28, 31, 36 28, 31, 36
Highest individual income tax bracket
rate
28% 31% 31% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6%
Rate on long-term capital gains 28% and 15% 28% and 15% 28% and 15% 28% and 15% 28% and 15% 28% and 15%
Rate on dividends  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates
Limitations on personal exemption and
itemized deductions N.A.
Personal exemption phases
out (PEP) between
$100,000 and $222,500
(single), $150,000 and
$272,500 (joint). Limitation
on itemized deductions
(Pease) for AGI over
$100,000. Thresholds
indexed for inflation
PEP and Pease,
thresholds indexed
for inflation
PEP and Pease,
thresholds indexed
for inflation
PEP and Pease,
thresholds indexed for
inflation
PEP and Pease,
thresholds indexed
for inflation
Standard Deduction
$3,250 (single
person) / $5,450
(married couple)
$3,400 (single person) /
$5,700 (married couple)
$3,600 (single
person) / $6,000
(married couple)
$3,700 (single
person) / $6,200
(married couple)
$3,800 (single person)
/ $6,550 (married
couple)
$3,900 (single
person) / $6,550
(married couple)
AMT exemption*****
$30,000 for single
filers, $40,000 for
joint filers
$30,000 for single filers,
$40,000 for joint filers
$30,000 for single
filers, $40,000 for
joint filers
$30,000 for single
filers, $40,000 for
joint filers
$33,750 for single
filers, $45,000 for
joint filers
$33,750 for single
filers, $45,000 for
joint filers
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Tax c re d its
Child tax credit N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Child and dependent care tax credit (non-
refundable)*****
Maximum
expenditure eligible
for credit is $2,400
for one child, $4,800
for two or more;
maximimum credit is
20%-30% of
expenditures
Maximum expenditure
eligible for credit is $2,400
for one child, $4,800 for
two or more; maximimum
credit is 20%-30% of
expenditures
Maximum
expenditure eligible
for credit is $2,400
for one child, $4,800
for two or more;
maximimum credit is
20%-30% of
expenditures
Maximum
expenditure eligible
for credit is $2,400
for one child, $4,800
for two or more;
maximimum credit is
20%-30% of
expenditures
Maximum expenditure
eligible for credit is
$2,400 for one child,
$4,800 for two or
more; maximimum
credit is 20%-30% of
expenditures
Maximum
expenditure eligible
for credit is $2,400
for one child, $4,800
for two or more;
maximimum credit is
20%-30% of
expenditures
EITC rate and maximum credit 14%, max. $953
One child: 16.7%,
maximum $1,192; two
children: 17.3%, maximum
$1,235
One child: 17.6%,
maximum $1,324;
two children: 18.4%,
maximum $1,384
One child: 18.5%,
maximum $1,434;
two children: 19.5%,
maximum $1,511
No children: 7.65%,
maximum $306; one
child: 26.3%,
maximum $2,038; two
children: 30.0%,
maximum $2,528
No children: 7.65%,
maximum $314; one
child: 34%,
maximum $2,094;
two children: 36%,
maximum $3,110
EITC phaseout range and rate
$10,730-$20,264,
10%
One child/two children:
$11,250-$21,250,
11.93%/12.36%
One child: $11,840-
$22,370, two
children: $11,250-
$21,250,
12.57%/13.14%
One child: $12,200-
$23,050, two
children: $12,200-
$23,050,
13.21%/13.93%
No children: $5,000-
$9,000, one child:
$11,000-$23,755, two
children: $11,000-
$25,296,
7.65%/15.98%/17.68
%
No children: $5,130-
$9,230, one child:
$11,290-$24,396,
two children:
$11,290-$26,673,
7.65%/15.98%/20.2
2%
So c ia l Se c u rity  [a]
Social Security tax rate (OASDI) [b] 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4%
Hospital Insurance tax rate (HI) [c] 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9%
OASDI taxable maximum earnings 51,300 53,400 55,500 57,600 60,600 61,200
HI taxable maximum earnings [d] 51,300 125,000 130,200 135,000 no max. no max.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
In c o m e  Tax
Number of tax brackets* 5 5 5 5 5 5
Lowest individual income tax rate** 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%
Lowest individual income single tax
bracket
$0-$24,000 $0-$24,650 $0-$25,350 $0-$25,750 $0-$26,250 $0-$27,050
Lowest individual income joint tax
bracket
$0-$40,100 $0-$41,200 $0-$42,350 $0-$43,050 $0-$43,850 $0-$45,200
Other individual income tax brackets
(percent)*, ****
28, 31, 36 28, 31, 36 28, 31, 36 28, 31, 36 28, 31, 36 27.5, 30.5, 35.5
Highest individual income tax bracket
rate 39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.10%
Rate on long-term capital gains 28% and 15%
10% for tax payers in
the 15% bracket or
below, 20% for others
10% for tax payers in
the 15% bracket or
below, 20% for others
10% for tax payers in
the 15% bracket or
below, 20% for others
10% for tax payers in
the 15% bracket or
below, 20% for others
10% for tax payers in the
15% bracket or below,
20% for others
Rate on dividends  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates
Limitations on personal exemption and
itemized deductions
PEP and Pease,
thresholds indexed for
inflation
PEP and Pease,
thresholds indexed for
inflation
PEP and Pease,
thresholds indexed for
inflation
PEP and Pease,
thresholds indexed for
inflation
PEP and Pease,
thresholds indexed for
inflation
PEP and Pease,
thresholds indexed for
inflation
Standard Deduction
$4,000 (single person) /
$6,700 (married couple)
$4,150 (single person) /
$6,900 (married couple)
$4,250 (single person) /
$7,100 (married couple)
$4,300 (single person) /
$7,200 (married couple)
$4,400 (single person) /
$7,350 (married couple)
$4,550 (single person) /
$7,600 (married couple)
AMT exemption*****
$33,750 for single filers,
$45,000 for joint filers
$33,750 for single filers,
$45,000 for joint filers
$33,750 for single filers,
$45,000 for joint filers
$33,750 for single filers,
$45,000 for joint filers
$33,750 for single filers,
$45,000 for joint filers
$35,750 for single filers,
$49,000 for joint filers
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Tax c re d its
Child tax credit N.A. $500 (non-refundable) $500 (non-refundable) $500 (non-refundable) $500 (non-refundable)
600$, refundable up to
10% earned income
above $10,000,
threshold indexed for
inflation
Child and dependent care tax credit
(non-refundable)*****
Maximum expenditure
eligible for credit is
$2,400 for one child,
$4,800 for two or more;
maximimum credit is
20%-30% of
expenditures
Maximum expenditure
eligible for credit is
$2,400 for one child,
$4,800 for two or more;
maximimum credit is
20%-30% of
expenditures
Maximum expenditure
eligible for credit is
$2,400 for one child,
$4,800 for two or more;
maximimum credit is
20%-30% of
expenditures
Maximum expenditure
eligible for credit is
$2,400 for one child,
$4,800 for two or more;
maximimum credit is
20%-30% of
expenditures
Maximum expenditure
eligible for credit is
$2,400 for one child,
$4,800 for two or more;
maximimum credit is
20%-30% of
expenditures
Maximum expenditure
eligible for credit is
$2,400 for one child,
$4,800 for two or more;
maximimum credit is
20%-30% of
expenditures
EITC rate and maximum credit
No children: 7.65%,
maximum $323; one
child: 34%, maximum
$2,152; two children:
40%, maximum $3,556
No children: 7.65%,
maximum $332; one
child: 34%, maximum
$2,210; two children:
40%, maximum $3,656
No children: 7.65%,
maximum $341; one
child: 34%, maximum
$2,271; two children:
40%, maximum $3,756
No children: 7.65%,
maximum $347; one
child: 34%, maximum
$2,312; two children:
40%, maximum $3,816
No children: 7.65%,
maximum $353; one
child: 34%, maximum
$2,353; two children:
40%, maximum $3,888
No children: 7.65%,
maximum $364; one
child: 34%, maximum
$2,428; two children:
40%, maximum $4,008
EITC phaseout range and rate
No children: $5,280-
$9,500, one child:
$11,610-$25,078, two
children: $11,610-
$28,495,
7.65%/15.98%/21.06
%
No children: $5,430-
$9,770, one child:
$11,930-$25,650, two
children: $11,930-
$29,290,
7.65%/15.98%/21.06%
No children: $5,570-
$10,030, one child:
$12,260-$26,473, two
children: $12,260-
$30,095,
7.65%/15.98%/21.06%
No children: $5,670-
$10,200, one child:
$12,460-$26,928, two
children: $12,460-
$30,580,
7.65%/15.98%/21.06
%
No children: $5,770-
$10,380, one child:
$12,690-$27,413, two
children: $12,690-
$31,152,
7.65%/15.98%/21.06
%
No children: $5,950-
$10,710, one child:
$13,090-$28,281, two
children: $13,090-
$32,121,
7.65%/15.98%/21.06%
So c ia l Se c u rity  [a]
Social Security tax rate (OASDI) [b] 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4%
Hospital Insurance tax rate (HI) [c] 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9%
OASDI taxable maximum earnings 62,700 65,400 68,400 72,600 76,200 80,400
HI taxable maximum earnings [d] no max. no max. no max. no max. no max. no max.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
In c o m e  Tax
Number of tax brackets* 6 6 6 6 6 6
Lowest individual income tax rate** 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Lowest individual income single tax
bracket $0-$6,000 $0-$7,000 $0-$7,150 $0-$7,300 $0-$7,550 $0-$7,825
Lowest individual income joint tax
bracket
$0-$12,000 $0-$14,000 $0-$14,300 $0-$14,600 $0-$15,100 $0-$15,650
Other individual income tax brackets
(percent)*, **** 15, 27, 30, 35 15, 25, 28, 33 15, 25, 28, 33 15, 25, 28, 33 15, 25, 28, 33 15, 25, 28, 33
Highest individual income tax bracket
rate
38.6% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35%
Rate on long-term capital gains
10% for tax payers in
the 15% bracket or
below, 20% for others
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
5% for taxpayers in
the 15% bracket;
15% for other
brackets
Rate on dividends  = individual rates
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
5% for taxpayers in
the 15% bracket;
15% for other
brackets
Limitations on personal exemption and
itemized deductions
PEP and Pease,
thresholds indexed for
inflation
PEP and Pease,
thresholds indexed for
inflation
PEP and Pease,
thresholds indexed for
inflation
PEP and Pease,
thresholds indexed for
inflation
PEP and Pease limits on
personal exemptions and
itemized deductions
reduced by 1/3,
thresholds indexed for
inflation
PEP and Pease limits
on personal
exemptions and
itemized deductions
reduced by 1/3,
thresholds indexed
for inflation
Standard Deduction
$4,700 (single person) /
$7,850 (married couple)
$4,750 (single person) /
$9,500 (married couple)
$4,850 (single person) /
$9,700 (married couple)
$5,000 (single person) /
$10,000 (married
couple)
$5,150 (single person) /
$10,300 (married
couple)
$5,350 (single
person) / $10,700
(married couple)
AMT exemption*****
$35,750 for single filers,
$49,000 for joint filers
$40,250 for single filers,
$58,000 for joint filers
$40,250 for single filers,
$58,000 for joint filers
$40,250 for single filers,
$58,000 for joint filers
$42,500 for single filers,
$62,550 for joint filers
$44,350 for single
filers, $66,250 for
joint filers
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Tax c re d its
Child tax credit
600$, refundable up to
10% earned income
above $10,350
1,000$, refundable up to
10% earned income
above $10,500
1,000$, refundable up to
15% earned income
above $10,750
1,000$, refundable up
to 15% earned income
above $11,000
1,000$, refundable up to
15% earned income
above $11,300
1,000$, refundable up
to 15% earned
income above
$11,750
Child and dependent care tax credit (non-
refundable)*****
Maximum eligible
expenses are $3,000 for
1 child; $6,000 for 2 or
more; maximum credit is
35% (phasing down to
20% at $15,000 of AGI)
Maximum eligible
expenses are $3,000 for 1
child; $6,000 for 2 or
more; maximum credit is
35% (phasing down to
20% at $15,000 of AGI)
Maximum eligible
expenses are $3,000 for 1
child; $6,000 for 2 or
more; maximum credit is
35% (phasing down to
20% at $15,000 of AGI)
Maximum eligible
expenses are $3,000 for
1 child; $6,000 for 2 or
more; maximum credit
is 35% (phasing down
to 20% at $15,000 of
AGI)
Maximum eligible
expenses are $3,000 for
1 child; $6,000 for 2 or
more; maximum credit is
35% (phasing down to
20% at $15,000 of AGI)
Maximum eligible
expenses are $3,000
for 1 child; $6,000 for
2 or more; maximum
credit is 35%
(phasing down to
20% at $15,000 of
AGI)
EITC rate and maximum credit
No children: 7.65%,
maximum $376; one
child: 34%, maximum
$2,506; two children:
40%, maximum $4,140
No children: 7.65%,
maximum $382; one
child: 34%, maximum
$2,547; two children:
40%, maximum $4,204
No children: 7.65%,
maximum $390; one
child: 34%, maximum
$2,604; two children:
40%, maximum $4,300
No children: 7.65%,
maximum $399; one
child: 34%, maximum
$2,662; two children:
40%, maximum $4,400
No children: 7.65%,
maximum $412; one
child: 34%, maximum
$2,747; two children:
40%, maximum $4,536
No children: 7.65%,
maximum $428; one
child: 34%, maximum
$2,853; two children:
40%, maximum
$4,716
EITC phaseout range and rate
No children: $6,150-
$11,060, one child:
$13,520-$29,201, two
children: $13,520-
$33,178.
Starting/ending points
increased by $1,000 for
joint filers.
7.65%/15.98%/21.06%
No children: $6,240-
$11,230, one child:
$13,730-$29,666, two
children: $13,730-
$33,692. Increased by
$1,000 for joint filers.
7.65%/15.98%/21.06%
No children: $6,390-
$11,490, one child:
$14,040-$30,338, two
children: $14,040-
$34,458. Increased by
$1,000 for joint filers.
7.65%/15.98%/21.06%
No children: $6,530-
$11,750, one child:
$14,370-$31,030, two
children: $14,370-
$35,263. Increased by
$2,000 for joint filers.
7.65%/15.98%/21.06
%
No children: $6,740-
$12,120, one child:
$14,810-$32,001, two
children: $14,810-
$36,348. Increased by
$2,000 for joint filers.
7.65%/15.98%/21.06%
No children: $7,000-
$12,590, one child:
$15,390-$33,241,
two children: $15,390-
$37,783. Increased by
$2,000 for joint filers.
7.65%/15.98%/
21.06%
So c ia l Se c u rity  [a]
Social Security tax rate (OASDI) [b] 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4%
Hospital Insurance tax rate (HI) [c] 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9%
OASDI taxable maximum earnings 84,900 87,000 87,900 90,000 94,200 97,500
HI taxable maximum earnings [d] no max. no max. no max. no max. no max. no max.
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2008 2009 2008 2009
In c o m e  Tax So c ia l Se c u rity  [a]
Number of tax brackets* 6 6 Social Security tax rate (OASDI) 12.4% 12.4%
Lowest individual income
tax rate**
10% 10% Hospital Insurance tax rate (HI) 2.9% 2.9%
Lowest individual income
single tax bracket
$0-$8,025 $0-$8,350 OASDI taxable maximum earnings 102,000 106,800
Lowest individual income
joint tax bracket
$0-$16,050 $0-$16,700 HI taxable maximum earnings no max. no max.
Other individual income tax
brackets (percent)*, **** 15, 25, 28, 33 15, 25, 28, 33 Tax c re d its
Highest individual income
tax bracket rate 35% 35% Child tax credit
1,000$, refundable up to 15%
earned income above $8,500
1,000$, refundable up to 15%
earned income above $3,000
Rate on long-term capital
gains
0% for taxpayers in the 10%
and 15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
0% for taxpayers in the
10% and 15% bracket;
15% for other brackets
Child and dependent care tax
credit (non-refundable)*****
Maximum eligible expenses are
$3,000 for 1 child; $6,000 for
2 or more; maximum credit is
35% (phasing down to 20% at
$15,000 of AGI)
Maximum eligible expenses are
$3,000 for 1 child; $6,000 for 2
or more; maximum credit is 35%
(phasing down to 20% at $15,000
of AGI)
Rate on dividends
0% for taxpayers in the 10%
and 15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
0% for taxpayers in the
10% and 15% bracket;
15% for other brackets
EITC rate and maximum credit
No children: 7.65%, maximum
$438; one child: 34%,
maximum $2,917; two
children: 40%, maximum
$4,824
No children: 7.65%, maximum
$457; one child: 34%, maximum
$3,043; two children: 40%,
maximum $5,028; three children
45%, maximum $5,657
Limitations on personal
exemption and itemized
deductions
PEP and Pease limits on
personal exemptions and
itemized deductions reduced
by 2/3, thresholds indexed
for inflation
PEP and Pease limits on
personal exemptions and
itemized deductions
reduced by 2/3, thresholds
indexed for inflation
EITC phaseout range and rate
Standard Deduction
$5,450 (single person) /
$10,900 (married couple)
$5,700 (single person) /
$11,400 (married couple)
AMT exemption*****
$46,200 for single filers,
$69,950 for joint filers
$46,700 for single filers,
$70,950 for joint filers
No children: $7,470-$13,440, one
child: $16,420-$35,463, two
children: $16,420-$40,295, three
children: $16,420-$43,279.
Increased by $5,000 for joint
filers.
7.65%/15.98%/21.06%/21.06%
No children: $7,160-$12,880,
one child: $15,740-$33,995,
two children: $15,740-
$38,646. Increased by $3,000
(indexed for inflation) for joint
filers. 7.65%/15.98%/21.06%
Notes:
* Married couple filing jointly
** Indexing of income brackets for individual income tax began in 1985 under ERTA81 except for 1987 and 1988 when brackets were not indexed because of rate changes;
Changes in bracket amounts for 1985-1986, 1989-2000, and 2004-2007 occured as a result of indexing for inflation rather than from a change in tax legislation
*** 0% rate existed below these brackets until 1986
**** For years 1988-1990 rate applicable to highest income bracket is not the highest rate: 28% rate is applicable to two income brackets - the highest bracket and a lower one
[a] The taxable maximum for 1979-81 was set by statute; all other amounts were determined under automatic adjustment provisions of the Social Security Act
according to the national average wage index. The tax rate refers to the combined rate for employers and employees.
[b] OASDI: Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance program
[c] HI: Medicare's Hospital Insurance program
[d] The upper limit on earnings subject to HI was repealed by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.
Sources: Tax Policy Center (http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/index.cfm), Social Security Administration (http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/cbb.html
and http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/taxRates.html), last accessed May 2011
***** Not indexed for inflation
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Table 4.6.2: Decomposing changes in income distribution over time
data year: 1978 1978 1980 1978 1980
uprated to: 1980 1980
policy year: 1978 1978 1978 1980 1980
uprated to: 1980 1980
Mean of Mean of
(4)-(2), (3)-(1) (2)-(1), (4)-(3)
Inequality
Gini 29.70 29.70 30.96 29.10 30.38 0.68 -0.58 1.26 -0.60 1.28 -0.59 1.27
P90/P10 4.63 4.63 4.90 4.48 4.78 0.15 -0.12 0.26 -0.15 0.30 -0.13 0.28
P90/P50 1.82 1.82 1.87 1.79 1.84 0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.05
P50/P10 2.54 2.54 2.62 2.50 2.60 0.06 -0.02 0.08 -0.04 0.10 -0.03 0.09
Total
change
Decomposition I Decomposition I I
Shorrocks-Shapley
Decomposition
Tax policy
effect
Other
effect
Tax policy
effect
Other
effect
Tax policy
effect
Other
effect
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(0) (4)-(2) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Measures are based on equivalized income using the square-root of househohld size scale. Gini multiplied by 100. Uprating according the level of price inflation.
data year: 1981 1981 1984 1981 1984
uprated to: 1984 1984
policy year: 1981 1981 1981 1984 1984
uprated to: 1984 1984
Mean of Mean of
(4)-(2), (3)-(1) (2)-(1), (4)-(3)
Inequality
Gini 30.86 30.86 32.30 31.86 33.28 2.42 0.98 1.44 1.00 1.42 0.99 1.43
P90/P10 4.94 4.94 5.46 5.30 5.77 0.83 0.31 0.53 0.36 0.47 0.33 0.50
P90/P50 1.83 1.83 1.90 1.89 1.96 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
P50/P10 2.69 2.69 2.87 2.79 2.95 0.26 0.09 0.17 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.17
Total
change
Decomposition I Decomposition I I
Shorrocks-Shapley
Decomposition
Tax
policy
effect
Other
effect
Tax policy
effect
Other effect
Tax
policy
effect
Other
effect
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(0) (4)-(2) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Measures are based on equivalized income using the square-root of househohld size scale. Gini multiplied by 100. Uprating according the level of price
inflation.
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Table 4.6.3: Decomposing changes in income distribution over time (cont.)
data year: 1986 1986 1988 1986 1988
uprated to: 1988 1988
policy year: 1986 1986 1986 1988 1988
uprated to: 1988 1988
Mean of Mean of
(4)-(2), (3)-(1) (2)-(1), (4)-(3)
Inequality
Gini 33.75 33.75 34.07 34.76 35.09 1.34 1.02 0.32 1.01 0.33 1.02 0.32
P90/P10 5.87 5.87 5.93 5.98 6.02 0.15 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.10 0.05
P90/P50 1.96 1.96 1.98 2.00 2.02 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02
P50/P10 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.99 2.98 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
Total
change
Decomposition I Decomposition I I
Shorrocks-Shapley
Decomposition
Tax
policy
effect
Other
effect
Tax
policy
effect
Other
effect
Tax policy
effect
Other effect
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(0) (4)-(2) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Measures are based on equivalized income using the square-root of househohld size scale. Gini multiplied by 100. Uprating according the level of price inflation.
data year: 1986 1986 1988 1986 1988
uprated to: 1988 1988
policy year: 1986 1986 1986 1988 1988
uprated to: 1988 1988
Mean of Mean of
(4)-(2), (3)-(1) (2)-(1), (4)-(3)
Inequality
Gini 33.75 33.75 34.10 34.72 35.09 1.34 0.99 0.35 0.97 0.37 0.98 0.36
P90/P10 5.87 5.87 5.93 5.96 6.02 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06
P90/P50 1.96 1.96 1.98 2.00 2.02 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02
P50/P10 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.98 2.98 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
Total
change
Decomposition I Decomposition I I
Shorrocks-Shapley
Decomposition
Tax
policy
effect
Other
effect
Tax
policy
effect
Other
effect
Tax policy
effect
Other effect
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(0) (4)-(2) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Measures are based on equivalized income using the square-root of househohld size scale. Gini multiplied by 100. Uprating according to the level of mean
nominal earnings growth.
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Table 4.6.4: Decomposing changes in income distribution over time (cont.)
data year: 1989 1989 1994 1989 1994
uprated to: 1994 1994
policy year: 1989 1989 1989 1994 1994
uprated to: 1994 1994
Mean of Mean of
(4)-(2), (3)-(1) (2)-(1), (4)-(3)
Inequality
Gini 35.38 35.38 37.20 34.69 36.64 1.26 -0.56 1.82 -0.69 1.95 -0.63 1.89
P90/P10 5.87 5.87 6.43 5.61 6.13 0.26 -0.30 0.57 -0.26 0.52 -0.28 0.54
P90/P50 2.02 2.02 2.09 2.01 2.09 0.07 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.07
P50/P10 2.90 2.90 3.07 2.79 2.94 0.03 -0.14 0.17 -0.11 0.15 -0.12 0.16
Total
change
Decomposition I Decomposition I I
Shorrocks-Shapley
Decomposition
Tax
policy
effect
Other
effect
Tax
policy
effect
Other
effect
Tax policy
effect
Other effect
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(0) (4)-(2) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Measures are based on equivalized income using the square-root of househohld size scale. Gini multiplied by 100. Uprating according the level of price inflation.
data year: 2000 2000 2004 2000 2004
uprated to: 2004 2004
policy year: 2000 2000 2000 2004 2004
uprated to: 2004 2004
Mean of Mean of
(4)-(2), (3)-(1) (2)-(1), (4)-(3)
Inequality
Gini 35.86 35.86 37.25 36.12 37.57 1.71 0.32 1.39 0.26 1.45 0.29 1.42
P90/P10 5.53 5.53 5.99 5.61 6.03 0.51 0.04 0.46 0.08 0.43 0.06 0.44
P90/P50 2.05 2.05 2.12 2.08 2.14 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06
P50/P10 2.69 2.69 2.83 2.70 2.82 0.13 -0.01 0.14 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.13
Total
change
Decomposition I Decomposition I I
Shorrocks-Shapley
Decomposition
Tax
policy
effect
Other
effect
Tax
policy
effect
Other
effect
Tax policy
effect
Other effect
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(0) (4)-(2) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Measures are based on equivalized income using the square-root of househohld size scale. Gini multiplied by 100. Uprating according the level of price inflation.
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Figure 4.6.1: Average tax rates 1978-2009
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Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signicant
changes in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER
classication).
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Figure 4.6.2: Trends in market income
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Note: Change in market income (i.e., labor + capital income) relative to base year
1978. Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER classication).
Figure 4.6.3: Income inequality 1978-2009
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Note: The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signicant
changes in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER
classication).
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Figure 4.6.4: Absolute inequality and redistribution trends - 90/10
-1.6
-1.2
-.8
-.4
0
.4
.8
1.2
1.6
2
2.4
2.8
3.2
3.6
A
bs
ol
ut
e 
C
ha
ng
e 
(1
97
8=
0)
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
Pre-tax inequality Post-tax inequality
Measured redistribution Pure policy effect
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Note: The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signicant
changes in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER
classication).
Figure 4.6.5: Absolute inequality and redistribution trends - 90/10 - Imputation of
itemized deductions. 19782006
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Note: The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signicant
changes in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER
classication).
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Figure 4.6.6: Absolute inequality and redistribution trends - 90/50
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Note: The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signicant
changes in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER
classication).
Figure 4.6.7: Absolute inequality and redistribution trends - 50/10
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Note: The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signicant
changes in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER
classication).
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Figure 4.6.8: Absolute inequality and redistribution trends - Gini
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Note: The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signicant
changes in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER
classication).
Figure 4.6.9: Policy e¤ect on average tax rates
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Sourc e: Own c alc ulations  based on IPU MS C PS
Note: The series show the cumulative policy e¤ect on average tax rates in percentage
points. The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signicant
changes in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER
classication).
4.6. APPENDIX 123
Figure 4.6.10: Shapley-value policy and other e¤ects 90/10
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Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: Figure shows direct policy and other e¤ect. Interpretation of policy e¤ect:
Hypothetical percentage change in posttax income inequality compared to the
previous year if only tax parameters, tax base or brackets had changed. Other e¤ect:
Hypothetical percentage change in posttax income inequality compared to the
previous year if only the pretax income distribution had changed, but policy
parameters were xed. The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation
of signicant changes in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession
periods (NBER classication).
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Figure 4.6.11: Shapley-value policy and other e¤ects 90/50
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Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: Figure shows direct policy and other e¤ect, see Figure 8.
Figure 4.6.12: Shapley-value policy and other e¤ects 50/10
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Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: Figure shows direct policy and other e¤ect, see Figure 8.
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Figure 4.6.13: Shapley-value policy and other e¤ects Gini
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Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: Figure shows direct policy and other e¤ect, see Figure 8.
Figure 4.6.14: Shapley-value policy e¤ect
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Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: Figure shows direct policy e¤ect for all three inequality measures, see Figure 8.
Chapter 5
Stabilization, redistribution and
the political cycle in the US
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has shown that US tax reforms and their impact on the
income distribution can be grouped in certain subperiods. The direct e¤ect of tax
policy on income inequality reported in chapter 4 follows the political cycle with
a cushioning (aggravating) e¤ect observed under Democratic (Republican) admin-
istrations. These trends have prompted both US economists as well as political
scientists to emphasize the large impact of partisan politics on the income distri-
bution.1 Given that public debates on income inequality are often ideologically
overloaded, it is important that academic research contributes to a better under-
standing of the forces at work.
The following analysis focuses on the direct link between partisan politics, sta-
bilization and redistribution in the US. We rst show how automatic stabilizers
in the US have developed over the last three decades. We then investigate the
impact of partisan politics on three distinct measures which characterize the sta-
bilizing and redistributive capacity of the income tax system. In particular, we
test the hypothesis if policies enacted by Democratic and Republican administra-
1See e.g. Krugman (2005) or Bartels (2008) who argues that income inequality dramatically
increased under Republican administrations, but was attenuated under Democratic administra-
tions.
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tions signicantly di¤er from each other. We exploit the institutional design that
redistribution in the US occurs both on the federal and the state level and base
our analysis on a thirty year panel of US states. Indeed, tax and progressivity
levels di¤er substantially across states and over time which makes the US states
a suitable laboratory for such an analysis. Furthermore, by now and in contrast
to the majority of European countries, redistribution in the US is mainly achieved
through the tax system and only to a smaller extent by cash transfers.2
We assess to what extent tax levels, automatic stabilizers and inequality are
inuenced by Democratic and Republican governments. Thereby, we use state tax
burdens as a proxy for tax levels, income stabilization coe¢ cients (cf. chapters
2 and 3) as a measure for income insurance and the policy e¤ect on inequality
(cf. chapter 4) as an indicator for the impact of partisan politics on inequality.
While the former two indicators are inuenced by changes in both tax policy and
the pre-tax income distribution, the latter measure is solely a¤ected by policy
changes and thus under direct control of the government. By quantifying the
policy e¤ect on inequality and income stabilization for each state separately, our
analysis contributes to the recent US scal federalism literature which considers
the role of US states in redistribution.3 We then consider the relationship between
the political cycle and our measures for stabilization and redistribution and add
to the literature on partisan e¤ects.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 2, we show
how automatic stabilizers in the US have developed over time. Section 3 briey
reviews the recent literature on scal federalism and state level redistribution in
the US as well as the literature on partisan politics and economic outcomes. In
section 4, we present the data and our empirical approach. Results are discussed
in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2Cf. Blank (2002) and Eissa and Hoynes (2011).
3Cf. Baicker, Clemens and Singhal (2012), Gordon and Cullen (2012), Grant, Koulovatioanos,
Michaelides and Padula (2010) and Hoynes and Luttmer (2011).
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5.2 Automatic Stabilizers in the US, 1978-2010
5.2.1 Overall stabilization
Figure 5.7.1 shows how automatic stabilization of disposable income through the
US income tax system has changed in the period 1978 to 2010. These time series
extend those reported by Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) and Auerbach (2009) to
more recent years and additionally include state level taxes. As a measure for auto-
matic stabilization, we calculate the income stabilization coe¢ cient as described in
chapter 2 and decompose it into its components income and payroll taxes (FICA).
As in chapter 4, we use CPS data and the TAXSIM calculator for our computa-
tions.4 Note that both federal and state level income taxes which are calculated
after credits such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) or child credits are
deducted contribute to overall stabilization. Over the whole time period, average
income stabilization due to the EITC (not shown separately) which was enacted
in 1975 and signicantly expanded in the 1990s is below 1 percent. Interestingly,
the relative importance of the single components in smoothing income shocks has
changed substantially over the observed period. While the role of the federal in-
come tax has decreased, this reduction in the shock absorption capacity of the
tax system has partly been compensated by the growing importance of the payroll
tax. The stabilizing role of state level income taxes has also slightly risen over the
observed period.
Comparing the time series in Figure 5.7.1 to those presented in chapter 4 (Fig-
ures 4.6.44.6.8), one can conclude that tax reforms which caused post-tax inequal-
ity to rise (ERTA81, TRA86, EGTRRA01 and JGTRRA03) weakened automatic
stabilizers whereas the opposite e¤ect can be observed for tax reforms with an
inequality-decreasing e¤ect (RA78, OBRA90 and OBRA93). Changes in tax pro-
gressivity, in particular those caused by declining marginal tax rates in the 1980s
and early 2000s, are a key driver of the reduced stabilizing capacity of the US
4Simulations for the US in chapter 2 were based on the Survey of Consumer Finance. Compared
with the CPS, that survey has richer information with respect to household nances and credit
constraints which are crucial for the estimation of demand stabilization. For an assessment of
the robustness of our results, it is reassuring that in the corresponding year 2007 the level of
income stabilization is almost identical for both data sources.
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federal income tax.5 This trend was only partly moderated in the 1990s when
rising marginal rates increased progressivity and thus strengthened automatic sta-
bilizers. Hence, when the US was hit by the Great Recession at the end of 2007,
automatic stabilizers were at a historically low level which might be one important
explanatory factor for the considerable use of discretionary scal policy in the US
in recent periods (cf. Auerbach (2009)).
5.2.2 State decomposition
Summary statistics of income stabilization coe¢ cients for earch state and for the
whole sample period are shown in Tables 5.7.1 and 5.7.2. As in Figure 5.7.1, overall
income stabilization is decomposed into its components federal and state level
income taxes and social insurance contributions. In fact states only have discretion
over state level income taxes, and these account for the largest part of variation
which is exploited in the subsequent analysis. However, income stabilization by
federal income and payroll taxes also varies across states due to di¤erent income
distributions across states and over time.6 The states levy taxes on income with
varying degrees of progressivity. For example, there is a large heterogeneity across
states with respect to the lowest and highest tax rates, the number and range
of income brackets and the amount of personal exemptions (Tax Policy Center
(2012)). In 2010, the most recent year of our sample, seven states did not levy
taxes on income at all (Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington
and Wyoming) and two states limited taxes to dividends and interest income (New
Hampshire, Tennessee). These are the states which have on average the lowest
level of income stabilization over the sample period whereas those states which
had the highest marginal rates in 2010 (California, Hawaii, New Jersey, Oregon
and Rhode Island all close to 10 per cent) tend to have above average levels
5See Kniesner and Ziliak (2002b) who estimate that ERTA81 and TRA86 reduced consumption
stability by about 50 percent.
6Note that the potential stabilizing e¤ect of sales taxes which di¤er across states could also be
incorporated into the existing framework. However, this would require to shift the focus from
income to demand stabilization which is beyond the scope of this chapter (see chapter 2 for how
consumption taxes can stabilize household consumption). A further challenge would be to deal
with the issue of cross-border shopping as sales taxes are paid at the place of sale rather than
residence.
130 CHAPTER 5. POLITICAL CYCLE
of income stabilization. Other states (Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Massachuesetts,
Michigan, Pennsylvania and Utah) did have a at-rate income tax in 2010 with
tax rates ranging from 3 (Illinois) to 5.3 per cent (Massachusetts). Hawaii and
Missouri were the states with the highest number of income brackets (12) in 2010.
Personal exemptions in 2010 ranged from zero (Colorado and Pennsylvania) to
13,000 dollars for singles and 26,000 dollars for couples in Connecticut. To a large
extent, di¤erences in the total level of income stabilization across states are due
to these variations in state income taxation.
5.3 Literature
One central question in a scal federation is to what extent state and local govern-
ments should engage in redistribution. The traditional view is that redistribution
should occur (mainly) on the federal level as redistributive policies by state and
local governments can be hampered by mobility responses.7 The argument is that
as a response to an increase in taxes in one state, individuals with high wages will
migrate to other states with lower taxes which in turn induces gross wages for their
skill level to rise in the high tax state. As a consequence, net wages are una¤ected
by state tax policy.8 Against this theoretical presumption, the scal federalism
landscape in the US is characterized by a tremendous growth in state budgets
during the last decades and a substantial degree of redistribution taking place on
the state level. There is a growing literature which discusses the rationale for
the greater role of US states in areas such as taxation, health and public welfare.
Changes in intergovernmental interactions such as an incentivization of state own-
source spending by the federal government (Baicker et al. (2012)), negative vertical
externalities on the federal government which o¤set the positive horizontal scal
externalities of state level taxation on other states (Gordon and Cullen (2012))
7See e.g. early scal federalism models by Oates (1972) and Musgrave (1959).
8Feldstein and Wrobel (1998) provide empirical evidence for the US states that gross wages adjust
rapidly after changes in tax policy and hence, net wages cannot be altered by state tax policies.
They conclude that states cannot redistribute incomes and hence for state governments no
trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ ciency exists. Other studies, however, nd much more modest
or even no cross-state migration e¤ects resulting from heterogeneous tax and transfer policies
across states (see e.g. Bakija and Slemrod (2004) and Leigh (2008a)).
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and insurance e¤ects through state taxes and transfers that potentially mitigate
the incentives for mobility (Hoynes and Luttmer (2011) and Grant et al. (2010))
are important explanations for the observed trends in state revenue and spending
patterns.
The second strand of literature to which our study directly relates examines
the relationship between partisan politics, economic policy and macroeconomic
outcomes.9 One critical factor for the identication of partisan e¤ects is the non-
random selection of political parties. For example, the electorate might favor
certain parties depending on the economic conditions which prevail at the election
date or are expected for the future. Hence, an omitted variables problem might
exist due to unmeasured or unobservable voter preferences which can cause a bias
in regressions of party control on economic outcomes. Therefore, depending on
the research design one has to be careful in interpreting any correlations between
partisan politics and economic outcomes as causal.
Di¤erent empirical approaches have been used to overcome the inherent endo-
geneity problems of party control. One strand of the literature tries to establish a
quasi-experimental design by applying the regression-discontinuity (RD) approach
in order to get close to a (hypothetical) setting with randomization of the ruling
political parties. Conducting a randomized experiment based on a RD design in
the context of partisan politics has been introduced by Lee, Moretti and Butler
(2004) and Lee (2008).10 Lee et al. (2004) analyze voting records of Democratic
and Republican members of Congress in the US House of Representatives by ex-
ploiting the institutional design that party control changes sharply at 50 per cent
of the vote share.11 Testing the hypothesis of complete divergence versus partial
convergence of policy choices, the authors nd that the degree of electoral strength
9See e.g. Besley and Case (2003) for a survey on how political institutions in the US states a¤ect
policy outcomes.
10Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010) provide a general discussion of this
identication strategy and illustrate potential applications.
11A quasi-experimental design is established by comparing outcomes for units whose values of
an underlying forcing variable are close - either just above or below - to a pre-determined
threshold. These units are exptected to have similar characteristics in terms of observables,
with the exception of treatment, i.e. those units with values just below the threshold provide
the counterfactual outcome for those units with values just above the threshold. In the setting
in Lee et al. (2004) the units are legislators in the US House and the forcing variable is the
vote share they received.
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does not a¤ect a legislators voting behavior which indicates that voters merely
elect policies.12 Lee (2008) assesses the validity of the RD design in an analysis of
US House elections and shows under which conditions causal inference from this
approach can be as credible as from a randomized experiment. Pettersson-Lidbom
(2008) applies the RD approach to a panel of Swedish local governments and nds
spending and tax levels to be 2-3 per cent higher under leftist governments. Magal-
haes (2011) uses slim majorities in US state lower Houses instead of close elections
as the forcing variable. At the 50 per cent cuto¤, he does not nd a jump in the
state tax level, but conrms a general positive relationship between Democratic
control of the state House and the tax level.
Other studies in this eld rely on panel data methods which are sometimes
combined with instrumental variables estimation techniques. Leigh (2008b) con-
siders close elections of gubernatorial candidates, but does not nd tax levels to be
higher under Democratic Governors.13 Reed (2006) estimates for a 40-year panel
of US states that a 5-year Democrat control of the legislature is associated with a
3-5 percent higher state tax burden compared with a Republican control. In line
with Leigh (2008b), he does not nd a sizeable impact of the political party of
the governor. One feature of the work by Reed (2006) is that he controls for a
large set of state and voter characteristics in order to avoid problems of omitted
variable bias. Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010) suggest that the degree of polit-
ical competition is a further important channel through which tax levels might be
a¤ected. For a panel of US states they nd that stronger political competition is
associated with growth-friendly policy choices including lower taxes.
12In a similar vein, Fredriksson, Wang and Warren (2010) consider the e¤ect of gubernatorial
electoral outcomes on state tax policy and additionally account for governorslame duck terms.
Their results suggest that voters both elect and a¤ect income tax policy.
13Note that Leigh (2008b) also uses the RD design in one of his specications, but with a
wide range of observations around the 50 per cent cut-o¤. This does not make his approach
comparable to those RD studies cited above.
5.4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 133
5.4 Data and methodology
5.4.1 Empirical model
We estimate a set of regressions for the US states as in Reed (2006) and extend his
model with regard to the time period considered as well as the scope of the analysis.
In a rst step, we investigate the partisan e¤ect on the state tax burden and on
automatic stabilization. We follow Reed (2006) and collapse our sample period
into 5-year intervals and build averages for all explanatory variables (i.e. political
party variables and state characteristic variables) for the respective intervals.14 As
Reed (2006) argues the reason for aggregating the data is that economic outcomes
are a¤ected by partisan politics typically with some time lag which might di¤er
across states and time periods. Following this logic, the focus on 5-year aggregates
should reduce the likelihood of specication errors. The dependent variables state
tax burden and income stabilization are measured at the end of each 5-year period
and all political party and state characteristic variables are lagged by one period.
In a second step, we investigate the partisan e¤ect on income inequality. For
this analysis, we rely on the direct policy e¤ect which has been introduced in
chapter 4 for the federal level. We apply the same methodology here for the
state level. Compared with the state tax burden and the income stabilization
coe¢ cient, the policy e¤ect is a more direct measure for the redistributiveness
of the tax system. It isolates changes in inequality induced by tax policy from
those caused by changes in the distribution of pre-tax incomes with the former
representing one important part of institutions and the latter the role of market
forces. We argue that yearly data are the preferred specication for this kind of
analysis as the policy e¤ect is measured in annual changes rather than levels. All
independent variables are again lagged by one period.
Our regression model is based on the baseline specication in Reed (2006) and
includes state and time xed e¤ects:
14In section 5 we check the sensitivity of the results with regard to the choice of time intervals.
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yst = +
P
i i Political Party Variablei;st+
P
i iState Characteristics Variablej;st(5.4.1)
+ Initial Tax Burden + State FE + Time FE + "st
with t = 1983; 1988; :::; 2008 in case of 5-year intervals and t = 1979; 1980; :::; 2008
in case of yearly data. This model is estimated using state tax burden, our meas-
ure of automatic stabilization the income stabilization coe¢ cient and the tax
policy e¤ect on inequality as dependent variable yst.
5.4.2 Data
Summary statistics of the variables used in the subsequent analysis are shown in
Table 5.7.3.15 It updates Table 1 in Reed (2006) to the period 1978-2008 and
extends it by other variables used in our analysis, in particular by the income
stabilization coe¢ cient and the policy e¤ect on di¤erent inequality measures.
State tax burden is the ratio of total state and local tax revenue to state
personal income. The mean of this ratio is slightly larger than 10 per cent in our
sample period. The respective mean value for the income stabilization coe¢ cient
is roughly 33 percent. Contrary to the rst two dependent variables, the policy
e¤ect is measured in annual changes and can be interpreted as the component of
a change in a given inequality measure which is due to changes in tax legislation.
Mean values for the policy e¤ect on the P90/P10 and P50/P10 ratio are negative,
whereas they are positive for the P90/P50 ratio and the Gini. How large is the
policy e¤ect relative to the total change in post-tax inequality? For the P90/P10
ratio, for example, the mean annual change due to changes in tax policy is -
0.004 percentage points. Given an average yearly increase of the P90/P10 ratio of
0.06, the policy e¤ect to a small extent counteracts the increase in pre-tax income
inequality.
We use party control of both the executive and the legislative branch as in-
dicators for the impact of political parties. Democratic (Republican) Legislature
is a dummy variable which is 1 if Democrats (Republicans) control both cham-
15An overview on data sources is given in the Appendix.
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bers of the state legislature with the residual category being split control between
both parties. On average, Democrats controlled both chambers roughly half the
time and Republicans slightly more than a quarter. Democratic Governor is the
political party variable which acccounts for the gubernatorial inuence. Since in
the vast majority of cases the governor is either a Democrat or a Republican, the
residual category can be interpreted as Republican Governor. The ADA variable
is an interest group score for each states US House representatives and senators
and shall control for the voterspolicy preferences which are represented at the
federal level by their states federal legislators. The log of real per capita personal
income (PCPI) is measured in constant 1999 dollars and accounts for income dif-
ferentials across states. The initial tax burden at the beginning of a given time
interval is included in order to account for yardstick competition (Besley and Case
(1995)). Further control variables percent elderly, percent black, percent female,
percent college-ecudated, percent union, population density, farm share, manufac-
turing share are included in our regressions in order to account for state and
voter characteristics. For the sake of comparability, we also follow Reed (2006)
in the selection of states and do not include Alaska, Hawaii, Nebraska, Minnesota
and Wyoming as these states di¤er from the other states in terms of their political
institutions or other core variables used in the analysis. The sample thus includes
45 states.
5.5 Partisan e¤ects
5.5.1 Tax burden and income insurance
Baseline. Regression results are shown in Table 5.7.4. Column (1) is taken from
Reed (2006) (Table 2, Equation C, for the years 1960-2000) while columns (2) and
(3) show estimation results from our thirty-year sample ranging from 1978-2008.
First compare columns (1) and (2) with the state tax burden as dependent vari-
able. The only di¤erence between these models is the time period considered. We
conrm Reeds nding that the state tax burden is signicantly higher if Demo-
crats control both chambers of the state legislature for a period of ve consecutive
years relative to split control. The coe¢ cient on Democratic Legislature albeit
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slightly smaller than in Reeds sample is positive and signicant at the 5%-level.
In both specications, the coe¢ cient on Democratic Legislature is not only
statistically signicant, but also economically important. It implies that state
tax burden would be 0.33 (0.23) percentage points higher after a 5-year period
of Democratic control of the state legislature compared with split control. The
di¤erence between the coe¢ cients for Democratic and Republican Legislature in
columns (1) and (2) indicates that state tax burden would increase by 0.31 (0.29)
percentage points after a switch from Republican to Democratic control of the state
legislature. The estimated partisan control e¤ects should be compared with the
average 5-year change in state tax burden which is 0.19 (0.08) percentage points
in Reeds (our) sample. Thus, in our sample the partisan e¤ect leads to a change
in state tax burden which is almost 4 times as large as the average change. If the
estimated change in tax burden is evaluated relative to its mean value, one can
conclude that the state tax burden would increase by roughly 3% after a switch
from Republican to Democratic control of the state legislature. The null hypothesis
that the coe¢ cient for Democratic Legislature is equal to the one for Republican
Legislature can be rejected in Reeds (our) sample at the 5% (1%) level.
Interestingly, the coe¢ cient on the log of per capita personal income is negative
and signicant at the 5%-level both in Reeds and in our sample. However, it can
be suspected that income is endogenous to taxes which would cause a bias in the
OLS estimate. The issue of endogeneity will be addressed below. The coe¢ cient on
the initial tax burden is larger than zero, but smaller than 1 implying convergence
of tax burdens. With a few exceptions, coe¢ cient estimates for the other control
variables are close to the ones in Reed (2006).
In column (3), we estimate the same model as in (2), but with the income sta-
bilization coe¢ cient instead of state tax burden as dependent variable (cf. Tables
5.7.1 and 5.7.2). The coe¢ cient for Democratic Legislature is positive and stat-
istically signicant at the 1%-level. The di¤erence between the coe¢ cients for
Democratic and Republican Legislature implies that income stabilization would
increase by 0.59 percentage points after a switch from Republican to Democratic
control of the state legislature. This is more than twice as large as the average
change of 0.26 percentage points in income stabilization after a 5-year period.
Relative to its mean value, our estimates imply that income stabilization would
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increase by roughly 2% after a switch from Republican to Democratic control of
the state legislature. The adjusted R-squared of 0.94 is slightly higher than in the
specication with state tax burden as dependent variable.16 The null hypothesis
that the coe¢ cients on Democratic and Republican Legislatures are equal can be
rejected at the 1%-level.
IV estimation. The empirical evidence on the relationship between income and
taxes points to the fact that income is endogenous to taxes.17 Reed (2006) argues
that besides income further state characteristic variables could depend on the state
tax burden and instruments the following variables by their initial values: log of
real PCPI, percent elderly, percent black, percent female, percent college-educated,
percent union, population density, farm share, and manufacturing share.18 How-
ever, Reed (2006) does not report rst-stage summary statistics on the excluded
instruments such as the partial R-squared or the F-statistic which are important
statistics in order to assess if a weak instrument problem might exist (Bound, Jae-
ger and Baker (1995)). We investigate this issue and nd rather low values for
the partial R-squared and the F-statistic in some of the rst-stage regressions (cf.
Table 5.7.5). This indicates that a problem of weak instruments might indeed ex-
ist in this context. Therefore, in all subsequent two-stage least squares regressions
we treat the log of real per-capita income as the only endogenous regressor and
instrument the 5-year averages by their initial values at the beginning of a given
5-year interval.19
How do results change when we account for the potential endogeneity of in-
come? Results of IV-estimations are reported in Table 5.7.6. As can be seen in the
rst two rows, the coe¢ cients on the political party variables change only margin-
ally, if at all. Their signicance level does not change either. The null hypothesis
16The high values for the adjusted R-squared in columns (1)-(3) suggest that the chosen specic-
ation including a broad set of control variables as well as time and state xed e¤ects is able to
explain a large part of the variation in the dependent variable.
17Cf. Saez et al. (2012) for a recent survey of the literature on the elasticity of taxable income.
18More precisely, Reed (2006) instruments the 5-year average of a given state characteristic
variable by its initial value at the beginning of the 5-year interval.
19Note that in a robustness check Reed (2006) reports IV estimation results with the log of real
per-capita personal income as the only endogenous regressor. He nds that results are largely
una¤ected by restricting the set of endogenous regressors to income.
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that the coe¢ cient for Democratic Legislature is equal to the one for Republican
Legislature can be rejected at the 1%-level for the specications shown in columns
(2) and (3). The IV-estimations thus conrm that the e¤ect of partisan politics
on state tax policy measured either by the state tax burden or by income stabil-
ization is substantial. We conrm Reeds nding that the coe¢ cient on income
becomes insignicant in the model with state tax burden as dependent variable
(column (2)) and increases in size in the regression on income stabilization (column
(3)). This points to the fact that the coe¢ cient on income is indeed negatively
biased in the OLS estimation.
Choice of time interval. One obvious concern is how sensitive the results are
with respect to the choice of the time interval. In order to address this question, we
collapse our thirty-year sample into shorter intervals ranging from yearly data to
4-year periods. This increases the number of observations from 270 in our baseline
(Table 5.7.4, column (2) and (3)) up to 1350 when yearly data are considered.
Estimation results for both dependent variables are reported in Table 5.7.7.20 As
before, all right-hand side variables are lagged by one period.
How do results compare with our baseline estimates?21 Across specications we
nd either the negative coe¢ cient on Republican Legislature, the positive coe¢ -
cient on Democratic Legislature or both coe¢ cients to be signicant. Importantly,
this does not change our main conclusion from the previous analyis. The null hy-
pothesis that the coe¢ cient for Democratic Legislature is equal to the one for
Republican Legislature can be rejected irrespective of the choice of the time inter-
val. We nd largest e¤ects for the specication based on yearly data. In this case
both state tax burden and income stabilization are estimated to increase by 5%
relative to their mean value after a switch from Republican to Democratic control
of the state legislature.
20Apart from the time interval, the alternative specications are identical to those reported in
Table 5.7.4. For the sake of brevity, in Table 5.7.7 we only show coe¢ cients for the political
party variables.
21Note that coe¢ cients need to be adjusted such that they reect the same time interval, i.e.
coe¢ cients from the specication with yearly data need to be multiplied by 5, those from the
specication with 2-year intervals by 2.5 and so on.
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5.5.2 Inequality
Compared with the analysis presented in the previous section, we make three
extensions in order to analyze the partisan e¤ect of tax policy on inequality in
more detail. First, we address the impact of federal tax legislation. The tax policy
e¤ect di¤ers from the state tax burden insofar as it is inuenced by both federal
and state level policies while the state tax burden is solely determined at the state
level. To account for tax legislation on the federal level, we include a dummy
variable which takes a value of 1 if there was a Democratic President in a given
year.22 Second, we use additional information in our data indicating if more than
a 50% majority is needed in a state legislature to pass a tax increase. In some
states, either 60%, 67%, or 75% of the seats are needed in both chambers of the
legislature to be able to pass a tax increase.23 We are thus able to exploit a more
narrow measure of control of the state legislature.24 Third, in addition to the
legislative branch we account for the executive branch of the state government in
order to get a more complete picture of the partisan impact on tax policy.
Instead of collapsing the data into 5-year time intervals we use yearly data as
the preferred specication. The reason for this choice is that the policy e¤ect is
measured in annual changes rather than levels.25 All other control variables, again
lagged by one period, correspond to those from the previous analysis. We run
regressions with the tax policy e¤ect on di¤erent inequality measures (P90/P10,
P90/P50, P50/P10, Gini) as dependent variable. This enables us to estimate
the partisan e¤ect on di¤erent parts of the income distribution. Compared with
22The inclusion of this additional covariate comes at the cost that we can only control for three
period xed e¤ects corresponding to the three decades our sample spans, but not for xed
e¤ects for each time point. The reason is that both time controls do no vary across states but
only over time.
23The share of Democratic control of both chambers of a state legislature is 51% according to the
standard measure (cf. Table 5.7.3), but only 46% with the more narrow party control variable
which accounts for the required majority in both chambers to pass a tax increase. The shares
of Republican control are 27% and 24%, respectively.
24Note that with the more narrow measure of party control of the state legislature accounting
for the required majority to pass a tax increase, the residual category regarding the state
legislature is composed of split control and a partisan majority in both chambers which is not
su¢ cient to pass a tax increase.
25As in the previous section, we have experimented with di¤erent time intervals and do not nd
substantial di¤erences across specications.
140 CHAPTER 5. POLITICAL CYCLE
previous studies which usually use total inequality as dependent variable, we are
able to exploit a measure which is under direct control of the government and
which is solely a¤ected by changes in tax legislation.26 The empirical analysis
shall cast light on the question to what extent the policy e¤ect is determined by
Democratic and Republican control of the legislative and executive branch of the
state government as well as by di¤erences in partisan tax policy on the federal
level. Results are reported in Table 5.7.8.
Focus rst on the upper panel of Table 5.7.8 showing regression results with
political party controls for the state legislature and the federal administration. The
rst important result is that the coe¢ cient for Democratic President is negative
and highly signicant irrespective of the inequality measure under consideration.
For example, the coe¢ cient on Democratic President in column (1) implies that
in our sample period federal tax policy by Democratic administrations leads to
an average yearly reduction of the policy e¤ect on the P90/P10 ratio of 0.065
percentage points. This estimate should be compared with an average yearly
increase in this percentile ratio of 0.059 or, alternatively, against an average policy
e¤ect of -0.004 which shows that the e¤ect is also economically large. The partisan
e¤ect gets larger when we additionally account for party control of the legislature.
We nd highly signicant coe¢ cients for Democratic Legislature when the policy
e¤ect on the P90/P10, P50/P10 and on the Gini is the dependent variable. In these
specications we can reject the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients for Democratic and
Republican Legislatures are equal at the 1% level. For example, the coe¢ cient on
Democratic Legislature in the rst column of the upper panel in Table 5.7.8 implies
that on average a Democratic Legislature leads to a reduction of the policy e¤ect
on the P90/P10 ratio of 0.019 percentage points per year. This is almost 5 times
as large as the average policy e¤ect.
Turning next to the lower panel of Table 5.7.8, we nd an additional e¤ect of
the executive branch of the state government on the policy e¤ect holding constant
party control of the state legislature. The coe¢ cient on Democratic Governor is
26Recall that our decomposition analysis introduced in chapter 4 enables us to decompose the
total change in inequality into a component which is the direct consequence of policy changes
(policy e¤ect) and a residual term which captures changes in the pre-tax income distribution
(other e¤ect). In particular, potential migration responses to state income taxes are captured
by the other e¤ect and do not a¤ect the policy e¤ect.
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highly signicant in three out of four specications, but somewhat smaller than
the coe¢ cient on Democratic Legislature. Compared with the upper panel, coef-
cients on Democratic and Republican Legislature and on Democratic President
do not change much indicating that party control of the executive branch indeed
matters for the redistributive e¤ect of state tax policy.27 Our estimates imply that
the policy e¤ect on the P90/P10 ratio is reduced by 0.032 percentage points if
Democrats control both branches of the state government. Relative to its mean
value, a 5-year Democratic control of the state government would lead to a reduc-
tion in post-tax inequality measured by the P90/P10 ratio of approximately 3%.
Adding the e¤ect of a Democratic administration on the federal level to this, the
P90/P10 ratio would be reduced by 9% with policy changes a¤ecting the lower
and the upper half of the distribution contributing each roughly the same share.28
Importantly, these numbers disregard any behavioral responses to changes in
tax legislation which are captured by the other e¤ect in our decomposition ana-
lysis. Taking into account that a change in tax policy induces behavioral responses
and that these indirect e¤ects also impact on the income distribution, one can ar-
gue that the partisan e¤ect would be larger or smaller depending on the empirical
question if these so-called second rounde¤ects work in the same direction as the
direct policy e¤ect or not. Consider the introduction and subsequent expansions
of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) as an illustration of this argument. Our
decomposition analysis in chapter 4 has shown that in years with substantial ex-
pansions of the EITC the direct policy e¤ect was to reduce inequality, in particular
in the lower half of the distribution. Besides these direct e¤ects, the behavioral
reactions such as an increase in participation rates among married couples and
single mothers can be expected to have had a further dampening e¤ect on inequal-
ity. Hence, the total partisan e¤ect which additionally accounts for indirect e¤ects
would be even larger.
27This nding appears to be in contrast with Reed (2006) who does not nd a gubernatorial
e¤ect on the state tax burden.
28The P90/P50 ratio as well as the Gini would be reduced by 4% and the P50/P10 ratio by 5%
if both the federal administration and the state government were controlled by Democrats.
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5.6 Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the relationship between redistribution and the
political cycle in the US for the period 1978-2008. The scal federalism landscape
in the US is characterized by the fact that redistribution through the income tax
system occurs both on the federal as well as the state level. This institutional
framework has enabled us to estimate regressions for a panel of US states with
di¤erent measures of redistribution on the left-hand side and political party vari-
ables on the right-hand side of the regression equation. In line with the literature
on partisan politics and economic outcomes, we have addressed the issue of endo-
geneity of political parties by including a large set of voter and state characteristic
variables in our analysis in order to minimize any bias which might result from
unmeasured voter preferences. We have investigated the impact of partisan polit-
ics on the state tax burden, on income stabilization in case of proportional shocks
to gross income and on the policy e¤ect on inequality. These are distinct meas-
ures for the redistributiveness of the income tax system. State tax burden can be
considered as an indicator for tax levels, income stabilization serves as a proxy for
income insurance, while the policy e¤ect isolates the component of the change in
inequality which directly results from changes in tax legislation.
We nd strong evidence for the hypothesis that tax legislation enacted by
Republican and Democratic governments signicantly di¤ers in terms of its redis-
tributive e¤ect. Our estimations show that the state tax burden (income stabil-
ization) increases by 3-5% (2-5%) after a switch from Republican to Democratic
control of the state legislature. In the analysis on the partisan e¤ects on inequal-
ity, we have argued that a key advantage of our approach compared with previous
studies is that our left-hand side variable isolates the pure policy e¤ect on in-
equality from other changes in the pre-tax income distribution which are beyond
the control of the government such as migration responses after changes in state
income taxes. We are thus able to investigate the intendedimpact of tax policy
on the income distribution. Our results suggest that party control of both the
legislative and the executive branch of state government has a signicant e¤ect
on changes in inequality. Joint control of both branches of the state government
by Democrats leads to a reduction in post-tax inequality of up to 3% relative to
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Republican control. When we additionally consider the e¤ect of federal tax legis-
lation, the e¤ect of Democratic control increases further and ranges, depending on
the inequality measure, between 4-9%.
The analysis of partisan e¤ects on inequality could be extended in several direc-
tions. Firstly, it would be possible to incorporate other state-administered, redis-
tributive instruments besides income taxes in the existing framework, for example
sales taxes and cash benets such as AFDC/TANF and unemployment benets.
Clearly, the inclusion of these policies would give a broader picture with regard
to state level redistribution. However, we believe that our more narrow approach
focusing on the income tax system already gives valuable insights into the political
economy of redistribution in the US and the important impact partisan politics
can have on the income distribution. Secondly, our decomposition analysis allows
us to explore possible interactions between the policy e¤ect and changes in pre-
tax inequality. In this regard, it would be interesting to investigate politicians
reaction functions and whether these have changed over time. Thirdly, one could
decompose the policy e¤ect by disentangling the inuence federal and state level
policies have on income inequality. We intend to pursue these issues in future
research.
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5.7 Appendix:
5.7.1 Results
Figure 5.7.1: Income stabilization coe¢ cient, 1978-2010
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Table 5.7.3: Descriptive statistics, 1978-2008
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Tax Burden 10.46 1.29 7.16 13.71
Income Stabilization 33.21 2.86 25.94 40.28
Policy e¤ect on P90/P10 ratio -0.004 0.069 -0.45 0.32
Policy e¤ect on P90/P50 ratio 0.0009 0.013 -0.05 0.08
Policy e¤ect on P50/P10 ratio -0.003 0.026 -0.018 0.08
Policy e¤ect on Gini 0.01 0.22 -0.62 0.72
Initial Tax Burden 10.54 1.35 7.16 14.90
Democratic Legislature 50.81 46.16 0.00 100.00
Republican Legislature 26.67 39.85 0.00 100.00
Democratic Governor 51.41 42.42 0.00 100.00
Democratic President 36.67 48.21 0.00 100.00
ADA Average 42.40 20.52 3.39 85.82
Log of Real PCPI 3.18 0.21 2.73 3.89
Percent Elderly 11.92 1.71 7.63 17.12
Percent Black 11.94 12.66 0.10 71.02
Percent Female 51.24 0.82 48.74 53.81
Percent College-Educated 11.81 6.63 2.15 36.72
Percent Union 14.67 6.70 3.04 34.44
Population Density 381.15 1360.30 5.43 10061.45
Farm Share 1.21 1.48 -0.03 7.93
Manufacturing Share 13.71 6.13 0.64 32.05
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Table 5.7.4: OLS estimation
(1) Resu lts from Reed (2006), 1960-2000. (2) and (3) Own calcu lations, 1978-2008
(1) (2) (3)
Dep endent variab le Tax Burden Tax Burden Inc. Stab .
Democratic Legislature 0.33** 0.2347** 0.5139***
(2.58) (2 .206) (2 .953)
Republican Legislature 0.02 -0 .0598 -0 .0805
(0.13) (-0 .526) (-0 .398)
ADA score -0 .0021 0.001429 -0 .001679
(-0 .71) (0 .399) (-0 .270)
Log of Real PCPI -1 .7189** -1 .962718** 7.648536***
(-2 .12) (-2 .405) (5 .265)
Percent E lderly -0 .0815 -0 .033183 -0 .056201
(-1 .60) (-0 .861) (-0 .876)
Percent B lack -0 .0766** -0 .037468* -0 .093812**
(-2 .42) (-1 .712) (-2 .282)
Percent Female 0.0263 0.084143 -0 .050752
(1.42) (1 .317) (-0 .506)
Percent College-Educated -0 .0489** -0 .006702 0.008033
(-2 .22) (-0 .262) (0 .149)
Percent Union 0.0174 0.000022 0.041606
(1.10) (0 .000926) (1 .073)
Population Density 0.0075*** 0.004841** -0 .002168
(4.15) (2 .486) (-0 .571)
Farm Share -0 .0718 0.071737 -0 .141870
(0.879) (0 .884) (-0 .923)
Manufacturing Share -0 .0915*** 0.007662 0.017524
(-4 .25) (0 .436) (0 .575)
In itia l Tax Burden 0.4368*** 0.185496*** 0.365933***
(8.28) (2 .970) (3 .012)
Observations 360 270 270
Adjusted R -squared 0.825 0.908 0.940
Pol. Party Hypothesis Test (p-value)* 0.029 0.009 0.007
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (1) is taken from Reed (2006), Table 2, Eq. C . Dep endent variab le is the state tax burden for the p eriod 1960-2000.
Equations (2) and (3) are estim ated for the p eriod 1978-2008. (2) shows resu lts for the sam e model as in (1), but w ith the more
recent sample p eriod . Dep endent variab le in equation (3) is the overall incom e stab ilization co e¢ cient m easured on the state
level. A ll sp ecications include state and tim e xed e¤ects. W ith regard to the p olitica l party contro ls, the residual category is
sp lit contro l o f the state leg islature. *The null hypothesis is that the co e¢ cient for Democratic Legislature is equal to the one for
Republican Legislature.
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Table 5.7.5: Summary statistics from rst-stage regression
Dependent variable Partial R2 F(9,207)
Log of Real PCPI 0.7169 53.01
Percent Elderly 0.3874 12.13
Percent Black 0.5184 10.13
Percent Female 0.3071 7.69
Percent College-Ed. 0.7229 50.90
Percent Union 0.6223 30.24
Pop. Density 0.9058 184.12
Farm Share 0.1667 1.95
Manufact. Share 0.9486 344.68
Notes: First-stage F-statistic is heteroskedasticity-robust.
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Table 5.7.6: 2SLS estimation
(1) Resu lts from Reed (2006), 1960-2000. (2) and (3) Own calcu lations, 1978-2008
(1) (2) (3)
Dep endent variab le Tax Burden Tax Burden Inc. Stab .
Democratic Legislature 0.32** 0.2241** 0.5015***
(2.41) (2 .390) (3 .293)
Republican Legislature -0 .06 -0 .0610 -0 .0819
(-0 .4) (-0 .622) (-0 .461)
ADA score -0 .0012 0.001718 -0 .001342
(-0 .39) (0 .533) (-0 .245)
Log of Real PCPI 0.7806 -0 .252749 9.645108***
(0.78) (-0 .295) (6 .261)
Percent E lderly 0.0887 -0 .041407 -0 .065805
(-1 .57) (-1 .185) (-1 .154)
Percent B lack -0 .0689* -0 .041203** -0 .098173***
(-1 .82) (-2 .043) (-2 .642)
Percent Female 0 .02335 0.090694 -0 .043103
(0.82) (1 .593) (-0 .485)
Percent College-Educated -0 .0546** -0 .017882 -0 .005021
(-2 .09) (-0 .794) (-0 .111)
Percent Union -0 .0219 -0 .005946 0.034639
(-1 .02) (-0 .284) (1 .019)
Population Density 0.0084*** 0.005107*** -0 .001858
(4.49) (2 .967) (-0 .551)
Farm Share -0 .0465* 0.085577 -0 .125709
(-1 .86) (1 .211) (-0 .926)
Manufacturing Share -0 .0592** 0.012356 0.023005
(-2 .40) (0 .765) (0 .868)
In itia l Tax Burden 0.4687*** 0.200358*** 0.383286***
(8.52) (3 .591) (3 .507)
Observations 360 270 270
Adjusted R -squared n.a . 0 .906 0.940
Pol. Party Hypothesis Test (p-value)* 0.012 0.0035 0.0022
Robust z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (1) is taken from Reed (2006), Table 3, Eq. C . Dep endent variab le is the state tax burden for the p eriod 1960-2000.
Equations (2) and (3) are estim ated for the p eriod 1978-2008. (2) shows resu lts for the sam e model as in (1), but w ith the more
recent sample p eriod . Dep endent variab le in equation (3) is the overall incom e stab ilization co e¢ cient m easured on the state
level. In all sp ecications, the 5-year average of rea l p er cap ita incom e is instrum ented by its in itia l va lue at the b eginn ing of the
5-year p eriod . A ll sp ecications include state and tim e xed e¤ects. W ith regard to the p olitica l party contro ls, the residual
category is sp lit contro l o f the state leg islature. *The null hypothesis is that the co e¢ cient for Democratic Legislature is equal to
the one for Republican Legislature.
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Table 5.7.7: Choice of time interval
Tax Burden Inc. Stab. Tax Burden Inc. Stab.
4-year intervals 3-year intervals
Democratic Legisl. 0.13 0.46** 0.13* 0.30*
(1.055) (2.146) (1.660) (1.904)
Republican Legisl. -0.27** -0.02 -0.12* -0.14
(-2.379) (-0.0989) (-1.665) (-0.846)
Observations 315 315 450 450
Adjusted R2 0.896 0.934 0.905 0.940
Pol. Party Hyp. Test (p-value)* 0.0015 0.0475 0.0021 0.0140
Tax Burden Inc. Stab. Tax Burden Inc. Stab.
2-year intervals Yearly data
Democratic Legisl. 0.08 0.26** 0.04 0.16**
(1.374) (2.053) (1.477) (2.080)
Republican Legisl. -0.13** -0.24* -0.06** -0.14*
(-2.496) (-1.826) (-2.050) (-1.930)
Observations 675 675 1350 1350
Adjusted R2 0.914 0.938 0.945 0.945
Pol. Party Hyp. Test (p-value)* 0.0003 0.0013 0.0023 0.0007
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All specications include the same set of state characteristic control variables as well as
time and state xed e¤ects as in our baseline. *The null hypothesis is that the
coe¢ cient for Democratic Legislature is equal to the one for Republican Legislature.
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Table 5.7.8: Partisan e¤ect on inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P90/P10 P90/P50 P50/P10 Gini
Democratic Legislature -0.0192*** -0.0015* -0.0075*** -0.0394***
(-3.630) (-1.660) (-3.170) (-2.704)
Republican Legislature 0.0044 -0.000052 0.0028 0.0241
(0.878) (-0.0562) (1.233) (1.561)
Democratic President -0.0651*** -0.0154*** -0.0124*** -0.2256***
(-11.68) (-14.45) (-5.976) (-12.20)
Observations 1350 1350 1350 1350
Adjusted R2 0.264 0.286 0.140 0.368
Pol. Party Hyp. Test (p-value)* 0.0001 0.1917 0.0001 0.0005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P90/P10 P90/P50 P50/P10 Gini
Democratic Legislature -0.0197*** -0.0015* -0.0077*** -0.0405***
(-3.723) (-1.681) (-3.264) (-2.787)
Republican Legislature 0.0021 -0.0002 0.0018 0.0181
(0.414) (-0.173) (0.793) (1.170)
Democratic Governor -0.0126*** -0.0006 -0.0052*** -0.0327***
(-3.575) (-0.873) (-3.605) (-3.085)
Democratic President -0.0643*** -0.0154*** -0.012*** -0.2234***
(-11.60) (-14.42) (-5.834) (-12.18)
Observations 1350 1350 1350 1350
Adjusted R2 0.270 0.285 0.148 0.372
Pol. Party Hyp. Test (p-value)* 0.0002 0.2217 0.0003 0.0013
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variable is the tax policy e¤ect on a given inequality measure, i.e. the
component of the yearly change in inequality which is due to changes in tax policy. All
equations are estimated for the period 1978-2008 and include state characteristic
control variables as well as state and period xed e¤ects. *The null hypothesis is that
the coe¢ cient for Democratic Legislature is equal to the one for Republican Legislature.
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5.7.2 Data appendix
State political variables. State political variables are from Klarner (2003), as well
as updates available on the State Politics and Policy Web Site.
(http://academic.udayton.edu/SPPQ-TPR/klarner_datapage.html, accessed at Decem-
ber 15th, 2011). ADA Average is from Anderson and Habel (2009) who update the data
initially compiled by Groseclose, Levitt and Snyder (1999).
State economic variables. Data on state Tax Burden is provided by the Tax
Foundation (http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/show/336.html, accessed at Decem-
ber 10th, 2011). Income stabilization coe¢ cients and the series on direct policy e¤ects
result from own calculations based on IPUMS CPS and NBERs TAXSIM model. Data
on state Personal Income, Farm and Manufacturing Share is provided by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
Other state characteristic variables. State characteristics such as percent eld-
erly, percent black, percent female and percent college-educated are based on information
contained in IPUMS CPS. Data on union density is from Hirsch et al. (2001), with up-
dates available on http://unionstats.gsu.edu/MonthlyLaborReviewArticle.htm (accessed
at December 15th, 2011). Population density is provided by the Census Bureau.
Chapter 6
Concluding remarks
The aim of this book was to evaluate the stabilizing and redistributive role of
tax and transfer systems in Europe and the US. In the rst chapter, we briey
introduced the method of counterfactual simulations which is applied throughout
this book. Chapter 2 compared the e¤ectiveness of automatic stabilizers in Europe
and the US to protect households against income losses and to stabilize aggregate
demand. Chapter 3 extended this analysis and asked how much weight European
tax and transfer systems put on di¤erent income groups to insure them against
income shocks. Chapter 4 shifted the focus to the redistributive role of the income
tax system in the US during the last three decades and analyzed the direct e¤ects
of tax policy reforms on the income distribution. In chapter 5, we rst documented
how the strength of automatic stabilizers has changed over time in the US. We
then estimated in a set of panel regressions for the US states partisan e¤ects on
the stabilizing and redistributive capacity of the income tax system.
Our main results and the resulting policy implications can be summarized as
follows:
"How large is the EU-US stabilization gap?"
In case of a proportional income shock, the di¤erence in automatic stabilization
between Europe and the US is not as large as the widely held opinion might suggest.
In particular, especially in Eastern and Southern European countries automatic
stabilizers are below the US level. Comparing income stabilization stemming from
the income tax only and accounting for state income taxes in the US, we nd
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that the US value is even above the European average. When we consider an
asymmetric unemployment shock, however, the picture changes completey and
the EU-US stabilization gap increases substantially. Social transfers account for a
large part of the rise in the stabilization gap.
Our analysis has shown that simple macro indicators for automatic stabiliza-
tion such as revenue or expenditure to GDP ratios or semi-elasticities used by the
OECD can be useful predictors for stabilization of disposable income, but can be
misleading indicators for stabilization of aggregate demand. The reason is that
the latter depends on the prevalence of liquidity constraints. This suggests that in
economic downturns, policy measures aiming at low income housholds which have
a higher probability to be liquidity constrained and thus a higher propensity to
consume should yield higher stabilizing e¤ects than general tax cuts. Our analysis
has abstracted from normative welfare considerations about the optimal size of
automatic stabilization. Increasing the size of automatic stabilizers might have
negative side-e¤ects in terms of e¢ ciency. A potential way to minimize these
costs, however, is to implement discretionary policies that are triggered if certain
economic thresholds are passed.1 A comparison between the size of automatic
stabilizers and discretionary scal policy measures passed during the crisis reveals
that the US compensated weaker automatic stabilizers by a larger scal stimu-
lus, whereas European governments relied more heavily on the workings of auto-
matic stabilizers. The answer to the question which of these approaches proves
to be more e¤ective to provide macroeconomic stability depends on a number of
factors, including how timely and well targeted discretionary policy measures are
as well as on the credibility of subsequent consolidation plans.2 With regard to
the latter point, in an economic upswing automatic stabilizers lead to increased
tax revenue and lower spending on unemployment benets without any policy in-
tervention, whereas delayed exit strategies from discretionary measures may lead
to pro-cyclical scal policy and unsustainable debt accumulation.
"How do European tax and transfer systems protect households at di¤erent
income levels against losses in current income?"
1For example, the Extended Benet program in the US kicks in automatically in states that
meet certain thresholds with regard to the unemplyoment rate. See Baunsgaard and Symansky
(2009) for a discussion on automating the discretionary scal response.
2Cf. Debrun and Kapoor (2010).
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Our ndings indicate that there is very little stabilization of disposable income
for low-income households in some Eastern and Southern European countries.
Given that the marginal benet of an increase in income stabilization is highest
for these households from an insurance point of view, our results suggest that there
is some scope for enhancing automatic stabilizers in these countries.
"To what extent have changes in US tax policy counteracted or accelerated the
rise in income inequality?"
While the redistributive role of the US income tax system has increased over
time due to a dramatic increase in pre-tax income inequality, our decomposition
analysis has shown that policy e¤ects almost cancel out over the whole time period.
Note that our data do not allow us to draw any conclusions with regard to the
top of the income distribution due to topcoding of high incomes in the CPS. This
is insofar a limitation as the rise in inequality was to a large extent driven by
increases in top income shares. Irrespective of this limitation, our results suggest
that inequality also rose at other parts of the distribution and legislative changes in
tax policy counteracted these trends in some periods, but accelarated the increase
in inequality in other periods. Similiar to the analysis in chapters 2 and 3, we have
abstained from making normative statements with regard to the optimal level of
redistribution or inequality. Dening an acceptable level of inequality is ultimately
a challenge the society as a whole needs to decide upon. Our analysis has rather
aimed at identifying the policy impact on inequality in an unbiased manner.
"Are there signicant di¤erences in the stabilizing and redistributive role of the
US income tax system under Democratic and Republican administrations?"
The simple answer to this question is: Yes. More precisely, we show that auto-
matic stabilizers increase by 2-5% after a switch from Republican to Democratic
control of the state government. Considering party control of both the state le-
gislative and executive branch as well as the impact of policy changes enacted on
the federal level, we nd that Democratic control leads to a reduction in post-tax
inequality of 4-9% depending on the inequality measure. In light of the contrasting
proposals of the Democratic and Republican party to reform the federal income
tax system after the federal election in November 2012, our analysis on past tax
policy changes indicates that the implementation of these proposals would have
large, but strongly opposing e¤ects on income inequality.
157
Summing up the main lessons of this book, one can conclude that tax policy
indeed matters for inequality and stabilization. Future research should account
for indirect policy e¤ects through behavioural adjustments and their impact on
redistribution and stabilization. Labor supply responses could provide signicant
supply-side automatic stabilization. Changes in progressive taxation can be sus-
pected to a¤ect rent-seeking activities of top earners which might have contributed
to the surge in top incomes in the last decades. These are only two examples of
potentially important indirect policy e¤ects. Credible empirical identication of
these e¤ects would contribute to advance our knowledge on overall policy e¤ects.
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